Architecture as Crime Control by Katyal, Neal K
Article
Architecture as Crime Control
Neal Kumar Katyall
CONTENTS
I. How ARCHITECTURE CONTROLS CRIME .......................................... 1046
A. Four Architectural Mechanisms ........................... 1048
1. Natural Surveillance ............................................................ 1050
2. Territoriality ........................................................................ 1058
3. Building Comm unity ............................................................ 1062
4. Strengthening Targets .......................................................... 1067
B. Four Constraints on Crime ........................................................ 1071
1. Legal Sanctions .................................................................... 1073
2. Social N orm s ........................................................................ 1074
a. Looking Through Broken Windows ............................... 1078
b. Architecture as Social Expression ................................. 1083
3. Individual Attitudes .............................................................. 1086
4. Perpetration Cost ................................................................ 1089
II. METHODS FOR THE GOVERNMENT To HARNESS ARCHITECTURE ... 1090
A. Government as Builder ............................................................... 1092
1. H ousing ................................................................................ 1092
f Visiting Professor, Yale Law School (2001-2002); Professor of Law, Georgetown
University Law Center. Thanks to workshops at Georgetown, Yale, Fordham, University of
Virginia, and University of Connecticut, and to Bruce Ackerman, Allie Alperovich, Akhil Amar,
Jack Balkin, Rachel Barkow, Sara Beale, Cary Bernstein, Eric Braverman, Dan Capra, Richard
Chused, Andres Duany, Steven Duke, Bob Ellickson, George Fisher, Owen Fiss, Kim Ford-
Mazrui, Ryan Goodman, Karsten Harries, Julie Hilden, John Jeffries, Dan Kahan, Sonia Katyal,
Don Langevoort, Roger Lewis, Raj Nayak, Dan Posner, Estelle Rosen, Jeff Rosen, Joanna Rosen,
Mike Seidman, Nikhil Shanbhag, Kate Stith, Lynn Stout, and Emily Talen.
1039
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1040 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 111: 1039
2. Public Lands ........................................................................ 1095
3. Procurement ........................................................................ 1098
B. Government as Regulator ........................................................... 1100
1. Crime Impact Statements ..................................................... 1101
2. Housing Codes ..................................................................... 1102
3. Zoning .................................................................................. 1108
4. Tort Suits .............................................................................. 1112
5. Contractual Regulation ....................................................... 1116
C. Government as Enforcer ............................................................ 1119
1. Regulation of Places of Crime ............................................. 1119
2. Criminal Regulation of Owners of Places ........................... 1122
3. Criminal Regulation of Perpetrators and Others ............... 1123
a. Crimes Against Neighbors and Networks ..................... 1123
b. Crimes Against Architecture ......................................... 1124
c. Law Enforcement Priorities .......................................... 1125
4. Community Policing ............................................................ 1126
111. SOME RISKS OF ARCHITECTURE ....................................................... 1127
A. Threat to Privacy ........................................................................ 1128
B. Social Control ........................................................................ 1130
C. Geographic Substitution ............................................................. 1133
D. Suboptimal Architecture ............................................................. 1135
IV. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 1137
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
Architecture as Crime Control
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, one of the most important
and underexplored forms of crime control is architecture. Building on work
in architectural theory, this Article demonstrates how additional attention to
cities, neighborhoods, and individual buildings can reduce criminal activity.
In so doing, it considers as "architecture" the full range of activities, from
building design to city planning, with which architects are concerned.
Understanding the relationship between crime and architecture is
especially important as it becomes increasingly clear that conventional law
enforcement methods are, at best, partially effective in the fight against
crime. Over the past century, advances in architecture have far outpaced
those in law; from cranes to bulldozers, plastics to steel, we have developed
sophisticated tools and machines to shape the topography of the land.
Rather than following longstanding precedent, architecture has often
stressed innovation and has been subject to market forces that promote
better and cheaper designs.
This Article seeks to provide an account of effective crime control that
focuses more on architecture and less on conventional methods of law
enforcement. "An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure."'
Architectural solutions can prove more practical than the utopian ideas
often considered when crime control gets interdisciplinary, e.g., better
parenting and families and stronger law enforcement (from the political
right), or more jobs and education (from the political left). These projects,
though worthwhile, are often difficult to accomplish. Architectural
improvements that control crime, in contrast, can be adopted and
implemented locally with real effect. The idea is not to spend more
money-a major impediment to the solutions described above-but to
spend it differently.
Many civilizations have used design to reinforce particular belief
systems.2 Indeed, a standard notion in the emerging field of cyberlaw,
associated most directly with Lawrence Lessig, is that the "architecture" of
the Internet can prevent crime. A focus on architecture might seem to make
unique sense for the Internet: As Lessig observes, the Internet, an artificial
1. [Benjamin Franklin], PA. GAZETTE, Jan. 28-Feb. 4, 1735, at I (discussing fire prevention).
Lady Wootton has also argued strongly in favor of prevention of crime rather than punishment
down the road. BARBARA WOOTrON, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 91-118 (1963); see also
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 (1962) (stating that the Code's primary purpose is "to forbid and
prevent" criminal acts and that the purpose of sentencing is "to prevent the commission of
offenses"). This move, away from treating crime after it happens and toward a view of preventing
crime before it happens, is one familiar to doctors, who often weigh the benefits of preventive
medicine against the costs of treatment. E.g., David L. Sackett et al., Evidence-Based Medicine:
What it is and What it isn't, 312 BRIT. MED. J. 71 (1996).
2. WILLIAM H. ITTELSON ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 1
(1974); LAWRENCE J. VALE, ARCHITECTURE, POWER, AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 3 (1992)
("Throughout history and across the globe, architecture and urban design have been manipulated
in the service of politics.").
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environment, is all architecture (or code) and thus infinitely malleable, at
least in theory.3 Yet the real world may be more amenable to architectural
constraints than the Internet. Architectural changes are far more enduring
than code, which can be hacked instantaneously with potentially permanent
effects. Once the code is cracked, information can be disseminated across
the globe and becomes infinitely copyable. Thus, while the real world does
not consist only of architecture, it can be subject to more lasting
architectural solutions than cyberspace. It is time to reverse-engineer
cyberlaw's insights, and to assess methodically whether changes to the
architecture of our streets and buildings can reduce criminal activity.
Outside of cyberlaw, contemporary legal scholars and government have
not given sufficient attention to architecture, instead thinking primarily
about the effect of legal sanctions on crime, and only incidentally about
how other social institutions affect crime. In recent years, the discussion has
evolved to consider the impact of perpetration cost (the monetary price of
engaging in a particular crime) and the role of social norms.4 An
examination of architecture can supplement this progress, suggesting, for
example, that the high crime rates of inner cities are related to the physical
environment and not simply to the conventional explanations (poverty,
unemployment, poor schools, and the like).
Yet the instinctive reaction of many lawyers is to focus on legal rules,
without thinking about the constraint of physical space. Ironically, even an
architectural problem in crime control-" broken windows" -has
encouraged legal, not architectural, solutions. James Wilson and George
Kelling's classic article argued that physical signs of disorder-typified by
the broken window-prompt further crimes.5 Accordingly, governments
across the country have stepped up law enforcement and prosecution of
minor offenses like vandalism in an attempt to deter these "gateway"
crimes, crimes that are harbingers of more serious ones. A focus on
architecture opens up other possibilities, from shatterproof windows to
subtle barriers that make windows less accessible. Indeed, the very program
on which Wilson and Kelling based their article, the New Jersey Safe
Neighborhoods Act, used design-based strategies, but they went
unmentioned in the article, which had a strictly legal focus.
3. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 4-14 (1999); Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in
Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1009-10, 1038-39 (2001) (discussing architectural
solutions to computer crime). Some economists refer to these types of constraints as "technical."
RICHARD G. LIPSEY & PETER 0. STEINER, ECONOMICS 855-56 (4th ed. 1975).
4. See Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 609, 610-22 (1998) (discussing social norms and crime); Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence's
Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385, 2447-62 (1997) (same); id. at 2416-19, 2434-41 (outlining
perpetration-cost strategies); Katyal, supra note 3, at 1010-11, 1039-42 (same).
5. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood
Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29.
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This Article begins by exploring architectural solutions to crime and
then suggests ways for the government to take a more active role in
architectural design. Part I considers four architectural concepts: increasing
an area's natural surveillance (its visibility and susceptibility to monitoring
by private citizens), introducing territoriality (by demarcating private and
semiprivate spaces), reducing social isolation, and protecting potential
targets. The remaining Section of Part I explores how the practical
application of these concepts prevents crime. While architectural insights
into crime prevention are applicable to almost all structures, readers will
benefit by thinking of a paradigmatic application of the four concepts-a
housing project in an inner city. The project is characterized by high rates
of crime, distrust of police, and few opportunities for seclusion.
Architectural solutions hold out much promise in this setting; unlike law
enforcement, they offer many benefits and few undesirable effects.6
Drawing on extensive theoretical work about deterrence, I explain how
design principles can increase the cost of perpetrating crime, facilitate law
enforcement, promote development of social norms of law-abiding and law-
reinforcing behavior, and shape tastes against crime. Research in
architectural theory and environmental psychology reveals that architects
influence, in subtle ways, the paths by which we live and think. Fast-food
restaurants use hard chairs that quickly grow uncomfortable so that
customers rapidly turn over; elevator designers place the numerals and floor
indicator lights over people's heads so that they avoid eye contact and feel
less crowded; supermarkets have narrow aisles so that customers cannot
easily talk to each other and must focus on the products instead. With
6. Of course, when crime rates are low and law enforcement is working, crime prevention
through architecture might be unnecessary or even unwise, and this point counsels caution in
applying architectural solutions in legislation across the board. Just as law enforcement has veered
toward adopting the same coercive tactics against every criminal, whether a speeding mother or a
murderer, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 1549-51 (2001) (dismissing a
Fourth Amendment suit against a police officer who handcuffed and arrested a mother for failure
to wear a seatbell, threw her into a squad car-one without seatbelts-in front of her children, and
brought her to the police station), solutions based on architecture also run the risk of ignoring
important differences between settings. Not all forms of architecture are created equal, and some
types of architectural prevention may have deleterious effects.
7. ITTELSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 346 (discussing fast-food restaurants); FRANCIS T.
MCANDREW, ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 109 (1993) (discussing elevators); ROBERT
SOMMER, SOCIAL DESIGN 42-45 (1983) [hereinafter SOMMER, SOCIAL DESIGN] (discussing
supermarkets); see also ROBERT SOMMER, PERSONAL SPACE 121 (1969) [hereinafter SOMMER,
PERSONAL SPACE] (providing other examples, such as a cafd that hired an architect to design a
chair that placed "disagreeable pressure upon the spine if occupied for over a few minutes" and
Conrad Hilton's decision to move couches out of hotel lobbies to minimize the number of
lingering visitors).
Products, too, can prevent crime. For example, the government can either punish drunk
drivers after the fact, or it can try to design cars with automatic breathalyzers built into their
ignition systems. It can punish speeders for going substantially above the speed limit, or it can
prevent the construction of cars that go above a certain speed. This Article concentrates on
changes to the architecture of real property, not to the design of personal property. Many of the
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strategies like these, private architects are currently engaging in social
control. Law occasionally harnesses the power of physical space to shape
social norms and uses architecture as an expressive tool to embody certain
commitments. The platform ramps required by the Americans with
Disabilities Act, for example, not only allow access for the disabled, but
also express societal beliefs about discrimination.8
Part II illustrates specific legal mechanisms that facilitate design-based
solutions to crime. Distinguishing among situations where the government
acts as a builder, those where it acts as a civil regulator, and those where it
acts as a criminal enforcer, the Article finds solutions in a variety of legal
fields. When the government builds housing, designs streets, and maintains
parks, attention to architecture can prevent crime. Many housing projects
have acted as invitations to crime; government procurement regulations can
favor structures that act as invitations to community. Attention by
government can also lead to greater awareness of design-based solutions in
the private sector.
Private precautions can also be stimulated directly through government
regulation. For example, if private actors are ignoring crime prevention
through architecture, a jurisdiction might require crime impact statements
before significant housing and commercial developments are built. Zoning
decisions and building codes could also be modified to incorporate
principles of architectural design and crime prevention. Tort suits can
similarly encourage landlords and developers to adopt more effective
design, and these lawsuits can harness the educative power of insurance
companies. In the field of contracts, the law governing lease agreements
could be modified to require landlords to disclose poor architectural
features and local crime rates to prospective tenants. In the field of criminal
law, laws against breaking and entering can be used to protect architecture
directly. Governments can also use nuisance and forfeiture to take over
abandoned buildings and other places where crime festers.
Part III considers some of the problems that arise when governments
employ architecture to prevent crime. Architectural strategies can call for
the creation of extended panopticons, raising the major problem that Michel
Foucault identified with Jeremy Bentham's ideal-an expansion of social
same considerations apply, however, and substantial evidence suggests that product design can
deter crime. For example, the use of caller-ID has been shown to reduce the incidence of
harassing phone calls. See Ronald V. Clarke, Deterring Obscene Phone Callers: Preliminary
Results of the New Jersey Experience, I SECURITY J. 143 (1990). Other evidence suggests that
providing potential victims with alarms that notify the police about domestic violence will reduce
future aggression. See GRAHAM FARRELL & KEN PEASE, ONCE BI-TTEN, TWICE BITTEN: REPEAT
VICTIMISATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIME PREVENTION (Home Office Police Dep't,
London, Crime Prevention Unit Series Paper No. 46, 1993).
8. See JAMES G. SCOTT, ARCHITECTURAL BUILDING CODES 227-96 (1997) (describing
Americans with Disabilities Act provisions that regulate architecture).
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control into all aspects of life. These strategies may also threaten privacy by
opening up spaces to greater public view. Another looming problem
concerns the possible displacement of crime to areas without good design.
These objections are weighty, and there are unique risks to using
architecture as a crime-control method. Understanding the power of
architecture can inform society's resolution of how much and what type of
privacy and social control we want, particularly when those wants weigh
against the effective prevention of crime. Society will inevitably make
architectural choices; much is gained by folding these choices into a
deliberate and transparent legal strategy.
At the outset, I talk a lot about architecture and only a little about law.
This may be odd for a law review article, but the design is intentional.
Focusing on architecture first permits a fuller understanding of how
architectural variables influence human behavior. That understanding, in
turn, informs decisions about how law can best use architecture. The Article
shows how many of our current laws and regulations governing housing
and city planning, in fields that are thought of as entirely separate from
criminal law (such as property, torts, and contracts), can be effectively
harnessed to prevent crime. Architectural considerations should be
integrated into law, not banished into a separate and isolated discipline.
Such integration will underscore a number of theories of American law
that are applicable to architecture. Consider, for example, three prominent
claims in law today: (1) Government can never be "neutral," for its
inaction is tantamount to its action;9 (2) law does not simply change the
"price" of behavior; it shapes tastes because preferences are endogenous; °
and (3) legal solutions that neglect community understandings and social
norms are bound to fail." Architecture has analogues to each claim: (1)
There is no form of neutral architecture, for any choice of architecture is
bound to have externalities that favor certain groups in society; (2) the
design of buildings can shape attitudes and desires; and (3) architecture that
ignores aspects of community is likely to have a destructive effect. This
inquiry into architecture and crime also helps us understand how
architectural considerations can supplement other areas of law, such as torts
(specifically, preventing catastrophic accidents through better design) and
criminal procedure (particularly, informing the question of what types of
places are most likely to engender a reasonable expectation of privacy). 2
9. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 120-23 (1986).
10. See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 126-41 (1987);
Samuel Bowles, Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other
Economic Institutions, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 75, 78-81 (1998).
1I. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991) (arguing that social
norms, not law, constrain much human behavior).
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As a result of this synthesis of law and architecture, not only will we look at
law in new ways, we will look at physical space differently, too. The lens of
expressivist and social norms theories of criminal law will generate new
understandings of architecture and push architects to become more
interdisciplinary as well.
Architecture by itself cannot stop crime, nor can it replace law.
Architectural determinism is dead, for good reason. Nevertheless, its death
should not blind us to the many subtle and important ways in which
architecture alters human behavior, in crime as well as in other areas.
Especially in a world of heterogeneous offenders, government must draw
upon all constraints on crime-law, cost, norms, and architecture-to have
maximum impact.
I. How ARCHITECTURE CONTROLS CRIME
Law enforcement is necessary and important, but even with substantial
improvements, it will not fully succeed in crime prevention. Society lacks
resources to invest in enough prosecutors, police, jails, juries, and judges,
and additional expenditures will receive diminishing returns. Moreover,
even at current rates of enforcement, complaints of civil rights violations,
false arrests, incompetent police officers, and malicious prosecutors plague
the system. 3 Police do not learn about most crimes: Only a little more than
one-third are even reported. 4 Statistics show that law enforcement is only
able to solve one-fifth of all reported crimes. 5 Prisons are notoriously bad
at rehabilitating criminals and sometimes serve as "schools for crime" that
16promote criminal activity.
12. See William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 1265, 1265-70 (1999) (observing how jurisprudential protection for privacy depends on
the type of physical space).
13. As Wilson says, " [ln crime prevention, not too much should be expected of the police."
James Q. Wilson, Dilemmas of Police Administration, 28 PuB. ADMIN. REV. 407,415 (1968); see
also THOMAS A. REPPETTO, RESIDENTIAL CRIME 71 (1974) (" Altering the environment in which
a criminal operates will likely prove a simpler matter than altering the behavior of individual
criminals or the forces which produce criminal populations.").
14. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1999, at 96
tbl.91 (2001), at http:llwww.ojp.usdoj.govfbjslpub/pdf/cvus99.pdf (estimating that 36.3% of
crimes are reported).
15. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES 1999, at 6 (2000) (finding a twenty-one percent clearance rate). Even for the most serious
crime-murder---three to four out of ten cases remain unsolved. See Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov't Mgmt. of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs,
Restructuring and the Dist. of Columbia, 106th Cong. (2001), http://www.wpdc.org/News2001/
0103/010322_statement.htm (statement of Charles H. Ramsey, Chief of Police, Washington, D.C.,
Metropolitan Police Department).
16. See Richard Lowell Nygaard, Is Prison an Appropriate Response to Crime?, 40 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 677 (1996).
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Traditional law enforcement, however, is not the only possible solution.
Architects have suggested that crime can be prevented by manipulating the
design and placement of many simple items, such as doors, bus stops, and
park benches. Today's airports prevent crime by replacing bathroom
entrance doors with right-angle entrances that permit the warning sounds of
crime to travel more freely and that reduce the sense of isolation. 7
Countries throughout the world, such as Australia, Canada, Great Britain,
Japan, and the Netherlands have used architectural design techniques to
prevent crime.' The 2000 Sydney Olympics self-consciously employed
architecture to reduce crime by modifying landscapes, restricting access to
sites, changing parking patterns, and creating visibility around stadiums. 9
Unfortunately, for the past six decades, American criminal law has
focused on the specific characteristics of offenders (such as economic
status, race, age, employment status, and mobility) and has largely ignored
the location of crime.2" But just as individuals can be recidivists, so too can
certain places." In Minneapolis, for example, three percent of locations are
responsible for fifty percent of calls to which police respond, and similar
patterns occur in other cities.22 Such findings come as no surprise to many
Americans, who think in terms of "safe" and "unsafe" areas. Nor are they
17. SOMMER, SOCIAL DESIGN, supra note 7, at 45-49.
18. TIMOTHY CROWE, CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN 8 (2000).
Britain has a "Safe Neighbourhoods Unit" that surveys and makes improvements to lighting and
physical safety. The Mayans used zigzag walls around their residences as mechanisms to deter
intruders, and medieval European cities were built on top of mountains to take advantage of the
natural terrain and to repel invasion. Id. at 83, 212.
19. Police declared planning for the games to be "the single biggest crime prevention project
ever undertaken" in Australia. Paul McKinnon, Olympics 2000, at http://www.aic.gov.aul
conferences/urban/mckinnon.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2001).
20. This focus stands in contrast to earlier studies of criminals, most notably those from the
University of Chicago in the first half of the century. See ROBERT PARK ET AL., THE CITY (1925)
(suggesting that social interaction or its lack is facilitated by particular forms of architecture in
cities and that social organization can have an impact on crime rates); Louis Wirth, Urbanism as a
Way of Life, 44 AM. J. SOC. 1, 15-16 (1938) (making a similar argument). These studies tracked
nineteenth-century French and English criminology, which concentrated on the place of crime as
well. E.g., M.A. QUETELET, A TREATISE ON MAN (New York, Burt Franklin 1842); John Glyde,
Localities of Crime in Suffolk, 19 J. STAT. SOC'Y LONDON 102 (1856).
21. See Michael E. Buerger et al., Defining the "Hot Spots of Crime": Operationalizing
Theoretical Concepts for Field Research, in CRIME AND PLACE 237, 238-40 (John E. Eck &
David Weisburd eds., 1995); Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR.
L. REV. 391, 391 (2000) (arguing that "the structural and cultural organization of neighborhoods
can either facilitate or hinder crime occurrence"); Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Hot Spots of
Predatory Crime: Routine Activities and the Criminology of Place, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 27 (1989);
see also William J. Wilson, Studying Inner-City Social Dislocations: The Challenge of Public
Agenda Research, 56 AM. Soc. REV. 1, 10-11 (1991) (discussing concentration of crime in inner
cities).
22. Lawrence W. Sherman, Hot Spots of Crime and Criminal Careers of Places, in CRIME
AND PLACE, supra note 21, at 35, 36. Studies of cities such as Houston and Akron support this
finding. See C. RAY JEFFERY, CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN 195 (rev.
ed. 1977); see also WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE 54-55 (1990) (making a
similar claim for neighborhoods in other cities).
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a surprise to police officers, who have been using pin maps for decades to
plot out dangerous locations.23
It is not only in particular areas, but also in particular types of
buildings, that crime is more likely. Convenience stores are often selected
for robbery because they are located near major roads but tend to be too far
away from the roads to be seen by passersby.24 Burglaries are much less
likely in buildings where residents remain home during the day.25 And I
soon discuss high-rises, which have much more crime than other
buildings.26
A. Four Architectural Mechanisms
Some architects have outlined mechanisms for crime prevention
through principles of design." This emerging field is known as "Crime
Prevention Through Environmental Design" (CPTED). CPTED
mechanisms are not well understood by all designers and builders. Many
ignore crime prevention because their clients are wealthy enough to afford
special protection, from burglar alarms to doorpersons.28 The federal
government also lacks regulations for crime prevention in housing project
design.29 Nevertheless, an extensive review of the architectural literature
reveals four basic concepts. Design should: (1) create opportunities for
natural surveillance by residents, neighbors, and bystanders; (2) instill a
sense of territoriality so that residents develop proprietary attitudes and
23. J. Thomas McEwen & Faye S. Taxman, Applications of Computer Mapping to Police
Operations, in CRIME AND PLACE, supra note 21, at 259, 260.
24. MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME 17-18
(1990); JEFFERY, supra note 22, at 205; Dennis C. Duffala, Convenience Stores, Armed Robbery,
and Physical Environmental Features, 20 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 227 (1976).
25. REPPETrO, supra note 13, at 48-49.
26. OSCAR NEWMAN, DEFENSIBLE SPACE 191 (1972) (stating that high-rise buildings have
"seven and a half times as much vandalism, robberies, and arrests of loitering drug addicts");
infra text accompanying notes 97-99, 200-206.
27. SCHLOMO ANGEL, DISCOURAGING CRIME THROUGH CITY PLANNING 7-15 (Ctr. for
Planning & Dev. Research, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Working Paper No. 75, 1968) (outlining
crime prevention concepts); CROWE, supra note 18, at 36-38 (same); NEWMAN, supra note 26, at
9, 50; Stephanie W. Greenberg et al., Safety in Urban Neighborhoods: A Comparison of Physical
Characteristics and Informal Territorial Control in High and Low Crime Neighborhoods, 5
POPULATION & ENv'T 141 (1982); Roger K. Lewis, Defensive Notion: Using Environment To
Ward Off Crime in Neighborhoods, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 1996, at F1.
28. NEWMAN, supra note 26, at 116. Commercial architects do not generally incorporate
these techniques into their design. MARY S. SMITH, CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH
ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN IN PARKING FACILITIES (Nat'l Inst. of Justice, Research in Brief, Apr.
1996), http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles/cptedpkg.txt ("Many parking facilities lack CPTED design
features becausL most property owners and architects are not familiar with the basic principles of
design concepts for crime prevention.").
29. Interview with Lawanda Young, Policy Director, Office of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Public and Assisted Housing Delivery, Department of Housing and Urban
Development, in Washington, D.C. (June 12, 2001).
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outsiders feel deterred from entering a private space; (3) build communities
and avoid social isolation; and (4) protect targets of crime.
These four goals often work in synergy so that, for example, natural
surveillance is most effective when social isolation is minimized and when
design delays the perpetration of crime. But the goals can conflict with each
other. A theoretical and practical understanding of how each goal helps
prevent crime illuminates the choice about which goals should take
precedence. As the architectural literature is, generally speaking,
unsystematic and soft, an interdisciplinary legal perspective can clarify the
tensions and synergies among the goals.
This choice among competing goals is a small illustration of a larger
point in architectural design: A one-size-fits-all approach is destined to fail.
Effective prevention of crime through architecture involves working
through tradeoffs among operability, aesthetics, crime prevention, and other
goals. Therefore, design principles for architecture and crime control cannot
be divorced from the context in which they are applied and must be
malleable enough to adapt to a variety of circumstances." Like good police
officers and prosecutors, skilled architects examine the innate functions of
an existing area to see what is already working before they act.
Accordingly, they recognize that effective design requires input by the
community. Without such input, security features are likely to be resented,
taken down, or evaded (consider the "security" doors propped open on
campuses today).3 As we proceed through the four principles, they must be
understood as general aims of architecture rather than concrete precepts to
be applied rigidly.
30. RICHARD A. GARDINER, DESiGN FOR SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS 55 (1978); JANE JACOBS,
THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 6, 14 (1961); Steve Kuckuk, Frank Lloyd
Wright Quotes, at http://www.usonia.comnfllw.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2001) ("I never design
a building before I've seen the site and met the people who will be using it.").
31. RALPH B. TAYLOR& ADELE V. HARRELL, PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT AND CRIME 11-12
(Nat'l Inst. of Justice, Research Report, May 1996) (" [T]he crime-preventive benefits of changes
in layout appear to weaken as community mobilization wanes."). For example, Bridgeport,
Connecticut, erected concrete barriers near its highways to prevent individuals from driving
quickly into the city to buy drugs. Police believed that the strategy would deter crime because
buyers would fear "driving all over looped streets, stopping and turning around, trying to find
drugs with the possibility of having their nice cars, their jewelry, their money ripped off as they
look." Bridgeport Proposes Blocking Off Streets To Cut Drug Buyers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1992,
at Al; see Judith Gaines, Bridgeport Erects Barriers to Drug Trade, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 15,
1992, at 45, 1992 WL 4201483; To Stop Drug Sales, Bridgeport Barricades Its Streets, N.Y.
TIMES, May 18, 1993, at B5. As a result, drug sales dropped markedly, burglaries went down
from 600 per year to fewer than 100, robberies from 300 to 25, and the murder rate was cut in
half. Rick Hampson, Crime Is Down; Barricades Too: Conn. City's Decision Has Its Critics,
USA TODAY, Mar. 11, 1998, at 3A.
Bridgeport took the barriers down, however, because they were ugly and residents were not
pleased with them. See id.; see also David M. Halbfinger, Bridgeport Removing Barriers That
Slowed Crime but Marred Streets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1998, at BI (quoting architect Oscar
Newman as saying that Bridgeport implemented barriers on the cheap that "look[ed] so ugly that
people turn[ed] against them").
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1. Natural Surveillance
Natural surveillance refers to the use of architecture to create spaces
that are easily viewed by residents, neighbors, and bystanders. The most
famous exponent of this approach was Jane Jacobs, who reasoned that
"eyes on the street" would deter crime. Jacobs's goal was to investigate
why crime rates differed among cities. She discarded the conventional
theories of architecture and crime, such as those contending that building
more public housing would prevent crime. Instead, she emphasized the
density and diversity of city life.32
Jacobs argued that if people could be brought out onto city streets, the
crime rate would drop. She suggested, for example, that a house near a bar
is much safer than one in a remote part of the countryside or city.33 The bar
attracts crowds whose presence and powers of observation may deter crime
and draw attention, inducing those shopkeepers and residents who live
nearby to watch the activity on the street more often. The bar also has a
strong profit incentive to make sure that the area is safe for its customers,
and the possibility of encounters between perpetrators and members of the
general public may create enough uncertainty to make planning of crimes
difficult.'
Private individuals are responsible for the majority of crime prevention.
Yet much legal scholarship focuses on entities of the state, forgetting that
the public peace-the sidewalk and street peace--of cities is not
kept primarily by the police, necessary as police are. It is kept
primarily by an intricate, almost unconscious, network of voluntary
32. This lesson was one that great city planners such as Ebenezer Howard and Le Corbusier
had ignored. JACOBS, supra note 30, at 3-5, 19-25; see also CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH
HOUSING DESIGN 21 (Paul Stollard ed., 1991). Revitalizing city life is a central goal of architects
today. E.g., Gottfried Boehm, Pritzker Prize to Boehm, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 18, 1986, at 20
("I think the future of architecture does not lie so much in continuing to fill up the landscape as in
bringing back life and order to our cities and towns.").
33. JACOBS, supra note 30, at 37. But see MALCOLM RAMSAY, CITY-CENTRE CRIME 25-26
(Home Office, London, Research and Planning Unit Paper No. 10, 1982) (arguing that pubs can
increase crime rates); Dennis W. Roncek & Ralph Bell, Bars, Blocks, and Crimes, II J. ENVTL.
SYs. 35, 44 (1981) (finding that each additional bar on a residential block is correlated, on
average, with four additional crimes on that block).
34. JACOBS, supra note 30, at 54; see also FLOYD J. FOWLER, JR., ET AL., REDUCING
RESIDENTIAL CRIME AND FEAR: THE HARTFORD NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME PREVENTION
PROGRAM 2 (1979) ("Neighborhoods in which residents are out-of-doors, where surveillance is
easy... are less attractive to offenders."); Robert Hanna, Awareness, in HANDBOOK OF LOSS
PREVENTION AND CRIME PREVENTION 88 (Lawrence J. Fennelly ed., 1996) (explaining that
"watchers" can reduce crime).
Jacobs's observation is one instance of the great sociologist Erving Goffman's more general
point that order can be created out of temporary and spontaneous social interactions. ERVING
GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC PLACES 4, 8, 243-46 (1963) [hereinafter GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOR];
ERVNG GOFFMAN, INTERACTION RITUAL 1-3 (1967) [hereinafter GOFFMAN, INTERACTION
RITUAL].
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controls and standards among the people themselves, and enforced
by the people themselves. In some city areas-older public housing
projects and streets with very high population turnover are often
conspicuous examples-the keeping of public sidewalk law and
order is left almost entirely to the police and special guards. Such
places are jungles. No amount of police can enforce civilization
where the normal, casual enforcement of it has broken down."
Such reasoning suggests that architecture should capitalize on public-
regarding norms and encourage individuals to be involved in their
communities.
Empirical studies of burglary confirm that the surveillability of an area
is a major predictor of its crime rate. Crimes at universities are more likely
to occur in places with poor visibility, large bushes, and no buildings across
the street. 6 Damage to bus seats in London is higher on upper decks of
buses than on lower decks, and higher in back seats than in front ones, due
to lower visibility in those locations.3
7 Interviews with lawbreakers reveal
that "robbers are very conscious of architectural features" and that favorite
locations "are the narrow and enclosed pathways where visibility is poor
and witnesses nonexistent." 31
35. JACOBS, supra note 30, at 31-32.
36. Thomas J. Molumby, Patterns of Crime in a University Housing Project, 20 AM. BEHAV.
Sci. 247 (1976); see also JOHN E. CONKLIN, ROBBERY AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 91
(1972) ("Even professionals who rob commercial establishments shield themselves from public
view while in the place of business, picking a store that is set back from the street or standing in a
position inside the store where they cannot be seen from outside."); CRIME PREVENTION
THROUGH HOUSING DESIGN, supra note 32, at 8 (presenting an empirical study finding that
targets "were chosen partly because of the potential reward they may offer and because they were
not occupied, but mostly because they could be easily approached without the burglar being
seen"); Richard Block & Carolyn Rebecca Block, The Bronx and Chicago: Street Robbery in the
Environs of Rapid Transit Stations, in ANALYZING CRIME PATTERNS 137, 146-48 (Victor
Goldsmith et al. eds., 2000) (studying street robbery in the Bronx and Chicago and finding that the
crime rate peaked in areas with low natural surveillance).
37. PATRICIA MAYHEW ET AL., CRIME AS OPPORTUNITY (Home Office, London, Research
Study No. 34, 1976). Similarly, those buses with only one operator had a rate of vandalism that
was twenty times higher than those with additional operators. Id. American evidence shows that
crimes are more likely on the New York subways when ridership is low. See R. Lance Shotland &
Lynne I. Goodstein, The Role of Bystanders in Crime Control, 40 J. Soc. ISSUES 9, 18 (1984).
38. Sally E. Merry, Defensible Space Undefended: Social Factors in Crime Control Through
Environmental Design, 16 URB. AFF. Q. 397, 416 (1981); see also id. ("All agreed that the
playground was a poor place to rob people because it is too visible.... Robbers also take into
account the number of people around."). In one study, a sample group of over 100 convicted
burglars was shown videotape recordings of thirty-six dwellings, recorded in a manner meant to
simulate the observations that a passerby might be able to make from the street. The researchers
encouraged the offenders to "think aloud" while considering the videotapes, and the verbal
responses were recorded and analyzed. The results indicated that houses offering significant
"cover" were more desirable targets. For example, eighty-four percent thought that a detached
house, "well covered by trees and bushes," was an acceptable target. In addition, burglars
"argued that almost any obstruction, no matter how narrow, might be sufficient to break up their
outline thereby making them less visible." TREVOR BENNETr & RICHARD WRIGHT, BURGLARS
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There are three principal mechanisms that can be used to facilitate
natural surveillance: diversity of building use, building design, and lighting.
Diversity of Use. Jacobs argued that diversity of use would bring people
outdoors and increase natural surveillance. To generate adequate diversity,
each city district should serve more than one primary function, and each
function should occur during a different time of day so that there is some
consistency in population throughout the day.39 To plan for diversity, a city
cannot simply add a few incentives for businesses to operate in a particular
locale; rather, it must cultivate the type of residents who work in harmony
with the character of a given city district.' Such cultivation requires an
understanding of the primary uses of city districts and aggressive matching
of those uses with incentives for secondary uses. Generic plans for inner-
city development, such as central business districts and civic centers, tend
to ignore local conditions in lieu of wide-eyed hopes of generating massive
changes to areas.4 In addition to large-scale planning, municipal housing
decisions, from zoning to permits for new construction, could be redesigned
to enhance diversity instead of eliminating it.42
Building Design. Jacobs's views on city planning are of course
expensive and difficult to carry out all at once. In the forty years since the
publication of her book, architects have experimented with many designs
that alter individual buildings to enhance natural surveillance at lower cost.
Here are a few examples: adding additional windows and placing them in
high-traffic areas that look out onto public spaces;43 installing centralized
ON BURGLARY 58-62 (1984); see also GOTrFREDSON & HIRSCHI, supra note 24, at 25-26
(reporting similar findings).
39. JACOBS, supra note 30, at 150-51. More recent evidence also suggests that changing the
way city blocks are laid out can decrease crime and the fear of crime. DONALD APPLEYARD ET
AL., LIVABLE STREETS 245-48 (1981); TAYLOR & HARRELL, supra note 31, at 7-10. In addition,
landmark preservation laws can serve to increase natural surveillance and community bonds. See
JESSICA L. DARRABY, ART, ARTIFACT, AND ARCHITECTURE LAW § 14.02, at 14-13 to -20 (1995)
(discussing federal historic preservation laws); JACOBS, supra note 30, at 252; Carol M. Rose,
Preservation and Community: New Directions in the Law of Historic Preservation, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 473 (1981) (arguing that such laws increase social ties in a community).
40. JACOBS, supra note 30, at 152, 158. A separate study of villages and census districts in
England has confirmed Jacobs's intuition that diversity of use leads to greater surveillance. See
JOANNA SHAPLAND & JON VAGG, POLICING BY THE PUBLIC 23 (1988). The study found, for
example, that in mixed-use neighborhoods, small businesses served as "watchers" and focal
points for communication about crime, leading the authors of the study to criticize single-use
zoning. Id. at 70-72.
41. JACOBS, supra note 30, at 162-69, 172, 402-03. Examples of urban design proposals to
reduce crime include Nashville's Shelby Safewalk and Boston's Greenway project. See Michael
Leccese, Urban Experiment, 85 LANDSCAPE ARCHITECTURE 22, 22 (1995) (discussing
Nashville's project); J. William Thompson, Banking on a River, 85 LANDSCAPE ARCHITECTURE
50, 55 (1998) (finding that the Charles River Greenway has become safer as more people use it).
42. It could be argued, however, that some forms of diversity might increase crime, as
evidence suggests that crime occurs because of relative disparities in wealth. See ROBERT K.
MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 234-35 (rev. ed. 1965).
43. Windows should be placed in areas that look out onto streets, and particularly in high-use
areas, such as the kitchen. The American architect Christopher Alexander suggests creating
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air conditioning to eliminate the need for clunky window units that block
natural surveillance;" leaving hallway corridors and alleys topologically
smooth to facilitate their visibility;45 setting buildings against each other so
that neighbors can watch others across a street or courtyard; using cul-de-
sacs to facilitate natural surveillance in the fronts of buildings;' building
front stoops and porches; and returning to World War I1 "three-generation
style" housing (in which houses had a separate apartment underneath them
that facilitated monitoring and reciprocal interactions).
47
Consider the placement of lobbies in apartment buildings. Elevator
lobbies that are far from the building entrance and the street, or those that
are reached only after passing through a series of corridors, reduce natural
surveillance. When indispensable tasks, such as waiting for an elevator and
receiving mail, are not observable to passersby and other residents, crime
can increase. A comparison of two housing projects in the Bronx, one with
a visible lobby and one without, revealed that the project with a visible
lobby had a crime rate thirty-three percent below the New York City
average while the other had a rate that was fifty-two percent higher than the
average.48
To illustrate these concepts, I have sketched out two drawings of a high
school. 9 The first shows the configuration of a school before crime
prevention principles are applied:
"window places" -interior seats near windows-that direct the gaze outward. CHRISTOPHER
ALEXANDER ET AL., A PATTERN LANGUAGE 837 (1977).
44. CROWE, supra note 18, at 54.
45. This technique has been used to reduce crime in housing projects. NEWMAN, supra note
26, at 95. It is also not surprising that many inexpensive motels use such architecture when
constructing their buildings.
46. The closed-off space can also facilitate territoriality and the use of common space for
interaction and development. However, cul-de-sacs permit easier access in the back of buildings,
which is why technological developments such as strong doors and powerful lighting provide
greater benefits in those spaces. CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH HOUSING DESIGN, supra note 32,
at 66.
47. CROWE, supra note 18, at 57.
48. Id. at 87. The two projects are Bronxdale Houses and Edenwald Houses.
49. These drawings build on the important work of Crowe. See CROWE, supra note 18, at
187-88.
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The informal areas are blocked from sight and far from school grounds.
Because no central place for congregation exists, students are spread over
the grounds, and there is insufficient density for monitoring. The four open
entrances and exits facilitate access to the school and escape.
Now envision a redrawn plan, where formal gathering areas are
designated:
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Student Parking
Through the designation of formal gathering areas, other places become
subtly off-limits to students. Indeed, those who are present in such areas are
likely to attract suspicion. And because the formal gathering areas are
naturally surveilled by building users (now sixty or eighty feet away, not
hundreds of feet), teachers and others inside the building can monitor those
outside. The gathering areas are long and thin, running alongside the school
windows, and two hedges prevent students from going farther away.
Moreover, the west entrance, which had the least potential for natural
surveillance, has been closed, thereby reducing access. Broward County,
Florida, adopted an extensive crime prevention program in its schools based
on these principles.5 0 Convenience stores have also used these architectural
ideas to halve losses from theft and robbery." They have moved parking
50. Id. at 226-38; see also Don Blue, Safety by Design, at http://www.ismcpi.org/
ica/reference/CPTED-1998 04.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2001) (providing many architectural
devices to reduce crime and violence at schools, including clear lines of sight, better lighting,
denotation of gathering areas, and parking lot restrictions); Safe Schools Design Guidelines, at
http:/lwww.fccdr.usf.edu/Projects/safel .htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2001).
51. CROWE, supra note 18, at 9, 52, 160; Card Casteel & Corinne Peek-Asa, Effectiveness of
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) in Reducing Robberies, 18 AM. J.
PREVENTIVE MED. 99, 109, 114 (2000) (finding similar results); see also Patricia D. Biles,
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lots to the front, to increase the visibility of customers' cars, and have
strategically positioned cashiers and other employees for maximum
surveillance of the store. They have also placed windows and torn down
advertisements and signs in areas that permit gas station cashiers to observe
the activities near the pumps.
Lighting. The benefits of lighting have been known for centuries.52
Lighting does two things. First, it helps anyone viewing a situation to see it
more clearly and thereby deters some crimes by increasing the powers of
perception of those already watching. Second, it encourages people to be in
the area in the first place because the greater visibility creates a sense of
security. The more eyes on the street, the more visibility constrains crime.53
"It is axiomatic that darkness is an ally to crime," J. Edgar Hoover
remarked, stating that the "thief, the arsonist, the rapist, the Peeping Tom
and all other perverse individuals often depend on darkness to cloak their
misdeeds and conceal their identities."5 4
One analysis of parking facilities found that the "single most
important" security precaution was lighting." A classic study showed that
more property offenses were committed in London in the winter months
and traced the increase in part to the longer periods of darkness in those
months.56 British research today shows that forty percent of nighttime street
crime occurs when lighting levels are at five lux or below (a typical side
street has a lighting level of about 18,000 lux on a bright day and two lux at
night), while only three percent of such crime occurs when the lighting is
above twenty lux."
Reducing Workplace Violence in Late Night Retail Establishments, at http://www.ismcpi.org/
ica/referencelCPTED-1998 02.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2001) (discussing how physical barriers
such as deep service counters and arrangement of furniture can prevent crime).
52. J.J. Tobias's excellent treatment of crime in nineteenth-century England, for example,
explains how lighting transformed the crime rate:
"We are so familiar with well-lighted streets," wrote John Wade in 1829, going on to
stress that they formed "no inconsiderable branch of the police by guarding both
persons and property from violence and depredation.... Every improved mode of
lighting the public sweets is an auxiliary to protective justice." As gaslighting
spread... it must have been a potent factor in making criminal activities more difficult.
J.J. TOBIAS, URBAN CRIME IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND 189-90 (1972).
53. Robert W. Chism, Lighting-First Line of Defense in Parking Structure Security,
PARKING, Sept.-Oct. 1986, at 77 ("Ample lighting will both deter crime and present a secure
atmosphere... inviting high and repeated customer usage."). A third effect of lighting is to give
potential offenders greater perception of bystanders and law enforcement. This prevents crime
when bystanders and officers are present, but it may undermine prevention when they are not.
54. John Edgar Hoover, The Lighted Way, GEN. FED'N CLUB WOMAN, Feb. 1963, at 6.
55. SMITH, supra note 28; see also Federal Role in Urban Affairs: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Executive Reorganization of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 89th
Cong. 80, 210-11 (1966) (statement of Rep. Charles Farnsley); John Parker, Safer Spaces and
Places: Reducing Crime by Urban Design 15 (Jan. 21, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (discussing new criminological data showing that lighting decreases crime and suggesting
that it "increases community pride, sense of ownership and surveillance").
56. CYRIL BURT, THE YOUNG DELINQUENT 160-65 (1925).
57. CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH HOUSING DESIGN, supra note 32, at 49.
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The powerful effect of light on crime suggests that the common-law
definition of burglary, which stipulated that it had to take place at night,
functioned as a sentencing enhancement to deter a type of theft in which
perpetrators were more likely to escape without detection.
8 Marginal
deterrence principles would require a higher sentence for a nighttime theft
than a daytime one because the probability of being seen and detected was
lower. However, as electricity became commonplace, the requirement that a
burglary take place at night lost much of its significance, as lighting made
the probability of detection at night at least as high as that during the day. It
is, therefore, not surprising that modem codes take the view that the
nighttime requirement is a mere technicality and not the essence of
burglary.
Appropriate lighting means meeting the standards set by the
Illuminating Engineering Society of North America, an entity that focuses
on what types of lighting best reduce crime. 9 In particular, lighting must
have an adequate uniformity ratio because human eyes crudely adjust to
varying degrees of light. If lighting is too uneven, or the glare too great,
then natural surveillance will be reduced severely.' Similarly, the tendency
of many cities to use yellow street lights, which reduce electricity costs, can
increase the crime rate by making streets (and individuals on them) look
menacing. A few urban developers are replacing these yellow lights with
white ones for that reason.6'
In addition to the three mechanisms of diversity, building design, and
lighting, natural surveillance can be fostered by creating "movement
generators" that bring bystanders out of doors. Some ways to do this
58. If a "man's countenance may be discerned, it is called day: and when darknesse comes
and day-light is past, so as by the light of day you cannot discerne the countenance of a man, then
it is called night." EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 63 (photo. reprint 1979) (London, E. & R. Brooke 1644). I am not claiming that such
considerations actually undergirded the nighttime requirement or its eventual abandonment, only
that the impact of light can explain why each rule made sense at the time. There were other
reasons to treat burglary at night differently. See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*224 (" [T]he malignity of the offence does not so properly arise from it's being done in the dark,
as at the dead of night ... when sleep has disarmed the owner, and rendered his castle
defenceless."). Blackstone's argument may explain why many early cases upheld burglary
convictions even when the moon was bright and offenders could be seen. E.g., Thomas v.
Mississippi, 6 Miss. (5 Howard) 20, 20 (1840); New Hampshire v. Bancroft, 10 N.H. 105, 105
(1839) ("That the matter does not depend upon the degree of light, and the ability to distinguish
objects at the time, is evident, because the light of the moon, however bright it may be, makes no
difference.").
59. SMITH, supra note 28.
60. One cost-effective method of increasing the uniformity and brightness of light in a
parking lot is to stain concrete. Stain is inexpensive, lasts many years, and creates strong
brightness without requiring much maintenance. SMITH, supra note 28. Lighting by itself,
however, will not solve the crime problem even in commercial garages. Architectural features
such as sloping floors in parking garages undermine natural surveillance and can increase the rate
of crime. Id.
61. Interview with Andres Duany, Architect, in New Haven, Conn. (Nov. 26, 2001).
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include holding regular farmers' markets, organizing special-occasion
festivals, and building porches and gardens.62
As important as natural surveillance is, it alone will not solve the crime
problem. Bystanders may be reluctant to intervene and stop crimes.
However, design might have an influence on such reluctance. Consider
three possible effects. First, bystanders are likely to intervene when they see
a crime rather than when they simply hear it-a finding with clear
implications for natural surveillance.63 Second, the greater the number of
people present in an area, the less bystanders will believe that intervention
poses risks to themselves.' Third, intervention is more common among
bystanders who feel they are part of a community, and, as I discuss later,
architects can design spaces to reduce social alienation.65
This last step points us in the direction of a more robust view of
architecture and crime. Rather than simply creating visibility, architecture
must also help develop the conditions under which people are more likely
to intervene and act as watchers. For that reason, the architecture of crime
control must carefully balance visibility and openness against other goals.
2. Territoriality
A second crime-prevention technique is to construct landscapes and
buildings that create and reflect a sense of territoriality. Territoriality
connotes ownership or stewardship of an area. It both provides an incentive
for residents to take care of and to monitor an area and subtly deters
62. TAYLOR & HARRELL, supra note 31, at 10-14.
63. R. Lance Shotland & Charles A. Stebbins, Bystander Response to Rape: Can a Victim
Attract Help?, 10 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 510, 518-22 (1980) (finding that sixty-eight percent
of respondents would intervene in a simulated rape if they saw a woman forced into a room and
heard a verbal exchange, whereas only thirteen percent would intervene upon only hearing the
conversation).
64. Shotand & Goodstein, supra note 37, at 11-12 (observing that high perceived costs to
intervention decrease its likelihood). It is also possible for natural surveillance to reduce bystander
intervention due to collective action problems. See, e.g., John M. Darley & Bibb Latand,
Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of Responsibility, 8 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 377, 380 (1968) ("An individual subject is less likely to respond if he thinks that others
are present."). This phenomenon may dampen some of the positive effects of natural surveillance,
but it should be pointed out that additional visibility can counter self-interested assumptions and
reveal that no others are likely to intervene. See id. at 378 (" [l]f others are known to be present,
but their behavior cannot be closely observed, any one bystander can assume that one of the other
observers is already taking action to end the emergency. Therefore, his own intervention would be
only redundant .... ).
65. See infra Subsection I.B.2. But see Merry, supra note 38, at 407-09 (stating that the
failure of bystanders to intervene is more important than architecture); Paul van Soomeren, Safe
and Secure Cities, The Physical Urban Environment and Reduction of Urban Insecurity: A
General Introduction, Paper Presented at the Conference on the Reduction of Urban Insecurity,
Barcelona, Spain, Nov. 17-20, 1987, at 8 (rev. ed. 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
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offenders by warning them that they are about to enter a private space.6
Concern about territoriality should be balanced against the need for natural
surveillance, so that spaces are neither too open nor too closed. If they are
too closed, bystanders and residents cannot self-police; if they are too open,
intrusion and crime could increase.
Architects can work to create territoriality by manipulating both the
internal and external features of buildings. One way to accomplish this task
is to use real barriers, such as locked doors and fences, and symbolic ones,
such as a short series of steps or an archway. Real barriers are obviously
more effective against a determined criminal, but they can impose heavy
costs. Symbolic barriers will often be sufficient to warn potential offenders
and help build a sense of territoriality among residents. An example of a
successful symbolic barrier is an entrance raised by a few inches. Height
can subtly convey distance and otherness. People are aware of minor
gradations of elevation and may refrain from entry if they sense a gradual
incline. Different colors and textures of surfaces can also be used to
demarcate public and private spaces.67
A group of British architects has drawn two pictures that illustrate how
symbolic barriers reinforce territoriality. In the first, a series of buildings
lacks a common entrance, and pedestrians cut through the property:
66. Sidney N. Brower, Territory in Urban Settings, in 4 HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND
ENVIRONMENT 179, 182-83 (Irwin Altman et al. eds., 1980); see also BENNETr & WRIGHT, supra
note 38, at 58 ("The aim of generating territoriality is to motivate residents to defend their own
areas by encouraging informal social controls. This is intended not only to catch more offenders,
but also to discourage strangers from entering the defended areas."); RICHARD MOE & CARTER
WILKIE, CHANGING PLACES: REBUILDING COMMUNITY IN THE AGE OF SPRAWL 102 (1997)
("Fostering a shared sense of turf or 'territoriality' among residents of a community is a strong
deterrent to crime and decay."); RALPH B. TAYLOR, HUMAN TERRITORIAL FUNCTIONING 260-61
(1988) (making the same argument); Brower, supra, at 188-89 (explaining how items like signs
and pictures reinforce territoriality).
67. CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH HOUSING DESIGN, supra note 32, at 68 (outlining this
approach); CROWE, supra note 18, at 83, 99 (same).
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FIGURE 3.




Empirical evidence suggests that housing projects that do not use real or
symbolic barriers to demarcate private spaces have been the most crime-
ridden.6' The most potent forms of barriers are not draconian, for the goal is
68. CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH HOUSING DESIGN, supra note 32, at 45 (providing these
two drawings); NEWMAN, supra note 26, at 66 (showing empirical support). By contrast, many
crime-free projects use symbolic barriers such as placing three steps before an entrance to a unit.
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simply to create "apparency" -a vivid image in the mind of an observer.69
A study of burglaries in Salt Lake City, for example, revealed that houses
with nameplates had lower rates of intrusion than those without them.7"
In addition to using barriers, architects can reduce the number of people
sharing special joint areas to encourage territoriality. These areas generally
consist of entrances, elevators, stairwells, common balconies, open green
areas, and parking facilities." Entryways that house few residents, such as
six to twelve families, have been shown to create a sense of territoriality."
By contrast, buildings with a single entrance for hundreds of residents
preclude effective facial recognition of neighbors and other legitimate
users. Buildings with fewer apartments per entryway have also been shown
to lower levels of fear and rates of victimization. 3 Similar results have been
found in comparing elevator banks to separated elevator facilities.74 These
insights are one example of Erving Goffman's more general point that
members of communities below a certain size are more likely to interact
and influence each other's behavior.75 In this way, territoriality serves to
constrain excessive natural surveillance. It is better to have fewer invested
neighbors than it is to have a greater number of passersby with little stake in
an area.
Unfortunately, the undifferentiated design of many apartment buildings
and housing projects induces residents to believe that the area outside their
door is public and thus the sole responsibility of the police. Effective
design, however, can construct housing in ways that create feelings of
territoriality.76 Street design can also be used to reinforce territoriality
NEWMAN, supra note 26, at 124; see also GARDINER, supra note 30, at 32 (discussing ways in
which territoriality reduces crime). A psychology study found that a sign of care such as planting
gardens or other vegetation is a "powerful territorial sign" that cues people to respect individual
property and reduces the tendency to cut across someone's property or to commit more serious
forms of trespass. Sidney Brower et al., Residents' Perceptions of Territorial Features and
Perceived Local Threat, 15 ENV'T & BEHAV. 419, 434 (1983).
69. See KEVIN LYNCH, THE IMAGE OF THE CITY 10 (1960) (describing the apparency
concept).
70. Barbara B. Brown, Residential Territories: Cues to Burglary Vulnerability, 2 J.
ARCHITECTURAL & PLAN. RES. 231, 234-35 (1985); see also JON LANG, CREATING
ARCHITECTURAL THEORY 156 (1987) ("The way in which buildings and the spaces between
them are designed affects people's perceptions of who should be in control of them.").
71. CROWE, supra note 18, at 55.
72. CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH HOUSING DESIGN, supra note 32, at 57; NEWMAN, supra
note 26, at 67-68.
73. TAYLOR & HARRELL, supra note 31, at 7.
74. NEWMAN, supra note 26, at 75. Hallways with two to five apartments on them had a
crime rate that was almost half that of hallways with six or more apartments. Id. at 69.
75. GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOR, supra note 34, at 132-34. Goffman has shown that individuals
"cognitively recognize" their neighbors even when they do not know tremendous amounts of
personal information about them. Id. at 112-13.
76. One rather simple way is to place two buildings in an "L" formation with a fence that
completes the triangle. Children can play in the open space, and adults can look out of their
windows at their children. NEWMAN, supra note 26, at 54-55 (discussing one such project, where
"[strangers are easily recognized, and their activity comes under observation and immediate
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through signage, street limits, and devices to slow traffic.77 Interviews with
burglars confirm that they avoid streets where access is restricted or where
they must backtrack."8 Monuments and markers can also demarcate the
transition from public space into private space.
3. Building Community
Another aspect of effective architectural design is the use of structures
that build communities instead of dividing them. Ralph Erskine once
remarked that "[tihe job of buildings is to improve human relations.
Architecture must ease them, not make them more difficult." 79
Unfortunately, much architecture, particularly public architecture, does not
maintain fidelity to such concepts. As William Julius Wilson observed in
The Truly Disadvantaged, "In both the housing projects and other inner-
city neighborhoods, residents have difficulty identifying their neighbors.
They are, therefore, less likely to engage in reciprocal guardian behavior.
Events in one part of the block or neighborhood tend to be of little concern
to those residing in other parts." 80
Natural surveillance emphasizes openness and visibility; territoriality
highlights the need for some closures. The goal of building community
straddles this tension, suggesting that spaces that are either too open or too
closed can be harmful and that the creation of semipublic space can
generate feelings of commonality. With certain forms of architecture,
individuals will feel less isolated and less compelled to commit crimes,"'
residents will find it easier to distinguish strangers from others, and
bystanders will be much more likely to prevent crimes or come to the
questioning"). More generally, "architects can create a clear understanding of the function of a
space, and who its users are and ought to be. This, in turn, can lead residents of all income levels
to adopt extremely potent territorial attitudes and policing measures, which act as strong
deterrents to potential criminals." Id. at 4.
77. See infra notes 214-216.
78. GEORGE RENGERT & JOHN WASILCHICK, SUBURBAN BURGLARY 84-85 (1985); see also
Vincent Scully, The Architecture of Community, in THE NEW URBANISM 221, 221 (Peter Katz ed.,
1994) (noting that architecture's "purpose is to mediate between the individual and the natural
world by creating the physical reality of the human community, by which the individual is linked
to the rest of humanity").
79. Marcus Binney, Unsung Hero Is in Tune with the Times, TIMES (London), Sept. 16, 1992,
Arts, at 3.
80. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 38 (1987).
81. See ROBERT J. BURSIK, JR. & HAROLD G. GRASMICK, NEIGHBORHOODS AND CRIME 53
(1993) (stating that isolation is a prime factor in predicting whether someone will engage in
crime); Melvin L. Kohn & John A. Clausen, Social Isolation and Schizophrenia, 20 AM. SOC.
REV. 265 (1955) (making a similar argument linking isolation and mental illness); Ralph Taylor &
Jeanette Covington, Neighborhood Changes in Ecology and Violence, 26 CRIMINOLOGY 553
(1988) (presenting an empirical study of violent crime in Baltimore and finding a strong
relationship between isolation and crime); Ralph B. Taylor et al., Block Crime and Fear:
Defensible Space, Local Social Ties, and Territorial Functioning, 21 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ.
303, 307 (1984) (arguing that design can increase social interaction and reduce crime).
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assistance of a victim after a crime takes place.8 2 Many have argued that
social isolation is dangerous for humans, leading to physical and
psychological disorders. 3 Reducing social isolation can also help facilitate
feelings of empathy, an emotion that can solidify reciprocity and reduce
crime. As Robert Putnam explains,
People who have active and trusting connections to others...
develop or maintain character traits that are good for the rest of
society. Joiners become more tolerant, less cynical, and more
empathetic to the misfortunes of others. When people lack
connections to others, they are unable to test the veracity of their
own views .... Without such an opportunity, people are more
likely to be swayed by their worst impulses.84
Architects cannot solve these problems, but they can aid in the task of
reducing feelings of isolation. Consider a study at Sarah Lawrence College.
The College had two sets of dormitories, each of which housed
approximately the same number of residents. The older dormitory consisted
of three small buildings, each of which had two entrances and a small
corridor. The newer dormitory was a massive single building with a large
entrance. Interviews with the students discovered a "strong communal
sense in each of the old buildings," but found that this sense was
"nonexistent" in the new dormitory." Those in the new building "resisted
any and all attempts by counselors and other students to shape them into
social groups" and "[a]lmost universally ... adopted a loner's attitude."8
Incidence of vandalism and drug abuse was high in the new building and
rare at the older buildings.87 These findings about dormitories also extend to
82. See Douglas D. Perkins et al., Participation and the Social and Physical Environment of
Residential Blocks: Crime and Community Context, 18 AM. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 83, 88
(1990); supra text accompanying note 64.
83. E.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, SUICIDE: A STUDY IN SOCIOLOGY (John A. Spaulding & George
Simpson trans., Free Press 1951) (1897).
84. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE 288-89 (2000). The converse is true as well;
cohesive communities arc the ones least likely to suffer from crime. Robert J. Sampson et al.,
Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 SCIENCE 918,
923 (1997) (presenting an empirical study of Chicago finding that "the combined measure of
informal social control and cohesion and trust remained a robust predictor of lower rates of
violence").
85. NEWMAN, supra note 26, at 75.
86. Id.
87. Id. Similar results were found in a study of Berkeley dorms, SIM VAN DER RYN &
MURRAY SILVERSTEIN, DORMS AT BERKELEY 23-27 (1967), and other studies have confirmed
these findings, see LEON FESTINGER ET AL., SOCIAL PRESSURES IN INFORMAL GROUPS (1950)
(providing similar results in graduate school housing); GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOR, supra note 34, at
118-19 (discussing how acquaintanceship develops through informal contacts in public places);
Robcrt R. Blake et al., Housing Architecture and Social Interaction, 19 SOCIOMETRY 133 (1956)
(finding that architecture influenced social interactions in army barracks); Leo Kuper, Blueprint
for Living Together, in LIVING IN TOWNS 1, 97 (Leo Kuper ed., 1953) (finding the same influence
on interactions among neighbors).
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more mundane matters, as even the placement of seats and benches can
bring people together or divide them, creating what architects call,
respectively, sociopetal and sociofugal spaces.88 Some architects self-
consciously create sociofugal spaces by, for example, designing chairs in
airports that make it difficult for people to talk to each other.8 9
One method of crime prevention, then, is to build spaces that facilitate
unplanned social interaction. These spaces can be strategically located by
placing them around waiting areas such as elevator lobbies, and areas in
which people have to spend some time (the playground for parents, the
mailboxes, the laundry room). Another simple strategy is to position door
entrances on hallways (in buildings) and streets (for smaller residences) so
that they face each other. Merton studied families who lived on opposite
sides of a street and found that when residents' doors faced each other, they
were much more likely to know their neighbors across the street-by a
seventy-four to four percent margin.9 ° Other work has demonstrated that the
amount of time people linger in a common area is crucial for the
development of social networks.9' Erving Goffman has shown that sight is a
helpful tool in promoting communication between speaker and listener:
"When persons come into one another's immediate physical presence, they
become accessible to each other in unique ways."92 As residents come to
88. ITrELSON El AL., supra note 2, at 140-41; see also ELIZABETH WOOD, HOUSING DESIGN
5 (1961) (stating that seats and benches, as well as checker tables for adults, can also be used to
bring people together and prevent crime); The Psychological Dimension of Architectural Space,
PROGRESSIVE ARCHITECTURE, Apr. 1965, at 159, 159 (stating that the "history of architecture
contains innumerable examples of architectural spaces that have been consciously manipulated to
draw people together or to disperse them," such as the New England village green).
89. Sommer describes airports as
perhaps the most sociofugal public spaces in American society. In most terminals it is
virtually impossible for two people sitting down to converse comfortably for any length
of time. The chairs are either bolted together and arranged in rows theater-style or
arranged back-to-back .... The motive... [appears to be] to drive people out of the
waiting areas into cafes, bars, and shops where they will spend money.
SOMMER, PERSONAL SPACE, supra note 7, at 121-22.
90. Robert K. Merton, The Social Psychology of Housing, in CURRENT TRENDS IN SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 163, 207-08 (Wayne Dennis et al. eds., 1948); see also Theodore Caplow & Robert
Forman, Neighborhood Interaction in a Homogeneous Community, 15 AM. Soc. REV. 357 (1950)
(presenting a separate study of housing finding that residents whose front doors looked out onto
common sidewalks were likely to know each other, even compared to neighbors that were closer
but did not look onto common sidewalks). This research may explain why Molumby discovered
that buildings with no other buildings directly across from them are responsible for sixty-five
percent of crime even though they represent only thirty-nine percent of apartments in a particular
neighborhood. Molumby, supra note 36, at 256.
91. ITrELSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 140; Perkins et al., supra note 82, at 104-07 (reporting
results from a survey of over 1000 New York City residents finding that physical environment is a
good predictor of collective participation in block associations); Harold M. Proshansky et al.,
Freedom of Choice and Behavior in a Physical Setting, in ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 173,
173 (Harold M. Proshansky et al. eds., 1970).
92. GOFFMAN, INTERACTION RITUAL, supra note 34, at 147.
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know each other, social organization can develop-leading to formal and
informal ways of promoting community interests.93
Architects have also emphasized how front porches encourage
interaction, so much so that some locales are experimenting with
ordinances requiring front porches large enough for several people to sit
down.94 The thinking is that if people will socialize on their front porches,
then they will know their neighbors and be aware of any unusual activity.
Architectural techniques can also make separate units look harmonious and
help build a common identity. For example, trees can be planted close
enough together to permit the foliage to look continuous instead of separate,
and awnings can be designed similarly to work together over storefronts.9"
In addition, some forms of architecture can create community symbols, thus
contributing to a collective identity.96
Larger-scale solutions exist, such as minimizing the number of large
apartment buildings. Environmental psychologists have found that those
who live in apartment buildings tend to feel isolated, a feeling that is
prevalent in high-rise buildings. A vivid illustration of this finding is the
Pruitt-Igoe housing project, a St. Louis facility so crime-ridden that it was
ultimately razed. According to a three-year study, crime festered in the
complex because
the architectural design. had an atomizing effect on the informal
social networks frequently found in lower-class neighborhoods.
Without the provision of semipublic space and facilities around
which such informal networks might develop, families have
retreated to the internal structures of their apartments and do not
have the social support, protection, and informal social control
found in other lower-class neighborhoods.97
93. LANG, supra note 70, at 167 ("The built environment... can be designed to facilitate the
operation of a social organization ... ."); WOOD, supra note 88, at 10-11 ("Design should help
this aggregation of strangers become less strange, more familiar to each other. Out of this
familiar[i]ty can come the informal communication, the informal groupings that constitute
fabric.").
94. The front porch concept may also help multiethnic communities break racial tensions as
people begin to look at each other as neighbors. See Barbara B. Brown el al., Neighbors,
Households, and Front Porches: New Urbanist Community Tool or Mere Nostalgia?, 30 ENVT &
BEHAV. 579 (1998).
95. JACOBS, supra note 30, at 390; see also GARDINER, supra note 30, at 30 (finding a
"direct link between the organization of the environment and the opportunity, and even
probability, for crime").
96. See PAUL SPENCER BYARD, THE ARCHITECTURE OF ADDITIONS 79 (1998) (arguing that
architecture "helps organize effective societies, providing monuments to focus their willingness to
root for or against a home team"); LYNCH, supra note 69, at 4 ("A vivid and integrated physical
setting ... plays a social role as well. It can furnish the raw material for the symbols and
collective memories of group communication.").
97. William L. Yancey, Architecture, Interaction and Social Control: The Case of a Large-
Scale Housing Project, in ENVIRONMENT AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 126, 129 (Joachim F.
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A comparison of a low-rise and high-rise project in New York
(respectively, Brownsville and Van Dyke) revealed that the high-rise
project had a much higher rate of crime.9" Because it lacked a sense of
territoriality, police felt "callous and indifferent" toward invading its
interior corridors, but these incursions by police could not by themselves
maintain order.99 The finding suggests that architecture can facilitate
privacy; the self-governing public life of the low-rise project gave police a
reason not to traverse private spaces.
Two other lessons have emerged from the architectural literature. First,
city planning should try to maintain valuable social networks. Expressways
that divide social spaces can often create crime on both sides of the
divide.1 ° The same is true of railroad tracks and other forms of public
construction. Second, creating an appealing environment will also build
community. Cleanliness and aesthetic appeal can attract people to an area,
thereby generating more actual and perceived safety and creating a feeling
of neighborhood pride. Instead of seeing disorder and assuming that it is
commonplace to contribute to further disorder, people will see order and be
less likely to disturb it. When lawbreakers congregate in places such as
Wohlwill & Daniel H. Carson eds., 1972). Other projects, such as one in Baltimore, consciously
tried to bring residents together into common spaces, and the results were impressive: "[TIenants
enjoyed better relations with neighbors, took part in more mutually supporting activities, made
more new friends, and took more pride in the immediate neighborhood and community."
ITTELSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 271; see also DANIEL M. WILNER ET AL., THE HOUSING
ENVIRONMENT AND FAMILY LIFE (1962) (providing results from a Baltimore study).
98. Van Dyke had nearly twice as many felonies and several times the number of robberies as
Brownsville, despite similarities of size, density, and demographic composition. NEWMAN, supra
note 26, at 47. While some believed that Van Dyke housed more "problem families," both
projects housed similar residents. Id. at 45-46. The overwhelming difference was architecture,
which changed the social interactions of the residents. In Brownsville, tenants left their doors ajar
to maintain auditory surveillance and let their children play in the corridors. In Van Dyke, by
contrast, the corridors were not designed for play, and parents were afraid to leave their doors
open. Such behaviors impeded natural surveillance and furthered social isolation. The finding is
striking because it shows how some explanations for crime, such as the breakdown of the family,
may improperly discount architecture. Cf OSCAR NEWMAN, COMMUNITY OF INTEREST 49 (1980)
(describing interaction as a result of architecture).
99. NEWMAN, supra note 26, at 42. Moreover, the Van Dyke design made it difficult for law
enforcement officers to patrol properly, a fact that may have led to additional callousness on the
part of the police. Id. at 49. This research suggests that architecture that facilitates surveillance
may actually strengthen privacy.
100. IT'ELSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 348 (stating that "the construction of major highways
through central cities... fracture[s] and fragment[sl delicate social networks"); see also
ALEXANDER GARVIN ET AL., URBAN PARKS AND OPEN SPACE 11-12 (1997) (discussing blight on
both sides of Interstate 5 in Seattle); RENGERT & WASILCHICK, supra note 78, at 62 (discussing
how a Delaware turnpike divides a community); Scully, supra note 78, at 222 (describing how
communities along Interstate 95 have been "physically torn apart and [their former members]
given no opportunity to form new ones"); Wesley Skogan, Fear of Crime and Neighborhood
Change, 8 CRIME & JUST. 203, 206 (1986) (noting that the "freeway networks driven through the
hearts of many American cities... destroyed ... low-income, minority neighborhoods").
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public parks, constraints on further lawbreaking erode.'0 ' Furthermore, the
group dynamics within enclosed spaces may lead to additional crime due to
the tendency of groups to engage in riskier behavior.' °2 By eliminating




One of the more obvious ways in which architecture can prevent crime
is by strengthening targets against attack. Some of these techniques are easy
to employ, such as placing deadbolts lower on door frames, having doors in
vulnerable locations swing outward, raising fire escapes to put them out of
easy reach, and reducing the size of letter-box openings. Modem
technology permits targets to be hardened in ways that are not obvious to
the public. Strong plastics, graffiti-resistant paint, and doors with steel cores
are a few examples. These advances allow architects to disguise their
efforts at strengthening targets and thus avoid sending a message that crime
is rampant. This message is, as I soon describe, an important feature that
distinguishes various architectures of crime control.
Substantial evidence reveals that such security measures decrease crime
in post offices, banks, and convenience stores."°4 When the British town of
Rochdale applied design principles to its housing projects (including the
repair of doors and locks, better fencing around dwellings, and strong
illumination), burglaries dropped by seventy-eight percent.0 5 Another study
101. Goffman states that:
[W]hen we find that places such as parks can become the scene of robbery, refuse
dumping, sexual solicitations, loitering... we must understand this collapse of public
order not merely in terms of the fact that it may be possible to avoid the police in these
places; we must understand that the involvement structure institutionalized in very
loosely defined behavioral settings reduces appreciably the degree to which these
nefarious acts are improper.
GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOR, supra note 34, at 215. For a discussion of park improvement, see infra text
accompanying notes 217-224.
102. David G. Myers & Helmut Lamm, The Group Polarization Phenomenon, 83 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 602, 602 (1976).
103. See Kahan, supra note 4, at 610 (discussing how social organization can deter crime).
104. See, e.g., Ronald V. Clarke & Simon Field, Target Hardening of Banks in Australia and
Displacement of Robberies, 2 SECURITY J. 84 (1991); Paul Ekblom, Preventing Post Office
Robberies in London: Effects and Side Effects, 11 J. SECURITY ADMIN. 36, 38 (1988) (discussing
security measures in post offices); Christian Grandjean, Bank Robberies and Physical Security in
Switzerland, 1 SECURITY J. 155 (1990) (finding that thirty-four percent of banks that encased
tellers with bulletproof glass had a robbery or an attempted robbery, whereas sixty-five percent of
those without such glass had a robbery or attempt); Ronald D. Hunter & C. Ray Jeffrey,
Preventing Convenience Store Robbery Through Environmental Design, in SITUATIONAL CRIME
PREVENTION 194, 200-04 (Ronald V. Clarke ed., 1992) (discussing security measures in
convenience stores).
105. CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH HOUSING DESIGN, supra note 32, at 75-77. When
several Chicago housing projects employed such techniques, an overwhelming majority of tenants
stated that they believed that drug dealing and physical violence had declined. See John E. Eck,
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of two British housing projects found that improved locks and doors
reduced burglaries by ninety percent in one area and fifty-nine percent in
the other, relative to a control area.1 6
To illustrate the importance of protection of targets, I have sketched out
a common plan for a bank:
FIGURE 5.
~~~One-wai tr f c
The bank was constructed as a fortress, with few windows and with walls
that blocked visibility. But experience showed that thieves preferred such
designs because natural surveillance was lacking."°7 In addition, the ATM
was placed in the back of the bank so that bank tellers, who were in the
back, could easily service it. However, this design located the machine in
an area with little natural surveillance. The parking lot, which architects
believed should be hidden from public view because it was an eyesore, was
also placed in an area that few could see. (Note the solid wall between the
Preventing Crime at Places, at http://www.ncjrs.org/workslchapter7.htm (last visited Nov. 1,
2001). Similar results were found for a British public housing facility. Id.
106. NICHOLAS TILLY & JANICE WEBB, BURGLARY REDUCTION: FINDINGS FROM SAFER
CITIES SCHEMES (Home Office Police Dep't, London, Crime Prevention Unit Paper No. 51,
1994). When a housing project, Potomac Gardens, in Washington, D.C., installed an eight-foot
fence around its buildings, the number of arrests there dropped from 150 to seven in one year.
Serge F. Kovaleski, Drastic Measures for a Desperate Place: Fences May Mean Freedom at D.C.
Housing Complex, WASH. POST, July 11, 1994, at D4.
The elimination and minimization of hiding places and dead spaces will also prevent crime.
CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH HOUSING DESIGN, supra note 32, at 26; John Parker, Safer Spaces
& Places: Reducing Crime by Urban Design, Paper Presented at the Council of Europe
Conference on the Relationship Between the Physical Urban Environment and Crime Patterns 11
(2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Interviews with burglars confirm that they
pick locations with overgrown shrubbery, for example. RENGERT & WASILCHICK, supra note 78,
at 86, 92. Such interviews also reveal that small windows actually promote crime, as they are
"easier to break or open" than large ones. BENNETr & WRIGHT, supra note 38, at 67-68.
107. See CROWE, supra note 18, at 164-67 (making these observations about bank security).
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parking lot and the inside of the bank.) As a result, bank patrons were at
risk of being robbed upon leaving the premises. Now consider this redesign:
FIGURE 6.
dr
i  h 
e tDh Bank
The redesign places both the parking lot and the ATM in the most visible
part of the area, permitting greater natural surveillance and enabling users
to get back into their cars quickly after using the machines. Interviews with
bank robbers have found that they prefer banks where it is difficult to see in
(to minimize the power of natural surveillance) and easy to see out (to plan
their escape and watch for law enforcement officers).'08
Careful attention to the placement and design of building entrances
makes buildings less accessible to criminals. To take an obvious example, if
a robber can stand on top of a trash bin and reach a second-floor window,
the bin should be placed somewhere far from the window." Prickly shrubs
placed outside of reachable windows can also deter crime. A duct that
spews hot air can be placed near a ground-floor window to deter entry.
Smells can also be strategically harnessed either to induce people to come
outside or to keep them away. 10
In order to fortify targets of crime, communities may at times have to
reduce the number of public streets available to criminals. Such strategies
should obviously be employed only in carefully selected settings, but
108. W.D. Tiffany & J.M. Ketchel, Psychological Deterrence in Robberies of Banks and Its
Application to Other Institutions, in THE ROLE OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE IN PHYSICAL SECURITY
81,83 (JJ. Kramer ed., 1979).
109. CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH HOUSING DESIGN, supra note 32, at 71.
110. Real estate brokers understand the power of smell--often baking bread in the oven
before showing a house in order to create a warm smell of familiarity and to mask any negative
odors. Stores that emit such smells, such as cookie shops, can serve a special purpose (or two) by
encouraging people to come outdoors and thereby create natural surveillance.
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controlling access routes has been shown to decrease crime."' When North
London closed a series of roads in the hope of eliminating drive-through
"john" traffic, arrests for all crimes dropped and "within a relatively short
period of time, a remarkable transformation occurred[-]the area was
transformed from a noisy and hazardous 'red light' district into a relatively
tranquil residential area." 112
Los Angeles recently experimented with a major initiative to reduce
gang violence through architecture. Faced with an escalating gang problem,
analysts believed that certain streets were allowing gang members to access
targets of crime easily and to escape quickly afterward. Once the city
placed traffic barriers on some of these streets, assaults fell from 190 to 163
in the first year, and from 163 to 138 in the next year; homicides dropped
markedly as well. 13 The city had designated a "control site"-a similarly
situated neighborhood that did not use the barriers-and homicides and
assaults did not decline at the site. The city also studied whether crime
increased in communities that neighbored the new barriers and found no
significant increase." 4
111. See ARNOLD SAGALYN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RESIDENTIAL SECURITY 37-38
(1973); TAYLOR & HARRELL, supra note 31 (finding that when North Miami built barriers to
reduce street traffic, it reduced the incidence of auto theft and assault); Ralph B. Taylor & Stephen
Gottfredson, Environmental Design, Crime, and Prevention: An Examination of Community
Dynamics, in 8 CRIME & JUST. 387, 392 (1986); Garland F. White, Neighborhood Permeability
and Burglary Rates, 7 JUST. Q. 57, 65 (1990) (finding in a study of burglary in Norfolk, Virginia,
that neighborhoods with many interior streets had high burglary rates). Some European cities have
also created "control zones" where single entrances and exits are employed to protect sensitive
areas, from a sidewalk to a full neighborhood. See Thomas Vonier, Halt: Who Goes There?
Urban Control Zones in Europe Offer Important Lessons for Securing U.S. Cities, 85
ARCHITECTURE 71, 73 (1996).
112. Roger Matthews, Developing More Effective Strategies for Curbing Prostitution, 1
SECURITY J. 182, 185 (1990).
113. JAMES LASLEY, "DESIGNING OUT": GANG HOMICIDES AND STREET ASSAULTS 2-3
(Nat'l Inst. of Justice, Research in Brief, Nov. 1998); Press Release, Los Angeles Police
Department, Stamp Out Crime Through Environmental Design, at http://www.lapdonline.org/
press.releases/2OOO/O1/ocop8.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2001). These reductions are statistically
significant, even when other factors that might have reduced the crime rate are taken into account.
LASLEY, supra, at 3.
114. LASLEY, supra note 113, at 4. The researchers surmised that geographic substitution did
not occur because the gangs could not expand to other areas without threatening the turf of
neighboring gang members.
In another intensive survey, the Land Use Research Unit at King's College, London, studied
more than 4000 blocks of low-income apartment buildings accommodating approximately a
quarter of a million people. Results were compared to a control group of over 4000 houses. ALICE
COLEMAN ET AL., UTOPIA ON TRIAL, at vii (1985). The study explored whether certain design
features-such as the number of dwellings per entrance, the number of floors per dwelling, the
position of the entrance, and the number of access points to the dwelling-contributed to high
crime rates. It also investigated whether these design features were associated with the presence of
signs of social malaise, such as litter, graffiti, vandalism, and public excrement. The results of the
experiment strongly indicate that crime, as well as the signs of social malaise, result from poor
architectural design. Poor design also resulted in higher private and insurance losses and in higher
social costs in the sufferings of crime victims, and it required higher public expenditure for
policing, courts, and prisons. Id. at 177-78 ("As each design variable worsens, there is an
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The federal government often employs target-hardening to protect its
sensitive buildings. The FBI building is built on stilts to minimize damage
in the event of a bomb detonation at street level. To decrease the likelihood
of presidential assassination, a stretch of Pennsylvania Avenue in front of
the White House was barricaded and closed to car traffic. " 5 The prevalence
of these sorts of architectural solutions, however, should not obscure the
other three goals of crime control through architecture. This is particularly
important because some forms of target hardening are suboptimal in that
their visibility evinces a fear of crime that can cause damage to the fabric of
a community and even increase crime rates 116 More attention to other
methods of architectural precaution can minimize the tendency to think
only in terms of target protection.
In sum, increasing natural surveillance, fostering territoriality, reducing
isolation, and protecting targets are strategies that architects use to prevent
crime and to control its impact. The efficacy of each strategy will vary by
context, and sometimes the pursuit of one goal will necessarily exclude
another goal. Accordingly, architects must develop a set of principles to
assess how architecture prevents crime. The search for these principles
necessarily requires a step back, to a more general claim about what factors
constrain criminal activity.
B. Four Constraints on Crime
Legal scholarship has been largely single-minded in its focus on one
constraint, public enforcement of the law through police and prosecutors. In
recent years, a burgeoning literature has explored the role of social norms in
preventing crime. A less obvious, but equally important, constraint is
perpetration cost. That is, if crime is expensive to commit (or creates a risk
of physical injury to the perpetrator), individuals will be more likely to
refrain from it. Architecture affects these constraints in dramatic ways. It
increases the power of law enforcement and its ability to deter crime,
increasing probability that more families will fail, in more ways, to develop their children's
capacity for adjusting to civilised life ...."). The study's authors concluded that crime can be
reduced through the use of window and entryway design, limits on the height and size of
buildings, and restriction of access. Id. at 170-74. Such methods also increased social interaction.
See id. at 72.
115. Some have suggested that damage from the Oklahoma City bombing would have been
mitigated if the designers had taken certain architectural principles into account. E.g., Nadine M.
Post, Defensible Space: More than Merely Cops and Robbers, ENGINEERING NEWS REC., May 1,
1995, at 18, 26. Early buildings, such as the Federal Reserve Board depositories, used
architectural principles to prevent crime. Minnesota v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 25 F. Supp. 14, 17 (D.
Minn. 1938) ("The primary object in designing and constructing the building was to erect a
structure that would safely preserve the funds and securities in the care of the defendant in the
event of fire, burglary, or mob attack.").
116. These concerns are taken up infra text accompanying notes 171-172 and in Section
IID.
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facilitates the creation of public social norms that constrain crime, helps
shape the tastes of individuals away from criminal activity, and increases
the perpetration cost of lawbreaking.
In the following sections, I explore each of these constraints as they
relate to architecture. Readers will note that several strands of the argument
regarding these constraints have been implicit thus far. Specific
consideration of architecture within the matrix of these constraints,
however, furthers the analysis. Before applying the matrix, it is worth
highlighting one feature that cuts across the constraints: unconscious
influence. Some architectural strategies will work even without the
conscious involvement of the criminal or the public. This feature contrasts
with crime-control strategies based on legal sanctions or public norms,
which generally work best when a potential offender has knowledge of
them. As Lawrence Speck, the Dean of the University of Texas School of
Architecture puts it, architecture operates "much more [on the]
subconscious than [the] conscious. Architecture is all about subliminal
experience.... You listen to music, you look at a painting. But you live in
architecture, and it affects you whether you're even conscious of it." "7
Architecture thus can be effective at many points in the spectrum of
consciousness.
Psychological evidence shows that criminals decode environmental
"cues" to assess the likelihood of success of a given criminal act."' A
classic study, with implications for natural surveillance, showed that
children are also more likely to act dishonestly when there is less
supervision around them."9 In another important study, Steinzor found that
the design of a meeting table influences who will speak and when, and who
117. Avrel Scale, Architect Lawrence W. Speck and "The Vision Thing," TEX. ALCALDE,
July-Aug. 1999, http://txtell.lib.utexas.edu/stories/sOOO7-full.html; see also Murray Edelman,
Space and the Social Order, 32 J. ARCHITECTURAL EDUC. 2, 5 (1978) ("Architectural cues that
are most potent when they function subconsciously reaffirm many other kinds of social
relationships as well ...").
118. Taylor & Gottfredson, supra note 111, at 401 (suggesting that criminals "decode"
physical cues); see also MIRILIA BONNES & GIANFRANCO SECCHIAROLI, ENVIRONMENTAL
PSYCHOLOGY 88-89 (Claire Montagna trans., Sage Publ'ns 1995) (1992) (noting studies in
territoriality that show that how a territory is defined, in terms of physical and symbolic barriers,
determines how it is defended against others); Thomas Gabor, Crime Displacement and
Situational Prevention: Toward the Development of Some Principles, 32 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY
41, 54 (1990) (describing research arguing that some environmental cues act as releasers in that
they stimulate release of an inhibited behavior against crime); Douglas D. Perkins et al., The
Physical Environment of Street Blocks and Resident Perceptions of Crime ad Disorder:
Implications for Theory and Measurement, 12 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 21, 21-23 (1992) (studying the
relationship between perceived "fear" of residents of a community and actual "incivilities"
-committed).
119. HUGH HARTSHORNE & MARK A. MAY, STUDIES IN DECEIT (1928). Natural surveillance
creates both conscious deterrence (some criminals knowingly refrain from action while bystanders
are present) and unconscious deterrence (the presence of bystanders may lead some perpetrators to
be more aware of the costs of their acts).
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is perceived to have a position of authority.' 20 It is therefore no great shock
that the eight months of negotiations that preceded the 1969 Paris Peace
Talks largely centered on what the physical shape of the negotiating table
would be. 2' It is said that Machiavelli designed a political meeting chamber
with a ceiling that looked as if it were about to collapse, reasoning that it
would induce politicians to vote quickly and leave.'
1. Legal Sanctions
Architecture can facilitate law enforcement in five respects. First, it can
help police catch criminals. When Bridgeport, Connecticut, wanted to slow
the drug trade, it erected a series of concrete barriers near a highway
running through the city. The city knew that suburbanites were pulling into
Bridgeport to buy drugs and then quickly leaving town, and it correctly
reasoned that barriers to slow traffic down would deter drug purchases.
123
Customers were afraid to come into Bridgeport because they knew that law
enforcement had a better chance of catching them.
Second, architecture can make it easier for police to intervene in an
evolving incident. Police are more comfortable going into areas with strong
natural surveillance and are more likely to enter peacefully when they
believe that residents will take care of them and monitor the situation.
12 4
Third, the presence of many bystanders at a crime scene can increase
the level of trust between police and the bystanders, leading the police to
additional information. A crowd of bystanders is less likely to fear a police
officer than are one or two bystanders. Therefore, as architects bring natural
surveillance to an area, they may ease community-police tensions.
Fourth, architecture can facilitate the identification of criminals after a
crime has been committed. By putting more people on the streets and
lighting facilities properly, a city makes it more likely that a given crime
120. Bernard Steinzor, The Spatial Factor in Face.to-Face Discussion Groups, 45 J.
ABNORMAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 552 (1950); see also ITTELSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 138 (reporting
similar results). Studies show that people who sit at right angles from each other at a table are six
times more likely to engage in conversation than those who sit across from each other. See
EDWARD T. HALL, THE HIDDEN DIMENSION 102 (1966).
121. ITrELSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 139.
122. CROWE, supra note 18, at 84-85; see also David Stea, Territoriality, the Interior Aspect:
Space, Territory, and Human Movements, LANDSCAPE, Autumn 1965, at 13, 15-16 (discussing
how alteration of the size and shape of rooms can have dramatic impacts on behavior).
123. There were, however, serious problems with the implementation and design of the
barricades. See supra note 31. Dayton, Ohio, used a more sophisticated barrier strategy that
facilitated crime control. See infra note 211.
124. NEWMAN, supra note 26, at 204. Victim surveys and interviews with convicted
criminals reveal that "the mere presence of bystanders reduces the likelihood of crime." Shotland
& Goodstein, supra note 37, at 9, 18. On the other hand, police might fear a mob of residents,
particularly in areas hostile to law enforcement.
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will be observed. A higher probability of accurate witness information thus
exists when architectural design strategies are employed.
Fifth, an understanding of architecture and crime can help police deploy
their resources in areas where crime is likely to fester. As a Hartford,
Connecticut, study found, "The physical environment affects the task of
police to the extent that opportunities for crime are structured. To the extent
that there are fewer places where offenders may operate freely, either
because of environmental effects on offenders or on citizens, the task of
police patrol is made easier." "'25
Gary Becker's celebrated article argues that two variables are equally
important to deterrence: the probability of enforcement and the sanction
imposed.1 6 Some recent evidence suggests, however, that the probability of
enforcement matters more to criminals than the maximum length of
sentence.' If this finding is correct, then architecture is particularly
important because it increases both perceived and actual probabilities of
enforcement. Although architecture obviously cannot change the maximum
sentence imposed by law, it can alter the more significant variable.
2. Social Norms
Because law enforcement cannot and should not be omnipresent,
society's mores can play a useful role in constraining crime. Architecture
works on two levels to facilitate governance through social norms. The
more obvious way is by empowering ordinary citizens, who are given a
greater ability to monitor and prevent wrongdoing in a community. Design
can influence a community's perception of safety and territoriality, and, in
turn, its tolerance for criminal acts. The less obvious, though perhaps more
important, mechanism is for architecture to shape individuals' attitudes
toward lawbreaking. I take up this subtle mechanism in the next Subsection.
Architecture empowers ordinary residents through techniques such as
natural surveillance, territoriality, and the reduction of social alienation.
Such techniques draw people outdoors and make members of a community
visible to each other, thus increasing both social pressure against crime and
the probability of detection. Norms are ineffective when residents live in
atomized apartments where interaction seldom occurs. Even the best social
codes are quite useless if it is impossible to observe whether people comply
with them. Architecture, by facilitating interaction and monitoring by
members of a community, permits social norms to have greater impact. In
125. FOWLER ET AL., supra note 34, at 5-6.
126. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169
(1968).
127. E.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV.
349, 379-80 (1997).
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this way, the power of architecture to influence social norms can even
eclipse that of law, for law faces obvious difficulties when it attempts to
regulate social interaction directly.128
Erving Goffman's sociological studies confirm the power of unplanned
social contacts on behavior. His work reveals that behavior is changed even
when one is not fully conscious of the presence of others.
29 These
unfocused interactions can be converted into focused ones, such as when a
bystander inserts herself into a situation. While eye-to-eye encounters
create the most important forms of interactions, including those that are
most likely to change behavior, Goffman believes that conduct will be
altered, whether the interaction is focused or unfocused.
3 Criminologists
also have emphasized the importance of true social interaction in reducing
crime. 3 ' This observation suggests that artificial methods, such as closed-
circuit television cameras, will not fully capture the benefits of surveillance,
because they do not have the same mutuality of interaction.'
32 The
observation also suggests that when the two architectural goals of
territoriality and natural surveillance come into conflict, the former goal
will generally yield greater crime prevention benefits than the latter.
In particular, bystanders are more likely to intervene to prevent crimes
when strong social interactions in a community exist.'
33 Studies of altruism
also show that people are much more likely to act cooperatively when they
128. SKOGAN, supra note 22, at 170-71.
129. Goffman observes:
Half-aware that a certain aspect of his activity is available for all present to perceive,
the individual tends to modify this activity, employing it with its public character in
mind.... And even if those in his presence are not quite conscious of the
communication they are receiving, they will none the less sense something sharply
amiss should the uncustomary be conveyed.
GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOR, supra note 34, at 33; see also id. at 88-92 (arguing that police should
become more involved in the community to curtail crime).
130. Id. at 92-95.
131. Mukherjee and Wilson note that "[tihe most important element of community-crime
prevention appears to be to bring about social interaction ... [because] interaction and familiarity
should... make it possible to detect strangers in the community... [and] lead to a cohesive
neighbourhood." SATYANSHU MUKHERJEE & PAUL WILSON, NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH 2 (Austl.
Inst. of Criminology, Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice No. 8, 1987).
132. GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOR, supra note 34, at 15-16 & n.5 (discussing how communication
with naked senses creates more interaction between individuals than that through artificial means).
133. Eleanor E. Maccoby et al., Community Integration and the Social Control of Juvenile
Delinquency, 14 J. Soc. ISSUES 38 (1958); see also Shotland & Goodstein, supra note 37, at 12-
13 (collecting studies). A study of Chicago found that a neighborhood's "collective efficacy," or
its mutual trust and willingness to intervene when neighbors' children are misbehaving, is one of
the most important factors in predicting crime rates, eclipsing even poverty. Robert J. Sampson et
al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 SCIENCE
918 (1997); see also Greg Saville & Gerry Cleveland, Second Generation CPTED: An Antidote to
the Social Y2K Virus of Urban Design 1-2 (Nov. 1, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (stating that social propensity to intervene is important).
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perceive a common social identity.'34 Experimental social psychologists
have uncovered striking evidence that even the most casual social
interaction can have a powerful effect on reciprocity. For example, when
subjects have met and spoken to each other for a single minute, they are far
more likely to intervene to help each other in the event of an emergency
than had they not met, and they will intervene more than twice as
quickly.'35
Minimal cooperation can change behavior in profound ways. Consider
the following experiment: Certain homeowners in Palo Alto were asked to
place a large and crude sign saying "drive carefully" in the front of their
homes. Only seventeen percent of homeowners agreed. Other homeowners
were asked to perform a small task, either sign a petition or place a three-
inch-square sign in their cars, and the "vast majority" of owners so agreed.
Two weeks later, these individuals were approached to put up the large
crude sign, and seventy-six percent of them did so-nearly five times the
percentage of the first group.'36 These findings have been replicated with
many subsequent studies in a variety of locations and involving a number of
different messages on the sign.'37 This research suggests that a community
can be built with a few small acts that eventually culminate in larger ones,
and the first small acts can be prodded along through architecture.
Put slightly differently, architecture can help a community amass social
capital. Social capital refers to the value created by networks of individuals
that are characterized by trust and reciprocity. 3 Informal connections-
such as having people over for dinner, playing cards, and small talk in
lobbies-can augment social capital by building networks of trust.'39 When
individuals believe that others are more likely to intervene and help out,
mutually beneficial cooperation ensues. The influential theorist Robert
Putnam offered many explanations for the decline of social capital, such as
134. Robyn M. Dawes et al., Cooperation for the Benefit of Us- Not Me, or My Conscience,
in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 97, 99 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990) (" [Eixperiments have led us to
conclude that cooperation rates can be radically affected by... group identity.").
135. BIBB LATAN12 & JOHN M. DARLEY, THE UNRESPONSIVE BYSTANDER 107-09 (1970);
see also Robyn M. Dawes, Social Dilemmas, 31 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 169, 185 (1980) (noting
that "[t]he salutary effects of communication on cooperation are ubiquitous" and citing studies);
Meares, supra note 21, at 395 ("Norm enforcement is easier when individuals in a community
have social linkages and trust one another."); David Sally, Conversation and Cooperation in
Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis of Experiments from 1958 to 1992, 7 RATIONALITY & SOC'Y
58, 67, 83 (1995) (describing how permitting visual contact in cooperation experiments increases
the extent of altruism).
136. LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETr, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION 50-51 (199 1).
137. Id. at 51-52 (discussing studies).
138. PUTNAM, supra note 84, at 19.
139. Id. at 93. Putnam distinguishes between "thick trust," which refers to trust among
individuals who know each other personally, and "thin trust," which refers to the background
principle of trust among individuals in a community who are unfamiliar with each other. Id. at
136. "Thick trust" strategies would focus much more on territoriality; "thin trust" ones focus
more on natural surveillance.
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pressures of time and money, mobility and sprawl, and generational
change. 40 One variable, however, did not receive sufficient consideration in
his groundbreaking study: architecture."' My claim is not that architecture
can explain the loss of social capital over the past fifty years-this loss has
occurred for myriad reasons. But architecture can be part of a solution. It
may be a solution at least as effective and realistic as others, such as
improving education, insisting on community service, creating family-
friendly workplaces, and trying to increase political participation.'42
Architecture can prevent crimes even when criminals believe the
probability of enforcement is low. The mere fact that architectural solutions
expose more criminal activity to public view, even if not ultimately
culminating in an official investigation or prosecution, deters because it
exposes criminals to the risk of social sanctions. This point is worth
emphasizing, as one feature of social norms strategies is that they are often
self-enforcing. By giving citizens the power to monitor and intervene in a
greater number of crimes, architecture gives a community more autonomy.
Such order maintenance would exist in the shadow of the law, so residents
would still be able to call the police in case of emergency. But such order
contemplates a good deal more discretion-and room for mercy-than
standard law enforcement. Norms would often be tailored more
appropriately to a given circumstance than would prosecution.143
140. Id. at 189-283 (examining these explanations).
141. At three isolated places in his book, Putnam makes reference to architectural concepts.
At one point, he notes that separatist zoning policies have reduced places for social gathering. id.
at 211. At another point, he refers to Jane Jacobs's invocation of informal networks of neighbors
as a constraint on crime. Id. at 308. Finally, his conclusion suggests that the development of
"more integrated and pedestrian-friendly areas" and "design of our communities and the
availability of public space" can help build social capital. Id. at 408. These concepts are not
sufficiently explored, but this is natural for a general and groundbreaking book such as Putnam's.
142. Id. at 404-08, 412-14. Child abuse rates are higher in areas lacking community cohesion.
See Jill E. Korbin & Claudia J. Coulton, Understanding the Neighborhood Context for Children
and Families: Combining Epidemiological and Ethnographic Approaches, in 2 NEIGHBORHOOD
POVERTY 65, 77-78 (Jeanne Brooks-Gunn et al. eds., 1997). In a study that compared two
neighborhoods, Garbarino and Sherman found that parents in a high-abuse community were more
afraid to ask for help from neighbors and to swap child-care arrangements with each other. See
James Garbarino & Deborah Sherman, High-Risk Neighborhoods and High-Risk Families: The
Human Ecology of Child Maltreatment, 51 CHILD DEV. 188, 192 (1980). They also found that in
those communities, "[a] family's own problems seem to be compounded rather than ameliorated
by the neighborhood context.... Under such circumstances strong support systems are most
needed, but least likely to operate." Id. at 195; see also PUTNAM, supra note 84, at 298-99
(discussing these studies).
143. An early theorist of architecture and crime stated that design "makes possible the
development of a social structure by means of which people can create their own social controls,
and do their own self-policing." WOOD, supra note 88, at 6. Heavy presence of law enforcement
officers is also costly and imposes a coercive stigma whose taint cannot be easily removed. Such
presence can, perversely, spur people to commit crimes as acts of rebellion, particularly in the
moments after the police leave a geographic location.
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a. Looking Through Broken Windows
In their influential article, James Wilson and George Kelling argued
that high levels of crime were a response to a breakdown in social order."
The solution to this breakdown, they claimed, was to reform police
practices. Wilson and Kelling modeled their conclusions on the basis of a
single initiative, the New Jersey Safe and Clean Neighborhoods Program, a
program that was only partially about law enforcement.'45 The slighting of
the non-law enforcement features of the New Jersey program is not
surprising, given the fact that Wilson and Kelling drew most of their
analysis from a Police Foundation study of the program. Legal academics
and politicians have thus followed the law-enforcement-centered approach
to broken windows and have used its rationale to justify prosecution of
quality-of-life offenses (New York City being a prime example of this
practice). 46
This legal approach, however, neglects a central component of the
theory behind broken windows, namely, architecture. Wilson and Kelling's
real insight was that signs of physical disorder could create fear in law-
abiding residents and induce these residents to stay indoors or even move
away. Visible signs of disorder may weaken the social norm against crime
even further:
A piece of property is abandoned, weeds grow up, a window is
smashed. Adults stop scolding rowdy children; the children,
emboldened, become more rowdy. Families move out, unattached
adults move in....
... [M]any residents will think that crime, especially violent
crime, is on the rise, and they will modify their behavior
accordingly. They will use the streets less often, and when on the
streets will stay apart from their fellows, moving with averted eyes,
silent lips, and hurried steps....
Such an area is vulnerable to criminal invasion. Though it is
not inevitable, it is more likely that here, rather than in places
144. See Wilson & Kelling, supra note 5, at 30.
145. The stated purpose of the Act was "to provide State aid to certain municipalities for the
purpose of upgrading and augmenting certain municipal services and programs relating to safe
and clean neighborhoods." Safe and Clean Neighborhoods Act of 1973, ch. 46, § 1, 1973 N.J.
Laws 103 (formerly codified at 52 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 27D-108 to 27D-1 16) (repealed 1979).
146. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of
Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1164 (1998) (proposing community policing,
antiloitering laws, gang curfews, and other order-maintenance policies). Similarly, Gerald Frug's
insightful article considers community policing the primary mechanism to combat fear of crime,
and does not focus on other measures. See Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 23,
80-85 (1998).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1078 [Vol. 111: 1039
2002] Architecture as Crime Control 1079
where people are confident they can regulate public behavior by
informal controls, drugs will change hands, prostitutes will solicit,
and cars will be stripped.
4 7
Perhaps unconsciously, Wilson and Kelling were following Jacobs's earlier
work. Jacobs believed that as crimes happen on a street, people become
more afraid of the location and avoid monitoring it. 4 8 Thus, a few crimes
have the potential to spiral into many-one crime is a complement to
another. Unfortunately, Wilson and Kelling converted these thoughts into
ones about law enforcement instead of emphasizing the regulation of social
order by ordinary citizens. Accordingly, government officials have
implemented broken windows as if it were a directive to law enforcement,
when its explanatory force is one that radiates far beyond policing.
When Wilson and Kelling arrived on the scene, New Jersey was not
restricting its solutions to broken windows to law enforcement reform. Its
"safe and clean" legislation was first enacted in 1973 and provided funds
for both community policing and programs to reduce urban blight. 4 9 In its
first year, grants under the "clean" portion were made for additional street
lighting, the construction of playgrounds, and the rehabilitation of a
community center. 5 The following year, the program led to the demolition
of 446 buildings, construction and refurbishing of thirty parks and
recreational facilities, and the purchase of more lighting.' None of these
reforms was considered in Wilson and Kelling's account of New Jersey's
success in reducing crime. When Wilson and Kelling wrote about New
Jersey's success in reducing crime, they explained the phenomenon as a
result of policing changes and neglected a crucial environmental variable
that had changed during the years they studied. What makes their
147. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 5, at 32.
148. See JACOBS, supra note 30, at 30; see also PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 52 (1967)
("People stay behind the locked doors of their homes rather than risk walking in the streets at
night. Poor people spend money on taxis because they are afraid to walk or use public
transportation. Sociable people are afraid to talk to those they do not know.").
149. Safe and Clean Neighborhoods Act of 1973, ch. 46, 1973 N.J. Laws 103 (formerly
codified at 52 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 27D-108 to 27D-116) (repealed 1979) (emphasis added).
150. N.J. DEP'T OF CMTY. AFFAIRS, 1974 NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY
AFFAIRS ANNUAL REPORT 31 (1975).
151. N.J. DEP'T OF CMTY. AFFAIRS, 1974-1975 NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY
AFFAIRS ANNUAL REPORT 31 (1976). In 1975, approximately $12.3 million was allocated to the
"safe" neighborhoods portion of the program, and approximately $9.5 million to the "clean"
portion. Id. The programs under the "clean" component, such as lighting, construction of public
facilities, and demolition of substandard buildings, continued in future years. See N.J. DEP'T OF
CMTY. AFFAIRS, 1975-1976 NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS ANNUAL
REPORT 14 (1977); N.J. DEP'T OF CMTY. AFFAIRS, 1976-1977 NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF
COMMUNITY AFFAIRS ANNUAL REPORT 18 (1978); N.J. DEP'T OF CMTY. AFFAIRS, 1978 NEW
JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS ANNUAL REPORT 19 (1979) (stating that grants
were used for "the construction of parks and recreational facilities, trees, litter baskets, public
works equipment and a variety of other locally determined priorities" ).
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conclusions even more troubling is that the change in this variable was the
result of an explicit provision in the exact law about which they wrote. Of
course, most people did not draw the connection between the "clean"
portion and crime rates. But surely Wilson and Kelling, whose diagnostic
work mentions architectural factors such as broken windows and
abandoned buildings, set crime policy back by not considering design-based
solutions and instead pursuing the single-track focus on law enforcement.
If architecture can help prevent windows from being broken in the first
place, then it can accomplish what "broken windows" policing has tried to
do, and in ways that may ultimately be better for communities. Quite
literally, the use of design tools-such as unbreakable plastic panes instead
of breakable glass ones--can reduce the reality and fear of crime. And
residents who engage in natural surveillance are most likely to intervene in
garden-variety incivilities such as littering, graffiti, and public drinking.
A focus on architecture permits exploration of strategies designed to
reduce the fear of crime, a crucial part of Wilson and Kelling's argument.
Studies suggest that nearly fifty percent of Americans are afraid to be
outside at night in their own neighborhoods.'52 Fear of crime is not solely
the product of the level of crime in a community; studies show that people
are more afraid of crime when they see signs of physical disorder around
them. 5 3 This finding squares with common sense. Most people do not read
crime statistics; rather they take cues from the environment.'54
152. Dan A. Lewis & Michael G. Maxfield, Fear in the Neighborhoods: An Investigation of
Crime, 17 RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 160, 160 (1980). Women, minorities, and the elderly tend to
have a greater fear of crime-a fear that is matched by the reality that they are more often targets
of crime as well. CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH HOUSING DESIGN, supra note 32, at 4; Victoria
H. Jaycox, The Elderly's Fear of Crime: Rational or Irrational?, 3 VICTIMOLOGY INT'L J. 329
(1978).
153. Lewis & Maxfield, supra note 152, at 162-70; see also SKOGAN, supra note 22, at 47
(arguing that physical decay can "spark fear of crime, because Americans have come to associate
it with higher levels of risk"); Ralph B. Taylor & Sally A. Shumaker, Local Crime as a Natural
Hazard: Implications for Understanding the Relationship Between Disorder and Fear of Crime,
18 AM. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 619, 634-35 (1990) (finding a discontinuity between actual and
perceived crime rates). Other empirical evidence suggests that people look to environmental cues
to assess the safety of a neighborhood. ARTHUR STINCHCOMBE ET AL., CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT-CHANGING ATTITUDES IN AMERICA 41 (1980) (" [W]e fear crime ... in situations
that give off danger signs in advance." ).
154. Widespread graffiti and abandoned buildings, for instance, have been shown to
contribute to the fear and reality of additional crime. See DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV.,
ABANDONED HOUSING RESEARCH (1973) (finding that the abandonment of as little as three
percent of buildings in an area can create a tipping point, inducing people to move away and
investors to tighten credit); SKOGAN, supra note 22, at 41-43; Lewis & Maxfield, supra note 152,
at 179 (discussing graffiti); John T. Metzger, Planned Abandonment: The Neighborhood Life-
Cycle Theory and National Urban Policy, 11 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE (2000),
http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/hpd/pdf/hpd-It0l-metzger.pdf (discussing how
abandoned buildings increase crime); Terance D. Miethe, Fear and Withdrawalfrom Urban Life,
539 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC1. 14, 21 (1995) (noting that "neighborhood
deterioration" prompts fear of crimc); William Spelman, Abandoned Buildings: Magnets for
Crime?, 21 J. CRIM. JUST. 481 (1993) (finding that blocks with abandoned buildings had crime
rates twice as high as blocks without them).
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By creating open and inviting areas that can be monitored easily,
architects can make residents and bystanders feel safer. 55 Studies have
shown, for example, that darkness in neighborhoods contributes to fear of
crime.'56 Once natural surveillance is enabled through lighting and the
variety of other architectural mechanisms discussed above, people will feel
more comfortable being out of doors. Sponsoring neighborhood cleanups
might be another way to reduce the fear of crime;'57 indeed, one might
wonder whether the recent reduction in crime in New York City is less a
result of quality-of-life policing and more a result of the beautification
campaigns launched in the city. Creating a sense of territoriality, which has
been shown to increase stewardship of the land, can encourage individuals
to lead beautification and cleanup campaigns on their own. The claim is not
that design will somehow magically transform places of fear into places of
frolic, 158 but that it can help usher in such a transformation.
If architecture can succeed in reducing the fear of crime, it can reduce
the actual crime rate even further. This logic follows directly from Wilson
and Kelling, who believed that the fear of crime decreases natural
surveillance and that natural surveillance in turn helps prevent crime. Fear
of crime can undermine the power of natural surveillance for four reasons:
(1) It may lead individuals to withdraw from community life; (2) it may
imply that attitudes against crime are sufficiently weak that it is not possible
to change them; (3) it may undermine the ability of the community to
organize itself against crime; and (4) it may harm local businesses, resulting
in a poorer economy and less pedestrian traffic.'59 Studies show that those
155. Bonnie S. Fisher & Jack L. Nasar, Fear of Crime in Relation to Three Exterior Site
Features, 24 ENV'T & BEHAV. 35, 52-54 (1992); Aldert Vrij & Frans Willem Winkel,
Characteristics of the Built Environment and Fear of Crime: A Research Note on Interventions in
Unsafe Locations, 12 DEVIANT BEHAV.: INTERDISC. J. 203, 213 (1991) (finding that "quiet and
deserted, poor lighting, good overall view, and actually criminal" are the four "factors that
contribute most to the unsafe image of a location").
156. BURSIK & GRASMICK, supra note 81, at 94-95 (discussing Mark Warr, Dangerous
Situations: Social Context and Fear of Criminal Victimization, 68 Soc. FORCES 891 (1990)); see
also CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH HOUSING DESIGN, supra note 32, at 48-49 ("[Ilmproved
external lighting can help to reduce crime levels and lessen the fear of crime. Effective lighting
increases the potential offenders' feeling of exposure and improves the chances of identification
and detection.").
157. TAYLOR & HARRELL, supra note 31, at 15.
158. See Merry, supra note 38 (criticizing the view that architecture will guarantee that a
space will appear safe).
159. BURSIK & GRASMICK, supra note 81, at 58. Fear of crime ultimately limits "encounters
with particular types of people, restrict[s] interpersonal relationships and communications
patterns, and reduce[s] participation in particular activities." Miethe, supra note 154, at 22. For
example, more than fifty percent of Seattle residents state that they avoid eye-to-eye contact with
strangers or stay away from them when they think they are in a "dangerous" area. Id. at 23; see
also JOHN E. CONKLIN, THE IMPACT OF CRIME 99 (1975) ("Crime also seems to reduce social
interaction as fear and suspicion drive people apart. This produces a disorganized community that
is unable to exercise informal social control over deviant behavior."); Skogan, supra note 100, at
215 ("One of the most significant consequences of fear is physical withdrawal from community
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who fear crime are most likely to be withdrawn from public life. And this
leads to a multiplier effect: The more people withdraw, the more crime
increases; the more crime increases, the more people withdraw."
Architectural solutions can break this dangerous spiral. Take graffiti as
an example. Because graffiti increases the fear of crime, architectural
techniques that make graffiti more difficult to place on walls may improve a
community's morale and bring more people out of doors, thereby reducing
the crime rate. The police officer and, more often than not, government
officials and policymakers look to the law to prevent graffiti. The architect,
by contrast, thinks about graffiti-resistant paints and stains, or careful use of
landscaping (planting prickly bushes near walls and the like).161
Washington, D.C., has a novel way of preventing graffiti in its Metro transit
stations: It uses curved walls that are impossible for passengers to reach and
paint. 62 And even of those architectural solutions that do not directly
reduce the crime rate, some will indirectly reduce it by minimizing fear.
163
life. Fearful people report that they stay at home more often, especially after dark. When they do
go out, they carefully avoid coming into contact with strangers.").
160. Bursik and Grasnick note:
If such withdrawal from local networks becomes widespread, the sense of mutual
responsibility among the residents is undermined, and those who are able to do so may
attempt to physically abandon the neighborhood at the earliest possibility. As a result,
the capacity for local control may further deteriorate, thereby accelerating the processes
that originally gave rise to crime.
BURSIK & GRASMICK, supra note 81, at 4-5 (citation omitted); see also SKOGAN, supra note 22,
at 49 ("[Clertain disorders are self-propagating--once they appear, they generate more disorder
unless they are quickly and energetically stamped out."); id. at 13 ("Such withdrawal tends to
reduce the supervision of youths, undermines any general sense of mutual responsibility among
area residents, and weakens informal social control. Withdrawal also undermines participation in
neighborhood affairs, presaging a general decline in the community's organizational and political
capacity.... Fewer people will want to shop or live in areas stigmatized by visible signs of
disorder; these problems feed upon themselves, and neighborhoods spiral deeper into decline.").
161. See CROWE, supra note 18, at 58 (outlining such solutions); see also BURSIK &
GRASMICK, supra note 81, at 102 (discussing how the presence of graffiti "clearly illustrates the
symbolic implications of disorder").
162. The Washington, D.C., Metro subway system prevents crime through the following:
(I) graffiti- and vandal-resistant materials in the trains and on platforms; (2) high ceilings to create
feelings of openness and reduce fear; (3) the absence of comers and winding corridors that block
visibility; (4) information booths above the platforms so that attendants can watch over them;
(5) trash receptacles to reduce litter; (6) plenty of lighting; and (7) clear signs to discourage
confusion as riders leave trains, making them less vulnerable to pickpocketing. See Nancy G. La
Vigne, Visibility and Vigilance: Metro's Situational Approach to Preventing Subway Crime, at
http://www.ismcpi.org/icalreference/CPTED-1998_lO.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2001). "
163. TAYLOR & HARRELL, supra note 31, at 4 ("Physical improvements may reduce the
signals of vulnerability and increase commitment to joint protective activities. Physical
deterioration, in all probability, not only influences cognition and behavior of potential offenders
but also shapes how residents behave and what they think about other residents."); id. at 14
("Resident-generated signs of caring and proprietorship signal to other residents and to outsiders
that people living there care, are vigilant about what happens on the street, and are willing to
intervene if needed."); Yoko Baba & D. Mark Austin, Neighborhood Environmental Satisfaction,
Victimization, and Social Participation as Determinants of Perceived Neighborhood Safety, 21
ENV'T & BEHAV. 763, 778 (1989) (making the same point).
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All of this should have been part of the original "broken windows"
proposal, but Wilson and Kelling's focus on law prompted politicians,
lawyers, and law enforcement officials to neglect architecture and focus on
legal enforcement against quality-of-life offenses instead.
b. Architecture as Social Expression
An ascendant theory in criminal law sees the law as an expression of
societal attitudes and beliefs.' 6 This expressive component of the law, it is
thought, can deter crime because the law's very enumeration of a set of
principles induces compliance. The study of architecture reveals that the
statute books are not the only vehicle by which such expressions can be
made. The physical environment, too, can be an expression of society's
aims and principles-so much so that the expressive power of the
environment may even supplant the expressive force of law. After all,
architecture is immediately apparent and speaks to those who view it in "an
invisible language." 65 As Amos Rapoport has observed, architecture sends
nonverbal messages that observers decode.166 One cannot understand, say,
the Berlin Wall by looking to its technical and physical details; its
expressive force dominates these other aspects.
Legal scholars have focused on the relationship between norms and
law, reasoning that changing law can change social norms. Some
economists, by contrast, have looked to price as a key variable in the
formation of social norms. The insight of the expressivist theory of criminal
law is to explain how social norms change even when prices are constant. It
provides an account for how the law's announcement of principles can
shape beliefs. Architects understand that physical space operates in quite
the same way, by expressing views that reinforce norms.
Architectural theorists from Heidegger to Harries have singled out
architecture's power of expression. To Heidegger, a bridge is not simply a
mechanism to bring previously separated locations and people together. It is
164. E.g., Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law, or
Tool for Criminal Enforcement?, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1227 (2000); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal
Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000).
165. MASAO NOGUCHI, INVISIBLE LANGUAGE: A DIALOGUE WITH FIVE ARCHITECTS
(1991); see also CHARLES T. GOODSELL, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF CIVIC SPACE 46 (1988)
(arguing that architecture is a "teaching medium"); CHRISTIAN NORBERG-SCHULZ, MEANING IN
WESTERN ARCHITECTURE 426 (1975) (" [Airchitecture too is a language.").
166. AMOS RAPOPORT, THE MEANING OF THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT 55-56 (1982); see also
MAYA LIN, BOUNDARIES 2:03 (2000) ("Each of my works originates from a simple desire to
make people aware of their surroundings, not just the physical world but also the psychological
world we live in."); RAPOPORT, supra, at 16-22 (discussing how details like window panes can
express certain messages); id. at 28-29 (discussing how the design of Renaissance churches
"express[ed] important ideas of neoplatonic philosophy").
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also a tool of expression.167 To Harries, architecture "not only expresses,
but intends to express cultural values and concerns. It does not just
communicate, it is intended to communicate." 168 Norwegian architect
Thomas Thiis-Evensen calls this "architectural expression" and points out
how even simple components of a building, such as its floor, wall, and roof,
express fundamental beliefs. 6 Other architects and architectural theorists
have also commented on the expressive power of architecture. 70
Until this point, we have considered the variety of architectural crime
prevention techniques as largely equal. Now our path begins to diverge.
The expressivist theory of architecture teaches us that architects must be
sensitive to the social message sent by design and refrain from using
patterns that instill fear. We have already seen signs of this problem, such
as dilapidated buildings, which communicate that crime is commonplace,
and spaces that are not lit well, which express an attitude of carelessness.
For this reason, subtle architecture that gently reinforces law-abiding norms
and prevents a degree of intrusion is to be preferred to explicit and
awkward physical barricades that reflect the feeling that a community is
167. Heidegger notes:
[P]eople think of the bridge as primarily and really merely a bridge; after that, and
occasionally, it might possibly express much else besides; and as such an expression it
would then become a symbol .... But the bridge, if it is a true bridge, is never first of
all a mere bridge and then afterward a symbol.
MARTIN HEIDEGGER, Building Dwelling Thinking, in POETRY, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT 143, 153
(Albert Hofstadter trans., Harper & Row 1971); see also Gunter A. Dittmar, Architecture as
Dwelling and Building Design as Ontological Act, SUBJECT, June 1998, para. 16, at
http://www.theo.tu-cottbus.de/wolke/eng/Subjects982/Dittmarldittmar t.html (" [Architecture]
locates us within the larger order of our world by 'carving out a place for our being' from the vast
and shapeless continuity of time and space and giving it symbolic and physical presence....
Buildings are not ends in themselves, but mediating objects through which we create a world for
ourselves and enter into a dialogue with the world around us .... (quoting Heidegger)).
168. KARSTEN HARRIES, THE ETHICAL FUNCTION OF ARCHITECTURE 285 (1997); see also
id. at 157 (noting that "buildings speak to us").
169. THOMAS THiiS-EVENSEN, ARCHETYPES IN ARCHITECTURE 35, 115, 299 (1987); see
also ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 43 (explaining that architects use a "pattern language" to
express certain concepts); Christian Norberg-Schulz, Kahn, Heidegger and the Language of
Architecture, 18 OPPOSITIONS 29 (1979) (explaining a similar concept).
170. For Louis Kahn, "the art of architecture is a poetic language. It is nonverbal, consisting
of physical ciphers meant to be read. Architecture 'speaks' through silent but evocative, corporeal
images directed to the eye." Joseph A. Burton, Philosophical Differences in the Thoughts of Louis
A. Kahn and Martin Heidegger, SUBJECT, June 1998, para. 17, at http://www.theo.tu-
cottbus.de/wolke/eng/Subjects/982/Burton/burton_t.html. James Polshek similarly says that
buildings "make public 'statements"' and can "reinforce the positive aspects of human behavior
and thus act as cultural and social stabilizers." JAMES STEWART POLSHEK, CONTEXT AND
RESPONSIBILITY 9 (1988). John Zeisel, an architectural sociologist, opines that "[the
environment is used as a medium of communication: to express individual group affiliation" as
well as "to send informal public messages" through, for example, "graffiti on public walls."
JOHN ZEISEL, SOCIOLOGY AND ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN 26 (1975).
Not too much should be made of all of this, for many individuals' beliefs are unlikely to be
significantly altered by architecture. The same could be said for the power of the law to change
social norms. In both disciplines, expression will change the norms of only some-but this is still
significant.
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under siege. Cheap wire fences do not express a belief in the power of law
or norms; rather, they reflect the opposite. 7 The same can be said for ugly
iron bars on windows, which express the terror of crime as powerfully as
does any sign or published crime statistic.
This insight suggests that certain forms of architectural prevention of
crime, particularly cheap barricades, will not capture all potential benefits
and may be counterproductive. There are, however, ways to design subtle
devices that barricade without reflecting fear. Moreover, a whole host of
architectural strategies-such as the placement of doors and windows,
creation of semipublic congregation spaces, street layout alterations, park
redesign, and many more-sidestep creating an architecture dominated by
the expression of fear. Indeed, cheap barricades often substitute for these
subtler measures. Viewed this way, gated communities are a byproduct of
public disregard of architecture, not a sustainable solution to crime. '72 Weak
17 1. Fences must be carefully designed; a cheap one will run the risk of creating a "fortress"
mentality and increase the fear of crime. HENRY G. CISNEROS, DEFENSIBLE SPACE 22 (1995); see
also Tom McKay, The Target Hardening Trap, at http://www.ismcpi.org/icaireference/
hardjtrap.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2001) (discussing problems with exclusive reliance on target-
hardening measures).
172. Gated communities generally work along only one architectural precept-reducing
access. They tend to have minimal natural surveillance and poor opportunities for social
interaction, thereby creating a false sense of security. See Georjeanna Wilson-Doenges, An
Exploration of Sense of Community and Fear of Crime in Gated Communities, 32 ENV'T &
BEHAV. 597, 600, 608 (2000); see also Edward J. Blakely & Mary Gail Snyder, Divided We Fall:
Gated and Walled Communities in the United States, in ARCHITECTURE OF FEAR 85, 97 (Nan
Ellin ed., 1997) (" [WIalls, street patterns and barricades that separate people from one another
reduce the potential for people to understand one another and commit themselves to any common
or collective purpose."); Udo Greinacher, Fear and Dreaming in the American City: From Open
Space to Cyberspace, in ARCHITECTURE OF FEAR, supra, at 281, 288-89 ('" [G]ated enclaves tend
to be nothing more than an assemblage of individuals lacking any communal spirit.... [Situdies
conducted by police departments have failed to indicate a decline in property crime due to such
elaborate and expensive measures."); Wilson-Doenges, supra, at 605 (summarizing an empirical
study showing that the sense of community in gated communities is lower).
In addition, the social meaning of a gated community is one of fear--one that reinforces a
view of crime as prevalent rather than controlled. See EDWARD J. BLAKELY & MARY GAIL
SNYDER, FORTRESS AMERICA 152 (1997) (" [G]ated areas... represent[] a concrete metaphor for
the closing of the gates against immigrants and minorities and the poverty, crime, and social
instabilities in society at large." ). Indeed, gated communities can attract criminals instead of repel
them. See John Allman et al., Sense of Security Can Be an Illusion, SUN-SENTINEL, Feb. 25, 2001,
at Al (quoting police detective Mike Reed as saying that "some criminals think if it's a gated
community, there must be something in there worth getting"). As a result of these factors,
empirical studies have found that gated communities do not decrease crime. See id. (discussing a
study of fourteen gated and fourteen nongated communities); Jim Carlton, Behind the Gate, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 1989, § 1, at 3 (describing police department studies in Irvine and Newport Beach,
California, that find no reduction in crime in gated communities); Nan Ellin, Shelter from the
Storm or Form Follows Fear and Vice Versa, in ARCHITECTURE OF FEAR, supra, at 13, 42
(noting studies that show the failure of gated communities to decrease crime); Wilson-Doenges,
supra, at 605-07 (discussing a more in-depth study of two communities).
These findings about gated communities do not call into question one of the central
conclusions of this Article, which is that a balance among architectural goals is optimal. Some
architecture, such as that used by gated communities, may prevent crime at the expense of social
interaction. This tradeoff might be worth it in rare circumstances, but a healthy balance among
access controls, social interaction, and natural surveillance will often be necessary. Gates alone
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public approaches to crime, whether through law enforcement or other
means, stimulate these pernicious methods of self-help.
In sum, we should not underestimate the expressive power of
architecture, particularly because law is rather clumsy at shaping social
norms. For the law to be truly successful, it actually has to express an
attitude that people can hear. And this requires that people know the law or
that the expression trickle down through numerous and sometimes
improbable filtering agents.' 73 Architecture is, by contrast, a ubiquitous part
of life. It does not shape tastes through a reflexive stimulus-response;
rather, it operates in nuanced and subtle ways. Careful attention to these
pathways is required, for devices that appear to prevent crime can be
counterproductive if they express fear.
3. Individual Attitudes
Winston Churchill, in defense of rebuilding the House of Commons
after the Germans bombed it, stated, "We shape our buildings, and
afterwards our buildings shape us." 174 Churchill understood proxemics and
went so far as to claim that the shape of the House was essential to the two-
party system and that its small size was critical for "free debate." "'
Architects can create spaces that bring people together or ones that set them
apart. They can reinforce feelings of familiarity and trust or emphasize
will rarely work along the multiplicity of dimensions needed for effective crime control. And a
government solution may avoid some of the perverse effects created by the gates, such as
suggesting items of value to potential burglars.
173. See JOHANNES ANDENEAS, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 110-28 (1974).
174. Winston S. Churchill, A Sense of Crowd and Urgency (Oct. 28, 1943), in 7 WINSTON S.
CHURCHILL: HIS COMPLETE SPEECHES, 1897-1963, at 6869, 6869 (Robert Rhodes James ed.,
1974). The statement appears to be a variation on Montesquieu's dictum, "[T]he rulers of
republics establish institutions; and afterwards the institutions mold the rulers." MONTESQUiEU,
CONSIDERATIONS ON THE CAUSE OF THE GREATNESS OF THE ROMANS AND THEIR DECLINE 25
(David Lowenthal trans., Free Press 1965) (1734).
175. Churchill wanted an "oblong and not semi-circular" Chamber. The latter enables
every group to move round the centre, adopting various shades of pink according as the
weather changes.... The party system is much favoured by the oblong form of
Chamber.... [Tihe act of crossing the Floor is one which requires serious
consideration. I am well informed on this matter, for I have accomplished that difficult
process, not only once but twice.
Churchill, supra note 174, at 6869. He then explained that the Chamber
should not be big enough to contain all its Members .... The reason for this has long
been a puzzle to uninstructed outsiders .... If the House is big enough to contain all its
Members, nine-tenths of its Debates will be conducted in the depressing atmosphere of
an almost empty or half-empty Chamber. The essence of good House of Commons
speaking is the conversational style .... But the conversational style requires a fairly
small space ....
Id. at 6870.
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harshness and social chaos. Sociological and psychological work confirms
the impact of design on behavior and attitudes.
76
The theory of how architecture shapes tastes has been developed within
the field of environmental psychology and has been largely ignored by law
schools due to their focus on the use of legal codes to regulate conduct.'
77
The general upshot of this work is that architecture can alter human
behavior. Many of these influences occur on a subliminal level, and their
effects are not always "thought out." 78 For example, when individuals
walk into a room, they will be cued by features of the room-whether it is
occupied (and to what extent), whether it is furnished (and in what manner),
and so on. Some of these features will be consciously noticed, others will
not. But the unconscious ones can influence behavior and attitudes too, as
evidence from psychiatric wards, prisons, and elsewhere reveals.
7 9
Caution about these experimental findings is warranted, for architecture
is only one variable in the mix of stimuli that influence individual behavior.
But these findings are not newfangled ones; indeed, the belief that
architecture changes attitudes is at least as old as Western civilization. The
ancient Greeks designed their temple columns with stone bearing large
traces of phosphorus because they knew it would throw off a golden glow
after dawn and dusk, reminding people to come to the temple and
commanding awe." Castles were built with moats, not simply to make
penetration more difficult, but also to set the castle off from the rest of the
land and induce reverence among viewers. Today, law enforcement is
aware of the power of architecture when it comes to questioning suspects.
The interrogation room is a study in architectural manipulation; its large
desks, tables, and high chairs for interrogators and bright lighting simulate
the effect of a truth chamber.
In addition to influencing social interaction,
8' architecture can
influence behavior and attitudes more directly through design. For example,
176. E.g., HALL, supra note 120, at 171 (emphasizing that "virtually everything that man is
and does is associated with the experience of space"); WILLIAM MICHELSON, MAN AND His
URBAN ENVIRONMENT 30-32, 168-90 (1970) (discussing studies).
177. ROGER G. BARKER, ECOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY 186-205 (1968); ITrELSON ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 1, 5-6, 343.
178. ITrELSON ETAL., supra note 2, at 13, 128.
179. See Daniel Glaser, Architectural Factors in isolation Promotion in Prisons, in
ENVIRONMENT AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 97, at 105 (discussing prisons); William
H. Ittelson et al., Bedroom Size and Social Interaction of the Psychiatric Ward, in ENVIRONMENT
AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 97, at 95, 99-104 (discussing psychiatric wards); see also
CONSTANCE PERIN, WITH MAN IN MIND 36 (1970) ("The physical environment is said to
influence social and interpersonal relationships ... [and] can maximize human interaction.");
Alberto Perez-G6mez, Dwelling on Heidegger: Architecture as Mimetic Techno-Poiesis,
SUBJECT, June 1998, at http://www.theo.tu-cottbus.de/wolke/englsubjects/982/perez-
gomez-t.html (discussing the scientific impact of architecture).
180. CROWE, supra note 18, at 82.
181. I have already shown how providing residents with some dominion over public spaces,
even through minor measures such as permitting gardening on public property, can prevent crime
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the feeling of being crowded correlates with aggression. 82 Architects can
alleviate the sensation of crowding by adding windows that allow for
natural light, by using rectangular rooms (which are perceived to be larger
than square ones), and by employing light-colored paints." 3 When people
perceive more space, they tend to become less hostile. Apart from these
positive effects, light and dark have other effects on human behavior that
may be relevant to crime.' 4 Other techniques, such as incorporating nature
and greenery, have also been shown to decrease aggressive behavior.'85
While the studies should not be overemphasized, psychologists have
found results showing that various colors affect behavior and emotions. The
most consistent such finding is that red induces a higher level of arousal
than do cool colors like green and blue."8 6 Another study indicated that
by giving people incentives to take care of their property and monitor nearby individuals. Such
strategies also reinforce a crucial lesson: People can manipulate the environment around them.
Incentives for individual control can encourage good neighboring and watchful eyes and can
suggest to criminals that they cannot rationalize away their criminal acts. JACOBS, supra note 30,
at 82 (contrasting a locksmith who "bawls out one of my sons for running into the street" with an
unrescued boy trapped in a housing project elevator; the former receives "an overt lesson in safety
and obedience" and the indirect lesson that the locksmith, " with whom we have no ties other than
street propinquity, feels responsible for him," whereas the latter "learns opposite lessons from his
experiences"); NEWMAN, supra note 26, at 206 (making a similar point).
182. See Andrew Baum & Paul B. Paulus, Crowding, in I HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PSYCHOLOGY 533, 533-70 (Daniel Stokols & Irwin Altman eds., 1987).
183. See Andrew Baum & Glenn E. Davis, Spatial and Social Aspects of Crowding
Perception, 8 ENV'T & BEHAV. 527 (1976) (discussing light-colored rooms); David R. Mandel et
al., Room Utilization and Dimensions of Density: Effects of Height and View, 12 ENV'T &
BEHAV. 308, 309 (1980) (finding that rooms exposed to light are perceived as less crowded);
Edward K. Sadalla & Diana Oxley, The Perception of Room Size: The Rectangularity Illusion, 16
ENV'T & BEHAV. 394 (1984) (discussing rectangular rooms); see also Naz Kaya & Feyzan Erkip,
Satisfaction in a Dormitory Building: The Effects of Floor Height on the Perception of Room Size
and Crowding, 33 ENV'T & BEHAv. 35 (2001) (discussing floor height).
184. Consider one study that put eight people each (four men and four women) in two rooms
without their shoes or anything in their pockets. One room was lit and one completely dark. In the
lit room, the subjects spoke in polite conversation the entire time, tended to sit in one spot, and
barely touched each other. However, in the dark room where subjects were told they would not
meet each other in the light, 100% of the subjects accidentally touched each other, 90%
intentionally touched each other, 50% hugged, some even kissed, and almost 80% reported feeling
some degree of sexual excitement. Kenneth J. Gergen et al., Deviance in the Dark, PSYCHOL.
TODAY, Oct. 1973, at 129-30; see also Roger Ulrich, View Through a Window May Influence
Recovery from Surgery,'224 SCIENCE 420, 421 (1984) (finding that patients with views of nature
outside windows had shorter post-operative stays).
185. See Stephen Kaplan, The Restorative Benefits of Nature: Toward an Integrative
Framework, 15 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 169 (1995) (concluding that experience in natural
environments mitigates stress); Frances E. Kuo, Coping with Poverty: Impacts of Environment
and Attention in the Inner City, 33 ENV'T & BEHAV. 5 (2001) (suggesting that the addition of
greenery would enhance the functioning of public housing residents); Frances E. Kuo & William
C. Sullivan, Environment and Crime in the Inner City: Does Vegetation Reduce Crime?, 33
ENV'T & BEHAV. 343 (2001) (finding that the greener a building's surroundings are, the fewer
total crimes occur).
186. See Glenn D. Wilson, Arousal Properties of Red Versus Green, 23 PERCEPTUAL &
MOTOR SKILLS 947 (1966). In one study of psychiatric wards, cool colors were found to induce
patients to be calmer and have higher self-esteem, and reduced the number of violent outbreaks.
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people walked faster down a hallway painted red or orange than down one
painted in cooler colors.187 After experimenting with hundreds of shades,
Professor Schauss identified a certain shade of pink, Baker-Miller, as the
most successful color to mediate aggression.'88 The shade has been tested
multiple times with strong results tying it to decreased aggression. In one
recent study, prisoners in Baker-Miller pink cells were found to be less
abusive than those in magnolia-colored cells.'89 Some members of the
scientific community remain unconvinced by such findings, and hesitation
is warranted before changing design along these lines.
None of this should be mistaken for architectural determinism or its
derivative belief that good buildings alone will end crime. These hopes of
"salvation by bricks" are illusory. ° But our rejection of this extreme
should not lead us to the opposite extreme view, which holds that physical
settings are irrelevant to human beliefs and action. Architecture influences
behavior; it does not determine it.
4. Perpetration Cost
Architecture can also constrain crime by making it more expensive, as
this monetary price will deter some offenders. This point can be
summarized briefly. When target-hardening measures and access controls
are employed, only those criminals who have the sophistication and tools to
circumvent these defenses will be frequent violators. Strong locks on doors,
for example, require training and equipment to break. Some empirical
evidence suggests that burglars are sensitive to fences and locks; one reason
is that such devices increase the cost of committing a criminal act.'
9'
Prominent criminologists have argued that crime is a result of a need for
Roger Christenfeld et al., How Physical Settings Affect Chronic Mental Patients, 60 PSYCHIATRIC
Q. 253, 262 (1989).
187. See RICHARD SEATON, DEP'T OF ARCHITECTURE, UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY,
MISCELLANEOUS UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH ON SPATIAL BEHAVIOR 18 (1968).
188. See Alexander G. Schauss, The Physiological Effect of Color on the Suppression of
Human Aggression: Research on Baker-Miller Pink, at http://bacweb.the-bac.edu
-michael.b.williams/baker-miller.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2001).
189. See C.P. Bennett et al., The Use of Baker-Miller Pink in Police Operational and
University Experimental Situations in Britain, 13 INT'L J. BIOSOCIAL & MED. RES. 118, 121
(1991) (noting that "statistical analysis produced a 95% probability that the pink cell would
tranquilize subjects quicker than a magnolia cell"); see also James E. Gilliam, The Effects of
Baker-Miller Pink on Physiological and Cognitive Behaviour of Emotionally Disturbed and
Regular Education Students, 17 BEHAV. DISORDERS 47 (1991).
190. JACOBS, supra note 30, at 113 (quoting Reinhold Niebuhr). For example, Buckminster
Fuller, the engineer who invented the geodesic dome, stated, "'I have learned to undertake reform
of the environment and not to try to reform Man. If we design the environment properly, it will
permit child and man to develop safely and to behave logically." Buckminster Fuller, What I
Have Learned: How Little I Know, SATURDAY REV., Nov. 12, 1966, at 70.
191. Barbara B. Brown & Irwin Altman, Territoriality, Defensible Space and Residential
Burglary: An Environmental Analysis, 3 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 203, 216 (1983).
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immediate gratification; "[t]hus a locked door will prevent some burglary.
A locked door that cannot be smashed without mechanical aid will prevent
more. A residence that appears to be observed by neighbors will be less
vulnerable than a residence that cannot be seen by people living in the
area." 192
The employment of natural surveillance and other strategies may force
criminals to work in teams and to hire lookouts and procure firepower to
avoid detection and capture. Such conspiracies, in addition to increasing the
severity of punishment, require the criminals to split profits and increase
capital investment. All of this can make crime less attractive to the criminal
by increasing the perpetration costs and reducing the potential gain.'93 In
addition, if individuals commit crimes despite the higher perpetration cost,
that cost might produce "income effects" that reduce the frequency of
entirely unrelated crimes. 94 Imagine a house burglar's reaction to the
installation of doors that require sixty minutes to break down instead of
thirty. Some burglars will refrain from the crime altogether due to the high
labor cost (a form of cost deterrence); others will still break down doors,
but will not have the time to commit other crimes (due to the income
effect). This aspect of deterrence becomes easier to understand when
"cost" is viewed not only as legal risk, but as a variable involving capital
and labor inputs.
II. METHODS FOR THE GOVERNMENT To HARNESS ARCHITECTURE
Government can promote architectural answers to crime, but the task is
not an easy one. We face three sets of difficulties here. One set of problems
has to do with teaching architects about crime control. As a discipline,
architecture does not devote much attention to crime, instead focusing
primarily on ornament, function, and more traditional matters of design. A
second set of problems has to do with criminal lawyers, who tend to think
retrospectively, in terms of particular offenses, specific offenders,
individual culpability, and purely legal remedies. A third set of problems
arises from the harm inflicted by aggressive forms of architectural control.
As I discuss in Part III, the use of architecture can be costly, may
undermine privacy and individual freedom, and may displace crime to other
locations. All three sets of problems are compounded by the fact that U.S.
land-use law is tremendously decentralized.
The methods proposed in this Part are not full "solutions" to these
difficulties, for these problems will persist in some form. Yet pessimism is
192. GOTrFREDSON & HIRSCHI, supra note 24, at 28.
193. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (arguing that conspirators can increase the perpetration cost of crime).
194. See Katyal, supra note 4, at 2432-34 (discussing income effects and y-optimality).
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not becoming either, for rules can be structured to encourage architects and
landowners to think about humanistic forms of crime control. Particularly
in those settings in which conventional crime-control proves ineffective or
too costly, more attention to architecture can be beneficial. To pluck out
five quick examples: (1) Governments could promote crime-control
mechanisms in their own construction and planning, thereby teaching
architects and private landowners by example; (2) governments could
require developers to submit "Crime Impact Statements" whenever they
embark on major projects and could thus lead architects and schools of
architecture to focus on crime prevention; (3) legislators could launch
systematic attempts to reform the model building codes in order to stress
crime control; (4) courts and legislators could strengthen already-existing
tort liability for poor architectural design to turn insurance companies into
educators about crime prevention; and (5) law enforcement agencies could
use criminal regulation of architecture, through forfeiture and other
methods, to eliminate recidivist locations.
As I discuss in the following Section, fire prevention provides a useful
model. Historically, the prevention of fire through architecture ran into
many of the same problems: Architects did not tend to think in such terms,
and decentralization of land use made legal reform quite difficult. Yet
effective fire prevention eventually succeeded, largely because private
insurance companies stepped in to become fire-prevention educators. Fire
prevention codes, many of which were written by insurance companies,
also played a significant role in encouraging localities to adopt adequate
safeguards.'95 So the task is difficult, but not impossible. The pages that
follow sketch out an analytical and practical framework for harnessing
architecture, focusing on three distinct government roles: government as
builder, as regulator, and as enforcer. Even if governments decide not to
follow these suggestions, knowledge about the intersection between
architecture and crime can help law enforcement predict where crime might
take place.'96
195. See S.S. HUEBNER, PROPERTY INSURANCE 368 (1938); infra text accompanying note
285.
196. As changes to the physical environment--such as an increase in the number of "for
rent" signs and abandoned buildings-become apparent, law enforcement officers can adjust their
priorities in anticipation of an increase in crime. TAYLOR & HARRELL, supra note 31, at 19
("Physical changes appear to precede crime changes .... [R]esearchers found that patterns of
owner-to-rental conversion, land use changes, and abandonment predicted the emergence of
hardened high-crime areas."); Ralph B. Taylor & Jeanette Covington, Ecological Change,
Changes in Violence, and Risk Prediction, 5 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 164, 172-74 (1990)
(discussing how crime prediction can vary by dynamic neighborhood characteristics); Sherry
Plaster Carter, Neighborhood Warning Signs--CPTED to the Rescue-Part 2: Expanded CPTED
Strategies, at http://www.ismcpi.org/ica/reference/CPTED-1998 06b.htm (last visited Nov. 1,
2001) (describing similar architectural features that predict crime increases). Some have suggested
that the predictive power of architecture can be used to facilitate rapid intervention by government
when an area is about to turn into a high-crime one. E.g., Leo Schuerman & Solomon Kobrin,
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A. Government as Builder
1. Housing
Several problems with modem housing projects have already been
covered, such as the height of the buildings, the design-induced feelings of
isolation, and the destruction of territoriality. Many of our nation's children
are raised in public housing; if architecture can foster social interaction and
anticrime attitudes among adults, such lessons similarly may be impressed
upon children.
Current federal regulations require public housing to conform to
building codes, national fire prevention standards, and the mandates that
projects "promote security" and "harmonize with the neighborhoods they
occupy." 97 Government can strengthen these regulations by incorporating
an explicit crime prevention focus. Building public housing that
incorporates crime prevention principles will help the effort to reduce other
social ills'98 and can be done at costs equivalent to or less than those for
existing projects."
In particular, government regulations could require consideration of the
architectural goals discussed in Part I. Empirical evidence, such as Oscar
Newman's study of 100 New York City housing projects, supports such
Community Careers in Crime, 8 CRIME & JUST. 67, 99 (1986) (suggesting that government can
react by increasing foot patrols, enforcing building codes more strictly, and carefully making
zoning decisions).
Furthermore, regardless of whether government uses architectural strategies, criminals will.
Lawbreakers currently change the environment to make their activity less visible, for example, by
employing mechanisms to slow down the entry of police officers into areas of crime and by
picking places to conduct their activity that facilitate easy escape. See Randall Atlas, The Other
Side of CPTED, SECURITY MGMT., Mar. 1991, at 63, 65-66 (finding such phenomena in Florida).
197. 24 C.F.R. § 941.203 (2001). In addition, regulations also suggest that families with
children should not be housed in elevator buildings. Id. § 941.203(d).
198. For example, poor architectural design can reinforce racial stereotypes in two ways.
First, specific knowledge can act as a barrier to discrimination. If an entryway to a housing project
is used by a few families, each of them will have the opportunity to know the others and will have
a strong ability to detect unwanted outsiders, of whatever race. By contrast, large projects where
hundreds of users pass in and out do not afford the same sort of protection. Instead, those
individuals who are stopped by residents may be disproportionately minorities, because of
unconscious or conscious racial profiling. Second, people who fear crime are generally more
likely to adopt odious general profiles of what a culprit "looks like," reasoning that the end of
preventing some crime justifies the racist means.
199. Such costs, moreover, should not be assessed in a vacuum, for the use of architectural
strategies confers positive externalities on society by reducing the crime rate. This reduction in
crime, in turn, reduces the amount spent on law enforcement and prisons and increases property
values. See generally CROWE, supra note 18, at 214 (explaining why revitalization of cities can be
done without huge expense); GARDINER, supra note 30, at 58-60 (arguing that architectural
solutions to crime are cost-effective); MOE & WILKIE, supra note 66, at xiii, 142-238 (arguing
that revitalization of cities is cost-effective). And as Hassan Fathy's groundbreaking work about
Egyptian planning demonstrates, architects can work within even severe cost constraints to
develop workable plans that take advantage of local supplies and labor markets. HASSAN FATHY,
ARCHITECTURE FOR THE POOR (1973).
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reforms.2' Newman found that large housing projects "encourage crime by
fostering feelings of anonymity, isolation, irresponsibility, lack of identity
with surroundings, etc.201 By strategically placing housing units, windows,
corridors, and entryways in areas that provide natural surveillance, design
protects both inhabitants and passersby-who will then venture out in
public more and draw additional people to the area. Accordingly, the recent
trend away from high-rise housing projects should be encouraged. One-
third of the 1.4 million units of public housing are already one- and two-
story structures, and buildings from three to six stories comprise almost
another quarter of the units.20 2 Paying more attention to exterior
environments is also important. Bulk uniform projects stigmatize residents
and suggest that they are "easy hits." 203
For some existing housing projects, the government could pass
regulations requiring retrofitting to prevent crime. Small private or
semiprivate lawns near entrances can encourage feelings of territoriality;
strong lighting can enhance visibility; staining and glazing can increase
contrast; and buildings refaced with a diversity of pleasing finishes can
reflect individuality and territoriality. Large open spaces can be subdivided
to encourage natural surveillance. If teenagers are a crime problem,
architects can create rough-appearing areas for them to congregate, for
200. See NEWMAN, supra note 26, at 27. Newman's work has been criticized on
methodological grounds. Merry, supra note 38; A.E. Bottoms, 14 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 203,
205-06 (1974) (reviewing NEWMAN, supra note 26) (criticizing Newman's methodology but
stating that his thesis is plausible). Other studies have corroborated his findings, however. Taylor,
supra note 81, at 305 (citing other studies and concluding that "the focus on design as a covariate
of crime has been substantiated"). Studies have also corroborated the theory of defensible space:
Defensible space theory has received strong supporting evidence from studies of public
housing in Britain and the United States and from studies of residential street blocks in
the United States. What many consider to be one of the strongest studies focused on 63
public housing sites around the country. The study found that sites with more
defensible space features had residents who better controlled outdoor spaces and were
less fearful and less victimized.
TAYLOR & HARRELL, supra note 31, at 8.
201. NEWMAN, supra note 26, at 28. Tall projects often achieve no greater housing density
than low-rise buildings, are more expensive, and facilitate crime and social isolation. Architects
took the high-rise concept from middle- and high-income buildings and simply copied it for
housing projects. But the formula of using a single entrance and elevator bank only works well in
conjunction with features that exist in upper-income buildings, such as a doorperson or security
guard. See id. at 23-24. Once the city of New Orleans switched from using large buildings with
interior stairs and corridors to using smaller two- and three-story walk-ups as housing projects, for
example, the robbery rate plummeted and burglaries of apartments were virtually eliminated, Id.
at 100. The result of such tactics is to "cement collective identity and responsibility... through
these social pressures[;] .. opening up all activity in public spaces to natural supervision proves a
very powerful deterrent to criminal acts." Id.
202. CISNEROS, supra note 171, at 9.
203. NEWMAN, supra note 26, at 102; see also ITTELSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 268 ("The
house is a symbolic extension of oneself; as such, its character (slum or mansion) may be the
result of personal qualities (inadequacy or skill) as well as a reinforcer of those qualities. With
many poor families the housing-poverty cycle is, indeed, a vicious one.").
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
10932002]
The Yale Law Journal
example, by using uncut stone slabs for sitting and placing the stones near
streets and apartments for natural surveillance.2 "
Clason Point Gardens in the South Bronx provides a helpful example of
how to retrofit existing projects. Architects made four simple changes to
these row houses to reduce the crime rate: They (1) placed attractive six-
foot iron fencing in the back of the row houses; (2) created paths and low
curbs in the front of each unit to demarcate the front yard of each row house
as individual property; (3) resurfaced the uniform building faqades in
different colors and textures to differentiate each unit; and (4) used street
lighting and seating areas in public spaces to encourage people to be
outside. Within one year, residents had begun to care for the areas in their
front and back yards; almost all of them planted grass seed, and many
planted shrubs. After the measures, the overall crime rate dropped by more
than fifty percent. In addition, nearly twice as many tenants felt comfortable
questioning strangers who were present on the grounds."0 5
There are, however, other projects for which there is only one solution:
razing them. Very poorly designed buildings-which tend to be tall, with
single entrances and bleak, uniform appearances-are not likely to become
vibrant or to attract law-abiding tenants. Federal law already permits
projects to be destroyed when crime is rampant, and many cities have done
so.
206
Instead of rebuilding projects, the federal government has encouraged
some tenants to take rent subsidies through programs such as "Section 8."
Just as with public housing projects, government can issue procurement
regulations to govern the architectural safety of such apartments. Landlords
204. NEWMAN, supra note 26, at 172-73. In addition, projects should be placed away from
highways (thereby preventing easy escape), avoid low windows (permitting entry into units by
persons and bullets), and avoid footpaths with winding trails and dense shrubs.
205. CISNEROS, supra note 171, at 10.
206. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437v (1994) (permitting demolition of housing projects when a project
"has high rates of vandalism and criminal activity (including drug-related criminal activity) in
comparison to other housing in the area"). The Federal HOPE VI program administers grants for
revitalization and demolition of projects as well. See Harry J. Wexler, Hope VI: Market
Means/Public Ends- The Goals, Strategies, and Midterm Lessons of HUD's Urban Revitalization
Demonstration Program, 10 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 195, 196-98
(2001); see also Elizabeth Benjamin, Crime Rate Falls for Public Housing, TIMES UNION, Sept. 3,
2000, at Cl (discussing the destruction of Edwin Coming Homes in Albany); Christopher
Burbach, Putting Pride in the Heart of the City, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, May 11, 2001, at I
(discussing the tear-down of Logan Fontenelle projects in Omaha "in an effort to decentralize
crime-plagued public housing"); William Claibome, HUD, Chicago Ink Deal To Reconstruct
Public Housing, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2000, at A2 (discussing the destruction of Chicago's Robert
Taylor Homes, which were "crime-plagued and drug-ridden"); Metro in Brief, WASH. POST, July
4, 1999, at C3 (stating that George B. Murphy Homes in Baltimore were tom down because they
were "crime and drug-infested"); Norm Parish, Darst-Webbe's Replacement Will Be Different,
ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, May 16, 2001, at B1 (discussing the destruction of the Darst-Webbe
project in St. Louis, which was "troubled by years of decay and crime"); Rena Pederson, To
Tame a Tough Neighborhood Take a Stroke from Tiger Woods, PROVIDENCE J., Jan. 13, 2001,
2001 WL 5372435 (discussing the tear-down of the East Lake Meadows project in Dallas).
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who have Section 8 tenants must already meet certain standards, such as
providing "lockable" exterior doors and windows, garbage facilities, and
kitchens with food storage space and sinks.2 7 Crime prevention, however,
could be a more explicit focus of the regulations governing rent-subsidized
housing. Approximately 3.7 million Americans currently receive these rent
subsidies from the government,2° so the power of such a regulation to
change the architecture of private apartments would be vast and might
impress these methods upon private builders as well.
2. Public Lands
City streets and sidewalks account for about one-quarter of developed
urban land,2°9 and governments own a plethora of buildings and parks.
Accordingly, governments' attention to crime prevention on their own lands
holds significant promise in controlling crime. Governments can also
transmit these techniques to the private sector by instructing architects and
construction firms in effective design.
Governments may redesign city streets to reduce crime in a variety of
ways. Consider five possibilities. First, because streets and sidewalks
constitute large amounts of land in cities, greater attention to lighting those
areas would deter crime substantially. Second, localities could alter the
placement of bus stops and other public transit facilities so that they are not
near alleys and other easy escape routes."0 Third, by using attractive
barriers, localities could selectively close streets with high crime and easy
escape routes and mark them as "no through street" or "dead end.""'
207. 24 C.F.R. § 982.401(c), (d) (2001). The local housing authority must inspect a unit both
prior to occupancy by a Section 8 tenant and at least on an annual basis. Id. § 982.405. With
Section 8, the government is not acting as a builder, but rather as a quasi-regulator. This Article
considers Section 8 here because the government is a market participant, and the methods follow
naturally from the analysis of crime prevention in housing projects.
208. U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., A PICTURE OF SUBSIDIZED HOUSING IN 1998
(1998), http://www.huduser.org/datasets/assthsgtstatedata98findex.htm. To the extent such costs
will be passed onto tenants, government could provide tax breaks or other sources of funding to
defray the cost. See infra Subsection II.A.3.
209. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 15 (2d ed. 2000).
210. A recent study of 1480 crimes at sixty different bus stops in Los Angeles found that over
one-half of the crimes were committed at six stops. Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris et al., Measuring
the Effects of Built Environment on Bus Stop Crime, 28 ENV'T & PLAN. B: PLAN. & DESIGN 255
(2001). The location of the bus stop was found to be a critical factor in predicting the crime rate;
for example, those bus stops near porous alleys had crime rates that were approximately double
those of stops not near alleys. Id. at 267. Bus stops near vacant lots also had crime rates at least
double those of stops not near such lots. Id. at 270.
211. When Dayton, Ohio, employed selective closures in the Five Oaks neighborhood after
the neighborhood had become known for a burgeoning drug and prostitution trade, the crime rate
plummeted. The city adopted an architectural plan that divided the one-half-square-mile area into
ten mini-neighborhoods. Each mini-neighborhood consisted of three to six streets and shared
similar housing styles. Streets were then closed off strategically, so that only one portal could be
used to enter each of the ten mini-neighborhoods. The other entrances were blocked with iron
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Fourth, to increase natural surveillance, trees or other vegetation could be
placed alongside streets to make them more attractive, and street cleaning
and sidewalk repair can be made regular.2"2 Building benches and
permitting inner-city gardening on public land would further draw people
outdoors.2"3 Fifth, communities could expand the use of traffic control
devices (such as neighborhood signs, rumble strips, chokers, bumps, and
traffic circles) and traffic restrictions (technological enforcement of
neighborhood low speed limits, truck and bus restraints, turn prohibitions,
and parking controls) to increase foot traffic and slow down escapes." 4
A full discussion of these alternatives must await another time. But one
illustration is illuminating: the Dutch woonerf, or "residential yard." By
repaving streets and displaying signs, woonerf developers make streets fully
available for pedestrians, as well as cars, and provide the "'gestalt' message
that the street belongs to the residents." '215 The upshot of the woonerf is to
increase contact between drivers and pedestrians, slow traffic down, create
a residential atmosphere, and "emphasize the street as a 'place' rather than
a 'channel.' 216 The woonerf illustrates some of the creative possibilities for
already-existing streets.
gates that could be unlocked in emergencies. The design made it difficult for criminals to escape
quickly and stimulated a sense of common identity within the mini-neighborhoods. Cheap gates
and high walls that excluded pedestrians were eschewed out of a belief that they would create fear
rather than drive it away. CISNEROS, supra note 171, at 21-22; see also David Holmstrom, Gates
in Dayton Fortress a Diverse Neighborhood, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 31, 1995, at 12
(describing the program); Ingrid Padgett, Neighborhood Stabilization Works for Dayton
Community, NATION'S CITIES WKLY., Sept. 5, 1994, at 3 (same). In total, thirty-five gates were
set up and twenty-six alleys were closed, at a cost to the city of under $700,000.
"The effect was dramatic and immediate. Between 1992 and 1993, nonviolent crime in Five
Oaks fell by 24 percent and violent crime by 50 percent.... The average price of a single-family
home in the area increased over the same period by 15 percent." CISNEROS, supra note 171, at 19;
see also Dina Bunn, Council Studies Street Gates, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, May 2, 1995, at 18A
(discussing the benefits of gates in Dayton, Miami Shores, Detroit, and St. Louis). The street
closures "made it impossible for drug dealers and their clients to operate there, because if you
came in to buy drugs and the cops came or someone reported you, you had to go back the way you
came in. You didn't have three or four different exit routes. That stopped the drug dealing." All
Things Considered: The Case for Gated Communities (NPR radio broadcast, Apr. 1, 1995).
212. APPLEYARD ET AL., supra note 39, at 66-67, 253.
213. TAYLOR & HARRELL, supra note 31, at 15 ("The garden gives them a reason to keep an
eye out on the street and involves them more in the neighborhood."); see also Tom McKay,
Empty Spaces, Dangerous Places: Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Reference
Materials, at http://www.ismcpi.org/ica/reference/empty space.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2001)
(discussing how urban gardens planted over vacant lots make an area safer). Such gardening can
also facilitate social interaction. Paul E. Greenbaum & Susan D. Greenbaum, Territorial
Personalization: Group Identity and Social Interaction in a Slavic-American Neighborhood, 13
ENV'T & BEHAV. 574, 587 (1981).
214. APPLEYARD ET AL., supra note 39, at 80, 253, 296-305; see also County Bd. v.
Richards, 434 U.S. 5, 7 (1977) ("A community may also decide that restrictions on the flow of
outside traffic into particular residential areas would enhance the quality of life there by reducing
noise, traffic hazards, and litter.").
215. APPLEYARD ET AL., supra note 39, at 250.
216. Id. at 250, 308; see also Eran Ben-Joseph, Changing the Residential Street Scene:
Adapting the Shared Street (Woonerf) Concept to the Suburban Environment, 61 J. AM. PLAN.
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In addition to improvements in street planning, crime prevention
requires better public park design. A park that is rarely used is like a street
without neighbors-a place for crime to fester. Yet many city planners
insist that building additional parks and open spaces is the solution to urban
ills. As Jane Jacobs once asked, "More Open Space for what? For
muggings?"2 7 Park design should follow the architectural precepts
discussed in Part I, such as building long and thin parks that permit
observation at every point. Parks should also have visible and well-marked
entrances and exits, level land, effective lighting, the absence of hidden
spaces, and high maintenance levels.2"8 A former top prosecutor has told me
that drug dealers in Washington, D.C., prefer to sell their wares in the
center of city parks over most all other locales because there they can see
the police coming and easily run in any direction."9 Therefore, low fences
and symbolic barriers should be used to preclude multiple exits.
In the 1970s, New York City's Bryant Park, located next to the Public
Library in midtown Manhattan, was commonly called "Needle Park."
Needles littered the ground, and prostitutes used the tall grasses to conduct
transactions. Law-abiders, both children and adults, avoided the park.
Crime flourished, in part because of the park's architecture; "design, rather
than sociology, was at the root of Bryant Park's problems." 2 20 The park
contained hidden areas conducive to criminal activity and its design
reduced the circulation of users.22" ' It was surrounded by a high granite wall
and dense tree growth, both of which interfered with natural visibility.22
The City of New York redesigned the park in order to reduce crime.
The new design was faithful to the park's original Victorian architecture,
but altered the topography to make all areas of the park visible. Secluded
spaces were eliminated; shrubs that interfered with visibility were removed.
The city created seating areas, permitted food kiosks, and erected a stage
for concerts. Drug dealing and other crimes dropped dramatically (the
ASS'N 504 (1995) (arguing that the success of the shared street concept in Europe. Japan, and
Israel suggests its adaptability to U.S. suburbs).
217. JACOBS, supra note 30, at 90.
218. See WILLIAM H. WHYTE, THE SOCIAL LIFE OF SMALL URBAN SPACES 10-59 (1980)
(documenting features that make parks and plazas more accessible and inviting, including
appropriate length of steps, small increases in ledge space, placement of such spaces within
sightlines, and other design features); DEBORAH HIERLIHY, CITY OF TORONTO PLANNING & DEV.
DEP'T, GREEN SPACES/SAFER PLACES: A FORUM ON PLANNING SAFER PARKS FOR WOMEN 1-4
(1990) (providing guidelines to safer parks); Robert Campbell, NYC Parks Expert Offers a Proven
Growth Plan, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 12, 2000, at D5 (outlining Bryant Park manager Dan
Biederman's ten rules for building safe parks).
219. Interview with DeMaurice Smith, Special Counsel, U.S. Attorney's Office for the
District of Columbia, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 12, 2000).
220. J. WILLIAM THOMPSON, THE REBIRTH OF NEW YORK CITY'S BRYANT PARK 8 (1997).
221. Design: Bryant Park, 12 PLACES 10, 11 (1998).
222. ANrrA R. NAGER & W.R. WENTWORTH, BRYANT PARK 87 (1976); THOMPSON, supra
note 220, at 8.
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annual robbery rate dropped from approximately 170 to less than ten).22
"[Twenty-five] years ago... Bryant Park was a nightmare, almost empty
except for the drug dealers who stood along the paths.... If Bryant Park
was fixable, surely no park is hopeless. And today Bryant Park is a gem,
full of life, music, flowers, food, and most important, people." 
224
Parks and streets are two examples of public-lands strategies, and we
have already considered how government buildings, such as schools and
offices, can be constructed to control crime. Decisions about the flow and
speed of traffic also have important ramifications for private land use and
are integral to understanding crime rates. These examples demonstrate the
variety of possible techniques and underscore how crime is influenced by
the choices of public officials.22
3. Procurement
Government cannot change by fiat many private uses of land without
resort to nuisance and forfeiture law. But it can expand crime prevention to
the private sector through tax breaks and procurement strategies. For
example, local governments can provide financial incentives to
neighborhoods and property owners to use architectural precautions. One
recent example of such incentives is Florida's Safe Neighborhoods
Program. The Program was instituted out of a recognition that many of the
causes of crime could be eliminated through better design and provides for
direct spending on architectural solutions to crime: Property owners'
associations, community redevelopment organizations, and local
governments can receive $20,000, $50,000, and $100,000, respectively."2 6
In return, each recipient is required to collect and provide certain
information about natural surveillance."2 7 A similar regime could be enacted
223. Design: Bryant Park, supra note 221, at 12.
224. Campbell, supra note 218. Property values in the surrounding areas have increased; real
estate brokers now say that the park is no longer a deterrent to customers, but rather "a marketing
tool." GARVIN ET AL., supra note 100, at 54; see also id. at 52 ("Now people are thrilled to be
there .... They feel safe there and when they feel safe, thousands of them come in. It's harder to
commit a crime because criminals feel conspicuous. Even though we have our own security force,
which is unarmed, a lot of our security is what I would call 'self-enforcing."' (quoting Bryant
Park manager Dan Biederman)). Similar success stories can be found in Waterfront Park's Story
Garden in Seattle, see Lee Fleming, Personal Journey, 84 LANDSCAPE ARCHITECTURE 19 (1994),
and Koshland Park in San Francisco, see Hans H. Chen, Making Parks Safe for the Public (June 8,
2000), at http://www.apb.comlsafetycenter/family/2000/06/08/parksafetyOl .html.
225. ALEXANDER GARVIN, THE AMERICAN CITY 232 (1996) ("An obvious way for
government to foster private investment in an area is by making visible, public improvements.").
226. FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 163.517(l)(a)-(d) (Harrison 2000).
227. Among other things, data must be collected on the "types, frequency, severity, and
location" of crime in the district, and that data must be compared to rates from other cities and
counties. The district must also provide an analysis of the "land use and environmental and
physical conditions of the district, giving particular attention to factors which support or create
opportunities for crime, [and] which impede natural surveillance." Id. ch. 163.513(2).
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as a tax expenditure. Generally, governments can use the tax system to
provide "carrots" to bring about better architectural precautions. Viewed
this way, the home-interest mortgage deduction might have indirect crime-
prevention benefits by increasing territoriality and the incentive to care for
neighborhoods.2'
One alternative to such financing arrangements is the use of loan-based
strategies. The government currently underwrites a large number of housing
loans through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. These institutions could
require loans to be accompanied by an inspection finding adequate crime
prevention mechanisms. Such a law may help create a class of professionals
who think about the intersection between architecture and crime.229
Another method to influence private architecture is government
financing for nonbinding crime-prevention standards. Governments have a
wealth of information about where crime occurs and which types of places
contribute to crime. Solitary architects, developers, and clients do not
always have the resources to determine what types of design work best to
prevent crime. Accordingly, governments could direct some resources away
from chasing perpetrators down after they commit crimes and toward
developing a set of architectural standards. European states such as France,
the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom have been using national
standards for years. The United Kingdom has a set of national guidelines
for design that local officials are under a statutory duty to consider, and the
British police have trained specialists called "Architectural Liaison
Officers" (ALOs) and "Crime Prevention Design Advisors" (CPDAs)."3 °
The entire European Union is now developing a set of central standards,
called TC325, that will "provide performance requirements for the
prevention of crime" such as "building layout, application of construction
elements, roads and paths, and crime preventive lighting.23 Some
228. Tax breaks and cash subsidies are examples of what Robert Ellickson and Vicki Been
have dubbed "beneficence law." ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 209, at 636, 643; see also
Curtis J. Berger, Controlling Urban Growth via Tax Policy, 2 URB. L. & POL'Y 295 (1979)
(arguing that tax policy can shape urban development); Barry A. Currier, Exploring the Role of
Taxation in the Land Use Planning Process, 51 IND. LJ. 27 (1975) (illustrating the possibility
that tax changes may influence land use decisions). To the extent that certain precautions do not
generate substantial rewards to the user until a critical mass of neighbors is using them as well, the
tax code could provide larger benefits for "first movers" who adopt architectural precautions at
early stages. Some forms of tax incentives, such as empowerment zone tax breaks, essentially
reward early movers more because the relief is available for a longer period of time. See I.R.C. §§
1391-1397F (1994). Accordingly, tax strategies could be modified to provide for longer tax breaks
for those who use architectural protections at earlier stages in time.
229. See GARVIN, supra note 225, at 5 (observing that, under 1938 Fair Housing
Administration mortgage insurance limits, "a house had to conform to published minimum
property standards that included structure, materials, and room sizes" and that the effect "was to
guarantee a minimum standard of quality on a national scale").
230. Parker, supra note 55, at 4-5.
231. European Committee for Standardization, Market, Environment, and Objectives of
CEN/TC325, Prevention of Crime by Urban Planning and Building Design, at
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American police departments, such as New Haven's, are currently putting
on their websites information about crime prevention through design.232 But
these efforts are piecemeal and underfunded, and no architectural crime
prevention standards exist. By investing even a small fraction of their
massive criminal budgets on architecture, governments can expedite
architectural solutions to crime.
The above methods sidestep many of the difficulties with civil
regulation of architecture. Public design can be a source of inspiration and
guidance to private architects. Nevertheless, if a jurisdiction wants to go
further and regulate private land use, there are several plausible regimes.
B. Government as Regulator
The argument advanced thus far has been primarily concerned with
public lands, though mechanisms to regulate private land use deserve
attention as well. Although private ordering might generate appropriate
architectural solutions to crime, there are four reasons why it may not in
some settings. First, some existing government regulations, such as fire
codes, prevent effective crime control, thereby precluding the market from
adopting these solutions. Second, the vast number of design details, many
of which can be subtle or even latent, may require government regulation,
just as many health and safety matters are handled today through building
codes. This is particularly true for rental units. Indeed, it is worth pointing
out that land use is already one of the most heavily regulated aspects of
American life, so those jurisdictions that decide to regulate property and
structures for crime control will not be extending regulation to pristine
areas. Third, when landowners employ architecture to control crime, they
may use poor forms of it, for example, barricades that produce negative
externalities, such as fear of crime. Greater public attention to architecture
can minimize these counterproductive self-help measures. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, the existence of law enforcement itself might
skew architectural choices by subsidizing bad architecture. Private residents
can afford to pay less attention to design because they are able to rely
somewhat on law enforcement; these public expenditures can hamper
http://www.cenorm.be/standardization/tech-bodies/cen-bp/resources/a325.pdf (last visited Nov.
1,2001).
232. New Haven Dep't of Police Serv., Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, at
http://www.cityofnewhaven.com/police/htm/safety/crimeprev-ed.htm (last vLited Oct. 16, 2001);
City of San Diego, Tips To Deter Crime Through Design, at http://www.sannet.gov
police/prevention/deter.shtml (last visited Nov. 1, 2000); Eugene Police Dep't, Keeping Our
Community Safe: Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, at
http://www.ci.eugene.or.us/DPS/police/Crime%20Prevention/cpted.htm (last visited Oct. 19,
2001); Mesa, Ariz., Police Dep't, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, at
http://www.ci.mesa.az.us/police/cpted.htm (last visited Oct. 16,2001).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1100 [Vol. I111: 1039
2002] Architecture as Crime Control
optimal ordering. By emphasizing architecture, government may promote a
more efficient solution to crime-one that reduces total expenditures on
crime by weaning residents off abundant law enforcement.
Government can regulate the construction, placement, and ownership of
private buildings and open spaces to bring about crime prevention. Many of
these methods of regulation are based on land-use law and employ devices
such as impact statements, building codes, exactions, and zoning. Others
are based on tort and contract law.
1. Crime Impact Statements
Under both federal and state law, agencies must file an "Environmental
Impact Statement" (EIS) that details the effect of particular development
decisions on the environment.233 Rules could similarly require developers to
file a "Crime Impact Statement" (CIS) before constructing a large project.
The details of who would be required to file the statement, and the amount
of review the statement would receive, may vary from one jurisdiction to
another. By integrating a CIS into existing local government approval
procedures, crime assessments could take place without some of the harms
associated with their environmental counterpart. Precisely because local
agencies already have so many tools available to them to stop development,
the addition of one more might yield greater benefits than harms.2"
A CIS strategy might accomplish two goals. First, it could generate
awareness on the part of clients and developers about ways in which design
can control crime. Second, a CIS system could engender a new focus in
architecture that could eventually culminate in widespread crime prevention
233. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1994) (requiring agencies to file such statements for major federal
actions); see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-981 (1998) (requiring EISs for private development
projects); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-8 (1998) (permitting local government to require developers
of major projects to submit EISs); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21160 (West 2001) (providing that the
EIS requirement applies to any private project that requires a lease, permit, or license from a
public agency and that the "public agency may require that person to submit data and
information... or to prepare an environmental impact report"). But see CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§ 21080.7 (West 2001) (providing limited exemptions for housing projects). Other statutes require
impact statements as well. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 1552 (1994) (requiring impact statements
regarding the Unfunded Mandates Act); 18 U.S.C. § 4047 (1994) (requiring prison impact
statements whenever the executive or the judicial branch submits legislation that could increase or
decrease the number of persons incarcerated in federal institutions); 42 U.S.C. § 1302(b)
(requiring the Department of Health and Human Services to provide impact statements when a
regulation might impact upon "small rural hospitals").
234. There are typically costs associated with the EIS. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk,
Environmental Review in the Land Use Process, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 2041, 2055 (1992)
(describing how EISs may slow development); cf. Stryker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v.
Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980) (stating that the EISs do not require agencies to "elevate
environmental considerations over other appropriate considerations"). Because developers are
already required to file an EIS, the CIS will not be as costly. A delay will already occur due to the
EIS, and some sets of data for the CIS and EIS may overlap (such as traffic projections from a
development).
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through design. Just as the environmental statements led designers to think
about the impact of construction on ecosystems, a CIS could induce a cadre
of professional architects to contemplate how design and crime interact.235
Architects who prepare CISs could take those lessons and apply them in
projects of their own, and the statements themselves could be used by
architecture schools and professionals to learn about the impact of design
on crime.
Moreover, a CIS can force consideration of the positive externalities
(such as natural surveillance) and negative ones (such as displacement) of
proposed developments. Rules can require developers to analyze not only
their own buildings, but also the impact of their projects on surrounding
spaces. If developers are too self-interested, or crime predictions too
difficult to make, a jurisdiction could have neighborhood commissions
retroactively file a CIS after a project is built and operational. Whichever
way the CIS is adopted, it will have the advantage of considering
externalities, an advantage not available to most other methods of
government regulation. A CIS is also flexible enough to accommodate
different methods of design, as it focuses on process rather than on
substance.236 Some architectural methods, however, may prove to be
important enough to regulate directly through devices such as housing
codes.
2. Housing Codes
Building and housing regulation has been used by societies as divergent
as the Babylonian empire of Hammurabi (1750 B.C.) and seventeenth-
century England. Today's codes represent one of the most extensive forms
of American regulation, though they largely escape the attention of
academics. They regulate everything from the size of a balcony to the
distance between stairs. As with many other forms of law, a model building
code exists, and there are local variations. The West uses the Uniform
Building Code, the Midwest has the Building Officials Code
Administrators, and the South applies the Southern Standard Building
Code.23 In large part, the codes have been drafted to ensure fire safety and
235. See LANG, supra note 70, at 71 (stating that environmental impact assessments "ha[ve]
had an effect on the design of many large-scale facilities.... If nothing else, the law has enhanced
planners' and designers' awareness that what they do has an impact on the environment").
Because many EISs are prepared by contractors, and because some private developers are
required to file them, a professional class has developed around the EIS, so much so that they
even have their own professional association-the National Association for Environmental
Professionals. See 40 C.F.R. § 1506.5(c) (2000) (permitting contractors to prepare EISs).
236. This feature may also yield public participation benefits.
237. See generally Scorr, supra note 8, at 1-33 (describing the codes). A note about
nomenclature: "Building codes" refer to codes that govern prospective construction; "housing
codes" refer to those that govern existing structures.
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the health of occupants and visitors, not to prevent crime. But they can also
reflect the power of architecture as an expressive tool,
238 and these codes
may be altered to stress the crime prevention techniques outlined in Part I.
Two main types of building codes exist: those that govern performance
and those that regulate design. Performance codes do not specify a
particular type of system; instead, they state a requirement that builders can
meet through methods of their own choice. For example, a performance
code may require that outside walls support a load of one ton, but leave the
choice of materials and method of construction open. A design code, in
contrast, specifies a type of mechanism or product to be used, such as a
fifteen-pin entryway key. Performance codes have more flexibility and
permit more evolution in products, but design codes can prevent
uncertainty. Crime prevention codes can be written in either fashion. For
example, a design regulation could require an outside front door to be
metal-plated; alternatively, a performance code could mandate that an
average person should not be able to break down the door within a thirty-
minute period.
A few regions use design codes to prevent crime."' One advantage of
using building codes is that they can reach early stages of human behavior,
before expectations are, quite literally, settled when a building is
completed.240 Government officers could work with architects and suggest
helpful strategies to avoid extensive retrofitting later. For existing
buildings, the expense of retrofitting will require housing codes to use
grandfathering provisions strategically in order to avoid imposing large
costs on existing property owners for relatively little crime prevention.
24
238. E.g., BYARD, supra note 96, at 1I (stating that because architecture is inevitably
entangled with expression, government regulation "protect[s] particularly valuable
understandings about the human condition expressed by existing architecture and... ensure[s]
continued public access to them").
239. See CROWE, supra note 18, at 216 ("There are literally thousands of examples of the
successful use of local codes and ordinances by CPTED teams to clean up problem neighborhoods
and businesses."); BARRY D. YATT, CRACKING THE CODES 117-18 (1998) (describing code
provisions designed to block entry). The zoning ordinances for Tempe, Arizona, set forth
maximum height requirements for walls and fences in residential areas, and provide that "[a]ll
exterior fixtures should be illuminated from dusk until dawn, unless otherwise designated."
TEMPE, AZ., GENERAL GUIDELINES CPTED § 2(a), (d) (1999).
240. See SCOTT, supra note 8, at 49-50 (describing inspection procedures). Some localities
use building codes to review crime prevention plans before approving construction, but this is not
a widespread phenomenon. CROWE, supra note 18, at 59; Randy Atlas, Crime Prevention
Through Building Codes, 9 J. SECURITY ADMIN. 3 (1986). Tempe's planning process requires a
CPTED coordinator, who is a police officer, "to sign off on all plans before a building permit or
certificate of occupancy is issued," leading one national developer who built a large mall there to
exclaim that they had "never before... consulted with a police department before beginning a
project." NAT'L CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL, DESIGNING SAFER COMMUNITIES: A CRIME
PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN HANDBOOK 51 (2000).
241. When building-code strategies are too costly to implement, they could be tempered
through the adoption of "smart codes" that strategically relax requirements. HUD recently
sponsored the development and publication of a model smart code, the Nationally Applicable
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A building code regime is costly insofar as it may be somewhat
inflexible, may overprotect certain areas, and may force government to
incur additional expenditures. Because government officers already survey
a facility to check for health and safety code violations, the expense of
adding a category for crime prevention code violations to the survey would
probably not be dramatic. Governments will nonetheless incur costs in
developing codes that appropriately balance security against other goals.
Some of these costs can be reduced by borrowing knowledge and rules
from other comparable jurisdictions. Moreover, building codes typically are
developed with the input of the local community, and, in particular, with
the input of builders and designers who participate in formal proceedings
through "notice and comment" procedures and informally provide advice
to building code committees.24 2 Nevertheless, all of these costs can be
powerful reasons not to regulate through building codes.
Should governments employ building codes for some of the less
burdensome requirements, they will need to adopt sanctions for
noncompliance. Compliance with traditional building codes is currently
enforced in two ways: by preventing people from entering and occupying
(analogous to an injunction) and by fining owners for noncompliance
(analogous to money damages). The analogies that I have drawn suggest
that a third option of enforcement (and one not used in housing codes),
declaratory relief, might prove beneficial-or even adequate by itself-for
crime prevention. The failure to conform to some of a code's more
expensive and extensive provisions could trigger a declaration by the
government that such premises do not meet local crime prevention
Recommended Rehabilitation Provisions, and states are beginning to experiment with such codes.
See Roger K. Lewis, Rejuvenating Historic Urban Centers with "Smart" Building Codes, WASH.
POST, May 6, 2000, at G13; Angela Paik, Change Proposed in Building Rules; "Smart Code"
Would Encourage Redevelopment, Rehabilitation, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2000, at B8
("Supporters say Smart Codes would make revitalization easier and in turn help cities and towns
rid themselves of run-down or vacant buildings."). In 1997, New Jersey was the first state to
create and implement a set of these codes, leading to a forty percent increase in spending on
rehabilitation of existing buildings the next year. See Peter H. Brink, New Frontiers in Community
Preservation, Address at the Maine Preservation Annual Conference (May 11, 2001), at
http://www.mainepreservation.com/brink-speech.htm,
Pattern guidelines, which establish looser city-design requirements, could also be used. For
example, San Francisco uses such guidelines to regulate building size, transportation, and open
space. These guidelines are in place in order to ensure that new developments will fit into"established city and neighborhood patterns in a complementary fashion. Harmony with existing
development requires careful consideration of the character of the surroundings at each
construction site." JON LANG, URBAN DESIGN 85-86 (1994).
242. SCOTr, supra note 8, at 26 (describing typical notice and comment procedures).
Although the specifications will differ, many of the same features that would be regulated by a
crime prevention code are currently regulated by building codes. YATT, supra note 239, at 249-53
(discussing building code regulation of doors and locks). Empirically, it is not clear that building
codes increase the cost of construction. See Richard F. Muth & Elliot Wetzler, The Effect of
Constraints on House Costs, 3 J. URB. ECON. 57 (1976) (reporting a regression analysis study
finding that following model codes does not result in cost increases).
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requirements. No fine would be imposed, but the declaration would notify
prospective customers, tenants, guests, and buyers that the premises are not
up to par. The threat of such declarations would create an ex ante
inducement for architects to build safety considerations into their plans, and
also for owners to retrofit if doing so is necessary to attract tenants or raise
rents. A market for information-in this case, information about safe and
unsafe conditions-will not always develop without government regulation.
In order to save money, architects and builders often cut corners,
particularly in ways that are latent or not immediately apparent. Such cost-
cutting is not always discernible by purchasers, even though it might keenly
interest them if they knew about it. 43
The traditional remedies of fines and injunctions are also potential
vehicles for encouraging compliance with crime prevention standards.
There are, of course, costs to such systems, such as the aforementioned
expense of enforcement, the harm imposed on owners in waiting for
approval, and the risk of overdeterrence and investment in excessive
precautions. But fines and injunctions will work well for some important
architectural precautions. Housing developers, homeowners, and
commercial establishments are far more responsive to the threat of
sanctions than are criminals. Governments can play on this asymmetry by
placing comparatively less liability on these (more responsive) actors,
instead of more liability on (less responsive) criminals, to achieve the same
result.2" Studies have shown that jurisdictions that adopted crime
prevention codes had a drop in their crime rates: Burglary dropped by one-
half in one area, by over one-fifth in another, and by one-tenth in a third
area.
245
Indeed, the use of building codes to prevent crime has a strong
historical precedent going back to 1285. Edward I enacted the Statute of
Winchester, a code designed to prevent the concealment of robbers.2' The
243. This is a standard rationale for the use of building codes. See STEPHEN R. SEIDEL,
HOUSING COSTS AND GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS 73-74 (1978) ("The complexity of today's
construction methods renders it unlikely that the prospective home buyer will have sufficient
technical knowledge to make an informed decision about the structural integrity of the unit.
Building codes serve as a substitute for... complete knowledge on the part of the
consumer .... ). In addition, the lack of government regulation of architecture may produce
negative externalities as residents use barricades that produce fear. See supra text accompanying
notes 171-172.
244. See Katyal, supra note 3, at 1011 (discussing how teenage hackers might be particularly
responsive to cost deterrence); id. at 1095, 1102 (observing that government should play on the
fact that Internet Service Providers and computer programmers are more responsive to legal
sanctions than are criminals).
245. Atlas, supra note 240, at 4. Some evidence shows that installing architecture to prevent
burglary during new construction adds $200 to $300 to the construction cost, and retrofitting a
house with similar protection costs between $350 and $600. Id.
246. Statute of Winchester, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, ch. 1. Jenks wrote that the Statute's "purpose is
clear as the day. It insists .. that the good citizen is not merely to abstain from disorder and
crime, sitting by with folded hands whilst others defy the law, but that he is bound to assist the
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Statute was enacted during the time of Robin Hood, when apprehension and
conviction of thieves were rare. 47 One provision of the Statute imposed
liability for certain robberies on members of the town who failed to catch
an offender; another provision directly regulated environmental design to
reduce crime.248 Under the latter provision, highways had to be enlarged
and bushes had to be cleared for 200 feet on either side of the highway. The
Statute went so far as to shift blame to property owners, ordering that if any
robberies or other felonies should occur "by Default of the Lord that will
not abate the Dyke, Underwood, or Bushes... the Lord shall be answerable
for the Felony." 24 9 In so doing, the Statute built on earlier English
precedents that governed design.250
The design regulations in the Statute of Winchester were
"unambiguously welcomed, judging by the number of presentments that
resulted." 25' Charges were brought against many property owners,
including the King, the Queen, and the Abbot of Westminster.252 The
Statute of Winchester demonstrates some of the possible approaches law
forces of order and good government." EDWARD JENKS, EDWARD PLANTAGENET (EDWARD I):
THE ENGLISH JUSTINIAN 220 (1923).
247. Henry Summerson, The Enforcement of the Statute of Winchester, 1285-1327, 13 J.
LEGAL HIST. 232, 233, 235 (1992). Lord Coke writes that "[t]his Robert Hood lived... in woods
and deserts, by robbery, burning of houses, felony, waste and spoile" and "[a]gainst these
[robbers] was the Statute of Winchester made in 13 E. 1. for preventing of robbery, murders,
burning of houses, ... and remedy provided by that act for the arresting of [these robbers]."
COKE, supra note 58, at 197.
248. Statute of Winchester ch. 2 (imposing an affirmative duty on some individuals); id. ch. 5
(directing " [t]hat Highways leading from one Market Town to another shall be enlarged, whereas
Bushes[,] Woods[,] or Dykes be, so that there be neither Dyke[,] Tree[,] nor Bush, whereby a Man
may lurk to do hurt, within two hundred foot [on either side]"). The Statute also required a park to
be set "the space of two hundred foot from the Highways... or that he [the Lord who built it]
make such a Wall, Dyke, or Hedge, that Offenders may not pass, ne return to do evil." Id.
249. Id. ch. 5. If an owner of such trees and bushes could not remove them himself, the
county would be required to "aid him therein." Id.
250. As Summerson reports,
As early as 1227 the bailiff of the Prior of Holy Trinity, Canterbury, was ordered to
have his lord's wood cut back for half a furlong on either side of a road in Essex, "for
the maintenance of the peace." In 1261 the justices itinerant in Oxfordshire ordered
that the mound which gave its name to Cutslow be levelled to the ground because
criminals were in the habit of lurking in the hollow on the top of the mound, while in
1279 an inquest found that "it would be expedient for the keeping of the King's peace
and the security of passers-by" for the Abbot of Lilleshall to bring under cultivation 30
acres of heavily wooded ground alongside Wating Street in Shropshire.
Summerson, supra note 247, at 233 (footnotes ornitted).
251. Id. at 242. The Statute was well-publicized early on, as Dunstable Priory cut back its
woods in Bedfordshire in 1286, and in 1287, jurors in Wiltshire "twice presented defects on the
part of the Abbot of Stanley, both involving the making of ditches, in which criminals could lurk,
too close to roads." Id. at 237.
252. Id. at 242-43. Even thirty years later, during Edward Il's reign, "jurors who otherwise
had little to say except that the articles of the Statute were kept either well or badly ... would still
report on woods endangering the safety of the roads. Their persistence on this subject indicates
that this was a clause which met a genuine need." Id. at 243. Stephen wrote, however, that the
entire Statute later fell into disuse. 1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW OF ENGLAND 189 n.2 (London, Macmillan 1883).
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can use, from regulating public and private structures (through devices such
as building codes) to regulating the behavior of bystanders (through
reporting or intervention requirements).
Yet some building and fire codes today, for no good reason, are written
to preclude the use of architectural techniques that prevent crime. In a
sense, then, safety and fire prevention codes may be resulting in some
increase in the crime rate. In the context of parking facilities, Mary Smith
has found that building codes can "hinder effective use of CPTED
principles" and specifically isolates rules requiring height limits on lighting
poles (which decrease uniform illumination), landscaping around parking
facilities, and removal of exit stairs from public view.
253 Codes that require
enclosed stairs are of special concern: "Due to fire code requirements, the
stairs are virtually sealed off.... This arrangement effectively precludes the
possibility of visual or auditory monitoring of activity in the stairwells....
Not surprisingly, fire stairs are the area in which a high percentage of the
rapes occur, and in which narcotics addicts congregate."
254 Architecture and
technology can be deployed, however, in ways that both prevent fire and
minimize crime.255
Police should also have concurrent jurisdiction with other local
agencies over code enforcement. Police used to pursue such tasks but now
generally believe that these violations are not their responsibility."
6 While
housing inspectors should by no means be replaced, police involvement
would underscore the relationship between the housing code and crime.
Finally, government can also regulate architectural features through the
strategic use of exactions. Exactions permit local governments to condition
permission for development on the owner's grant of certain property rights
to the government. While constitutional restrictions on exactions exist,
exactions may prevent crime when properly used."
7 Local governments can
253. SMrrH, supra note 28; see also NEWMAN, supra note 26, at 118-19 (explaining that
some crime prevention strategies have been blocked as violations of the building code); Gerald F.
Pyle, Spatial and Temporal Aspects of Crime in Cleveland, Ohio, 20 AM. BEHAV. SC!. 175, 194
(1976) (same).
254. NEWMAN, supra note 26, at 89. Similarly, some codes require fire escapes in apartment
buildings to be constructed in a scissors fashion, with crisscrossing ladders that permit individuals
to get off at a lower floor and to pick one of two sides of a building to exit. Due to the
many different possible exits, . .. it would take a contingent of policemen to apprehend
a criminal, even if they knew for sure that he was within a particular building. More
important than apprehension, however, is the fact that a criminal casing a scene will
perceive at a glance the number of escape options open to him and realize his risks are
minimal.
Id. at 34-35.
255. For example, cameras could be used to monitor stairways. At least some of the problems
with public cameras are not applicable to this solution, for cameras would not inhibit social
activity in these isolated areas.
256. SKOGAN, supra note 22, at 1-2.
257. In particular, there must be an "essential nexus" between what the developer will
provide and the public harm that the development would likely create. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
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demand that developers set aside a portion of land for uses that promote
natural surveillance (for example, well-designed parks and other land uses
that bring people out of doors), devote land to security measures (such as
egress and ingress control), and use adequate lighting. 58 Exaction strategies
are particularly appropriate when a local government wants to make case-
by-case decisions instead of adopting broad regulations through building
codes. However, wide discretion can result in weaker architectural regimes
and accusations of preferential treatment.
3. Zoning
The mention of preferential treatment brings to mind another form of
land-use regulation-zoning. The placement of residences, businesses,
parks, and other land uses can be used evenhandedly to prevent crime.
Cities that have adjusted their zoning practices have lowered their crime
rates.259 Unfortunately, many current zoning practices disregard or even
work against crime prevention goals.
Cities can zone for crime prevention in four general ways. First, instead
of creating districts of single uses-the houses go on the west side and the
businesses on the east-zoning can strive for diversity of use. Diversity
encourages people to avoid their cars and engage their local community. It
brings people together at different times of the day and night so that private
deterrence flourishes.26° Architects have emphasized for some time how
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). The dedication of property must also be "reasonably related"
or "roughly proportional" to the impact of the proposed development. Dolan v. City of Tigard,
512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). Some cities, including San Francisco and Boston, have even levied
exactions on developers for child care. See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 209, at 806.
258. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 1010 (4th ed. 1998) (discussing
how subdivision regulation ordinances can require a developer to provide for lighting, sidewalks,
and other facilities). Current subdivision regulations can be quite intrusive, governing matters
such as the maximum length of blocks, minimum grade of streets, prevalence of right-angle
intersections, and minimum street widths. See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 209, at 484.
259. TAYLOR & HARRELL, supra note 31.
260. JACOSS, supra note 30, at 14; Hok-Lin Leung, How Crowded Is Overcrowded? (1993),
at http://www.ismcpi.org/ica/reference/overcrowded.htm. Robert Ellickson has detailed a quite
different zoning proposal, arguing that panhandling and bench squatting should be considered a
chronic street nuisance in certain instances. Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct
in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165
(1996). Ellickson recognized that offensive street behavior could deter people from using public
spaces and that some forms of minor disorder could spiral into more serious crime. Id at 1171,
1176-77. To the extent these practices are zoned out of cities, constitutional problems may
emerge, particularly in light of increasing scrutiny of commercial speech restrictions. See Stephen
R. Munzer, Ellickson on "Chronic Misconduct" in Urban Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Bench
Squatters, and Day Laborers, 32 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 38-45 (1997). In any event,
architectural solutions that emphasize access controls and greater natural visibility are a less
restrictive alternative, and can be implemented (like Ellickson's proposals) with a preference for
bottom-up solutions that permit spatial variance. There may be some synergy between Ellickson's
approach and design-based solutions, in that removing panhandlers and other individuals might
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diversity can attract energy to a neighborhood and contribute to a sense of
pride.26' Such views have culminated in one of the most exciting
architectural movements in several decades, New Urbanism. Principally
associated with Andres Duany, Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, and Peter
Calthorpe, the movement strives to facilitate community through design.26
While these writers have not focused on crime, the discussion in Part I
suggests that New Urbanism may have important implications for crime
prevention. For example, restrictions on the maximum setbacks of houses
and requirements for their minimum setbacks can decrease crime-the
former by encouraging natural surveillance as residents are placed near
streets, the latter by providing land for sidewalks, which in turn promotes
natural surveillance and builds communities. Again, these strategies carry
costs and cannot be implemented until those costs have been weighed
against crime reduction and other benefits.
Second, land uses that are known to decrease crime, such as religious
buildings, should be strategically placed. As Tracey Meares and Phil
Heymann have shown, churches lower crime rates by cultivating social
organization and a sense of order.2 63 An architectural perspective suggests
that planners can incorporate these insights by encouraging houses of
worship to be centrally located. By making churchgoing part of the daily
fabric of life, instead of something requiring a special trip, social
organization will expand. Putting houses of worship in central locations
also creates natural surveillance in the area. Such placement may also have
a geographic halo effect. Due to this halo effect, certain buildings, such as
churches, may reduce the crime rate because they create feelings of guilt or
shame in potential perpetrators and because the absence of crime against
such structures furthers visible social order. By contrast, other buildings,
such as abandoned houses, may increase the crime rate because they convey
the impression that crime is normal.
increase the amount of natural surveillance by others. On the other hand, panhandlers can behelpful sources of information to the police, as they too engage in surveillance.
261. E.g., Anthony Lord, Comfort in the City, in PERCEPTION AND ENVIRONMENT:
FOUNDATIONS OF URBAN DESIGN 67, 67-70 (Robert E. Stipe ed., 1966).
262. PETER CALTHORPE, THE NEXT AMERICAN METROPOLIS (1993); ANDRES DUANY &ELIZABETH PLATER-ZYBERK, TOWNS AND TOWN-MAKING PRINCIPLES (Alex Krieger & WilliamLennertz eds., 1991); THE NEW URBANISM, supra note 78; Andres Duany et a]., New TownOrdinances and Codes, 59 ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN 71 (1989); see also MICHAEL J. SANDEL,
DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT 335-36 (1996) (praising New Urbanism for building communities).In addition to zoning, the New Urbanists strategically use building codes. See Scully, supranote 78, at 226 (describing how Duany and Plater-Zyberk's conception is different from that oftheir predecessors "in one fundamental respect: They write a code that controls the buildings aswell as the plan. They therefore ensure that the three-dimensional reality of the town will fulfillthe concept adumbrated in its plan-without themselves having to design every building in it");id. at 227 (noting that "the important place-maker is the code").
263. Philip B. Heymann, The New Policing, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 407, 412, 426 (2000);Meares, supra note 21, at 413-15. This is particularly the case for African-American churches,which are often the only autonomously controlled social institutions in inner cities.
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Third, zoning decisions must be periodically reassessed in light of
changing economic and social conditions. When an area appears to be on
the verge of a crime increase, cities could "coordinate housing, zoning, and
sanitation personnel in an effort to prevent or slow increases in physical
deterioration and housing abandonment. Such efforts might block the
emergence of higher crime rates, higher fear levels, or declining
commitment to the community." "
Fourth, zoning decisions could aim explicitly to encourage residents to
stay in a geographic area for long periods of time. A key factor in
preserving the quality of neighborhoods and preventing slums is to
encourage rootedness in the community.265 This goal does not require
people to occupy the same housing unit all of their lives; that would
unfairly penalize families with children, those with incomes that vary, and
others. Instead, if a neighborhood has enough diversity in its housing stock,
with units spanning a range in price, this diversity may encourage residents
to stay in their familiar neighborhoods. To the extent that a city zones out
nonconforming houses, however, the ability of residents to stay is
undermined. As populations turn over, crime may flourish because social
institutions are unlikely to form when people believe they are short-term
residents.266 In addition, social networks fail to emerge when individuals do
not know each other well due to high residential turnover.167 Group identity
and altruistic behavior are far less likely to emerge in these circumstances.
Again, such zoning changes may not be justified in places where crime
rates are low or costs of nonconformity are high, but, in some
circumstances, these changes may facilitate better crime prevention.
If keeping residents in a neighborhood over a sustained period of time
reduces the crime rate, this may also become a somewhat weighty argument
to favor rent control in areas at high risk for crime. 68 Forms of rent control
that prevent landlords from raising the rents of existing tenants above a
certain percentage essentially force people to stay in their existing
location. 69 Most argue that this feature of rent control is a vice, and those
264. TAYLOR & HARRELL, supra note 31, at 20.
265. JACOBS, supra note 30, at 139-40, 271.
266. BURSIK & GRASMICK, supra note 81, at 33; Taylor & Gottfredson, supra note 111, at
390.
267. BURSIK & GRASMICK, supra note 81, at 33.
268. While I concentrate on rent control, a similar argument might be made for real estate
transfer taxes, which decrease the mobility of owners and encourage rootedness in a community.
269. Rent control creates incentives for tenants to remain in their units longer than they
otherwise would because tenants enjoy the continued benefits of paying below-market rents. This
is particularly true in jurisdictions that feature vacancy decontrol, which allows a landlord to reset
the rents at any level once the current tenant leaves. Because rent control prevents the market from
clearing, there is a shortage of units in rent-controlled jurisdictions, motivating current tenants to
remain in their units. Empirical findings strongly support the conclusion that rent control
lengthens occupancy periods. ANTHONY DOWNS, RESIDENTIAL RENT CONTROLS 21-22 (1988).
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who disagree, such as Professor Radin, have argued that such stability
fosters neighborhood identity.2 10 However, proponents of rent control have
not explained fully why such an identity is important."'
A perspective focused on architecture and crime suggests one answer.
Rent control's encouragement of rootedness and territoriality may facilitate
better natural surveillance and, ultimately, crime prevention. An exhaustive
study of the literature has revealed no one who has yet drawn the
connection, but the relationship appears to be tenable. When neighbors are
strangers to each other due to rapid turnover, it is difficult to exercise
surveillance. High turnover rates can also decrease the effectiveness of
community organizations and increase the crime rate.272 Additionally, rent
control might decrease crime by creating incentives for renters to take care
of neighborhoods, as they will become invested in an area in which they
know they will reside for some time.273
On the other hand, there are some reasons why rent control could have
negative effects on architecture, and thereby increase the crime rate. Rent
control may lead to dilapidated buildings and the creation of slums, which
might increase fear and lead to less natural surveillance and ultimately more
crime.274 In addition, rent control might reduce the incentive for a landlord
There may be some mobility through side contracts between tenants, but such contracts are often
illegal and not easy to fashion.
270. Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350, 368-69
(1986).
271. See Jeffery James Minton, Rent Control: Can and Should It Be Used To Combat
Gentrification?, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 823, 851 (1997) (stating that to "make the argument for
rent control rest on more solid footing, more empirical evidence is necessary documenting the
value of community in residents' lives to prove that its preservation is favored to unhindered
mobility"); see also Robert C. Ellickson, Rent Control: A Comment on Olsen, 67 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 947, 953 (1991) (" [T]he overall desirability of keeping people in their current places is not
obvious. Commentators are prone to romanticize life in the peasant village, small town, or urban
enclave.").
272. SKOGAN, supra note 22, at 169.
273. Margarita Hill, Comprehensive Community Planning as a Tool for Neighborhood
Revitalization and Crime Prevention, Paper Presented at the Third International CPTED
Conference, Washington, D.C., 1988, at http://www.ismcpi.orglica/reference/CPTED-1998
_08.htim (last visited Oct. 19, 2001) (observing that most renters are not likely "to invest in
neighborhood improvements and are less likely to report or identify criminal activity"). Rent
control might also increase the diversity of incomes in a neighborhood by creating quite disparate
rents for similar units. Income diversity on average might reduce crime by generating more
natural surveillance, but it might increase crime by fragmenting the community.
274. Some have argued, for example, that the reduced investment return creates disincentives
for owners to invest in housing improvements, maintenance, and other security-enhancing
measures, leading to declines in housing quality and maintenance. E.g., Richard A. Epstein, Rent
Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 741, 765-67 (1988).
Empirical findings, however, are mixed as to the impact of rent control on housing quality. For
instance, one review of the literature found several studies showing definite declines in owner
investments in maintenance and repair under more stringent rent control. However, studies of
more moderate programs revealed an ambivalent relationship, leading some to conclude that there
is no clear correlation. DOWNS, supra note 269, at 20-21. If rent control does lead to poor quality
housing stock, it can increase the crime rate. See, e.g., SKOGAN, supra note 22, at 42 (arguing that
dilapidated buildings increase crime). Another way in which rent control might increase crime, as
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to incorporate crime prevention into architecture, as the market will not
reward such efforts.275 These questions about rent control and crime are too
difficult to answer here, but the framework advanced in this Article
suggests they deserve attention.
4. Tort Suits
Another option to bring about architectural protections involves tort
suits against architects and owners. These suits have already been brought
against landlords and shopping malls on the theory that the failure to
observe certain safety precautions was a contributing factor in the
commission of a crime.276 Tort liability can spur the incorporation of
effective design, but it runs the risk of consuming too many resources and
becoming overly burdensome.
Lawsuits could be brought against architects on a product-design defect
theory, arguing that their design facilitated a crime. Because many
jurisdictions have strong statutes of repose on liability for design defects,
however, such suits are difficult to bring.277 In addition, causality with
respect to a given crime may be difficult to prove. For these reasons,
regulation of architects is better accomplished through building codes than
through tort. The failure to comply with a building code, however, could
give rise to negligence per se liability, should the particular provision of the
code be something that a jurisdiction intensely wants to encourage.
In contrast to product liability lawsuits against architects, suits against
landowners have fared well in the courts-so well that "liability has been
one of the greatest motivators for property owners to improve security." 
278
The Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act requires landlords to provide
safe housing conditions, and some states use similar provisions to impose
Robert Ellickson has suggested to me, is that it poisons relations between landlords and tenants,
leading to more crime between them, or possibly even to more crime generally as friction and
anger take root.
275. Even a free market, however, may not reward landlords who take such precautions,
because many of them are not apparent. See supra text accompanying notes 171-172, 243.
276. One study of 267 such cases from 1983 to 1992 found that the average settlement was in
excess of $545,000 and the average verdict was $3.35 million. NORMAN D. BATES & SUSAN J.
DUNNELL, LIABILITY CONSULTANTS, MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN PREMISES SECURITY LIABILITY
6-7 (1993). A subsequent study of 731 cases from 1993 to 1997 found that the average award was
lower than this figure. See NORMAN D. BATES & JON D. GROUSSMAN, LIABILITY CONSULTANTS,
MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN PREMISES SECURITY LIABILITY II, at 6-7 (1999).
277. E.g., Post, supra note 115, at 18, 25 (explaining the difficulty with the product-design
theory).
278. See BATES & DUNNELL, supra note 276, at 8; see also Daniel B. Kennedy, A Synopsis
of Private Security in the United States, 6 SECURITY J. 101, 104 (1995) (stating that "many
organizations expend substantial revenues on private security systems" in response to such
lawsuits).
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tort liability.279 A leading case in favor of liability is Kline v. 1500
Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp., in which the D.C. Circuit held that
a landlord is "obligated to protect those parts of his premises which are not
usually subject to periodic patrol and inspection by the municipal
police."' 80 A tenant had been assaulted and robbed, and placing liability on
the landlord, the judges reasoned, would create the proper incentives to use
better security precautions:
As between tenant and landlord, the landlord is the only one in the
position to take the necessary acts of protection required.... Not
only as between landlord and tenant is the landlord best equipped to
guard against the predictable risk of intruders, but even as between
landlord and the police power of government, the landlord is in the
best position to take the necessary protective measures. Municipal
police cannot patrol the entryways and the hallways, the garages
and the basements of private multiple unit apartment dwellings.28'
Many other lawsuits have been successfully brought on the basis of
inadequate security-for failures such as inadequate lighting and locks.282
Courts have also upheld suits based on structural conditions that invite
crime, reasoning that doing so will bring about better design protections.283
279. See UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 2.104(a)(3), 7B U.L.A. 566
(1972); Brock v. Watts Realty Co., 582 So. 2d 438, 441-42 (Ala. 1991) (upholding liability where
a landlord failed to maintain locks in satisfactory condition, in violation of the Birmingham
Housing Code); Paterson v. Deeb, 472 So. 2d 1210, 1217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (finding
liability because a landlord did not comply with a Florida statute requiring effective locks and
finding that the statute had no foreseeability requirement); Braitman v. Overlook Terrace Corp.,
346 A.2d 76, 85 (N.J. 1975) (stating that a landlord could be liable for burglary due to the New
Jersey Hotel and Multiple Dwelling Law, which requires dead-bolt door locks).
280. 439 F.2d 477, 487 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
281. Id. at 484.
282. E.g., Frances T. v. Vill. Green Owners Ass'n, 723 P.2d 573 (Cal. 1986) (holding that
failure to provide adequate lighting is actionable for negligence); Isaacs v. Huntington Mem'l
Hosp., 695 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1985) (opining that the failure to maintain adequate lighting is relevant
to foreseeability); Mullins v. Pine Manor Coll., 449 N.E.2d 331 (Mass. 1983) (upholding a jury
award for the plaintiff against a college for a rape committed in a dorm room, despite the lack of
prior reports of violent crime on campus); Johnston v. Harris, 198 N.W.2d 409 (Mich. 1972)
(upholding liability for failure to provide locks); Trentacost v. Brussel, 412 A.2d 436, 440-41
(N.J. 1980) (holding that mugging is a foreseeable result of the absence of a lock on a front
entrance); Braitman, 346 A.2d at 84 (stating that a landlord was liable for "unreasonably
enhanc[ing] the risk of loss due to theft by failing to supply adequate locks to safeguard the
tenant's premises after suitable notice of the defect"); Small v. McKennan Hosp., 403 N.W.2d
410 (S.D. 1987) (finding that a hospital might be liable for rape and murder, in part because the
lighting did not meet industry standards); Tedder v. Raskin, 728 S.W.2d 343, 348 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1987) (stating in dicta that "[s]uch simple measures as providing adequate lighting in hallways
and locks on outside entrances are peculiarly within the landlord's capability and could
substantially reduce the risk of harm to his tenants. Under these circumstances, to hold the
landlord unaccountable for injuries proximately caused by the condition of the common areas
would be unconscionable").
283. Cooke v. Allstate Mgmt. Corp., 741 F. Supp. 1205, 1210 (D.S.C. 1990) (finding that the
physical layout of a building and, in particular, the positioning of a ladder nearby, can give rise to
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2002] 1113
The Yale Law Journal
One reason why such lawsuits may generate architectural precautions
concerns insurance companies. Insurance companies make substantial
profits by exploiting downward cost curves. They insure against a condition
that has some likelihood of occurring, and calculate the premium on that
chance. They then educate the customer about ways to reduce that
likelihood, which benefits the customer in that she learns valuable
information, and simultaneously benefits the insurance company by
reducing expected payouts." For example, a large percentage of fire
prevention today is the result of insurance companies that took aggressive
steps to educate construction companies and owners about fire
prevention.28 A similar result may be induced by crime-prevention
lawsuits.286 If so, tort liability will rely on insurers as educators and help
bring about better architectural precautions.
As with most tort regimes, liability can lead to the adoption of socially
inefficient precautions, because judges and juries will not always accurately
calibrate liability and cost. The degree of liability imposed should take into
account the fact that victims will often be able to prevent crimes on their
own; too much liability borne by property owners can be wasteful. Consider
negligence liability); Stribling v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 340 N.E.2d 47 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (finding
liability when a landlord failed to seal off a hole adjacent to a tenant's apartment through which
previous burglars had entered); COREY L. GORDON & WILLIAM BRILL, THE EXPANDING ROLE OF
CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN IN PREMISES LIABILITY 4 (Nat'l Inst. of
Justice, Research in Brief, Apr. 1996) ("CPTED has been useful in assisting plaintiffs in
demonstrating the causation element, i.e., that not only was the defendant's conduct unreasonable
but that had the defendant acted reasonably, it would have been a substantial factor in deterring
the crime."); Madeline Johnson, Landlord's Responsibility for Crime: Determining Legal
Causation, 17 REAL EST. L.J. 234, 238-41 (1989) (discussing how architectural principles can
demonstrate the causation of crime); Telephone Interview with Norman D. Bates, President,
Liability Consultants (June 28, 2001) (stating that several lawsuits have been brought successfully
on the basis of architectural designs against landowners).
284. Cf. W.A. DINSDALE, ELEMENTS OF INSURANCE 3 (3d ed. 1963) ("[I]nsurers build up
considerable knowledge and experience which they place at the disposal of their policyholders by
making recommendations with a view to the reduction of loss .. "); HUEBNER, supra note 195,
at 16 (" Property insurers are ideally situated, because of their interest in the matter and their
strategic position to acquire the necessary information and apply the needed remedies, to pursue
prevention of loss activities." ); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 197
(1987) (making a similar point).
285. HUEBNER, supra note 195, at 376 ("The fire insurance companies ... have performed
numerous important services in their efforts to reduce the nation's fire waste. Because they have
been peculiarly fitted for the task and at the same time have had an incentive based upon self-
interest, the insurance companies have made vital contributions to the field .... "); F. HARCOURT
KITCHIN, THE PRINCIPLES AND FINANCE OF FIRE INSURANCE 175-76 (1904) (stating that, in
Britain, "[ilt is hardly too much to say that the fire offices, by giving favourable terms for
construction designed expressly to prevent fires, have done more to reduce the fire danger in our
cities than the efforts of legislators and municipal administrators during several generations").
286. The only analysis of this point I have found is STUART WINCHESTER & HILARY
JACKSON, RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY (1982), which states: "[lInsurance companies may.. . be in a
better position to adopt a more coercive approach as illustrated by their success in persuading
commercial companies to improve security" because "victims ... frequently look to insurance
companies for security advice rather than to the police . I..." Id  at 1-12.
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Judge Posner's opinion in Wassell v. Adams.287 A couple from Pennsylvania
checked into a motel situated close to a high-crime area in Chicago. When a
man knocked on the door in the middle of the night, the woman opened the
door, thinking it was her fiancd, and admitted the stranger into the room.
She was raped, and the perpetrator was never found. She brought suit
against the motel, claiming that the motel had been negligent in failing to
take adequate precautions. A jury found that the motel was negligent, and
assessed the victim's damages at $850,000. But the jury also found that the
victim had been ninety-seven percent at fault, and, under the Illinois
comparative fault statute, apportioned the damages. The victim, on appeal,
claimed that she was not negligent and that, in any case, her negligence was
immaterial.
Judge Posner recognized that the motel could easily warn its customers
about the high crime rate, and so if the calculation were simply one about
who could cheaply issue warnings, the motel was at fault.28 But the
problem with that reasoning, he found, was that the warnings would not
have prevented the crime, as the victim thought that her fiancd was
knocking.289 Judge Posner also observed, however, that the motel could
have employed an inexpensive security guard and noted that had he been
reviewing the facts, he would have assessed the motel's liability at more
than three percent.29 Judge Posner therefore scrutinized the evidentiary
record and suggested liability that hewed to the cost and effectiveness of
various precautions.
Many judges will not make these calculations, however. One problem
with imposing tort liability is that, without adequate legislative guidance,
judges and juries may have to decide questions about architectural design
and likelihood of crime, and other difficult questions of causation. This is
very resource-intensive, particularly when such determinations must be
made in every case. Experts will be hired, testimony taken, and lengthy
arguments made. The costs of process may dwarf the expected recovery and
induce many victims to avoid bringing suit in the first place."' g Moreover,
287. 865 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1989).
288. Id. at 855.
289. Id. ("It is unlikely that a warning would have averted the attack. Susan testified that she
thought the man who had knocked on the door was her fiancd. Thinking this, she would have
opened the door no matter how dangerous she believed the neighborhood to be."). This
conclusion is, of course, contestable, as a warning by the motel could have made the victim more
likely to scrutinize a knock.
290. Id. at 855-56 ("A guard would have cost $50 a night. That is almost $20,000 a year.
This is not an enormous number.... If we were the trier of fact we would assess the
defendants' share at more than 3 percent.").
291. An emphasis on architecture, however, does not mean that tort liability should be
enhanced in every instance. For example, some states permit plaintiffs to show that a crime was
foreseeable by introducing evidence of crimes in neighboring locations. In Early v. N.LV. Casino,
Corp., 678 P.2d 683 (Nev. 1984), the plaintiff sued a casino for an assault in its restroom.
Although there had been no such reported assaults in the casino's restroom, the plaintiff was
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the lawsuits may focus on target-hardening and will not generate attention
to the more subtle forms of architectural precaution.
For that reason, if a jurisdiction wants to use tort liability to encourage
architectural solutions to crime, it could either create a specialized
administrative court where such lawsuits could be brought, or adopt a
building code enforced by negligence per se liability. 92 Either method
would avoid having each judge or jury reinvent the wheel to determine
what types of precaution are necessary. Negligence per se would also
provide guidance to parties and insurance companies well before litigation
even became an issue, but a specialized court might be better suited to
making locally tailored architectural determinations.
At present, however, the risk of tort suits provides a disincentive to
employ security measures and document criminal activity, because such
steps can constitute a landowner's admission of knowledge of crime risks.
Such precautions can further suggest that landowners have voluntarily
assumed the risk of providing security.293 Accordingly, governments might
develop "safe harbor" provisions that insulate entities that comply with
design requirements from tort lawsuits, or they might adopt rules to bar
admission of such improvements into evidence.
5. Contractual Regulation
One argument against tort liability for architectural design is that if
individuals want such features, they can contract for them and pay higher
prices. This possibility was suggested by Judge MacKinnon in his dissent in
Kline: "It is just too much, absent a contractual agreement, to require...
police patrol protection or its equivalent .... If tenants expect such
permitted to introduce evidence of assaults in the bathrooms of other casinos. Of course, a
defendant should be permitted to distinguish, in appropriate cases, one set of bathrooms from
another on the basis of design features.
292. A defense at trial may be allowed for a variance, given the particular circumstances
(depending on the extent of the fine and the type of regulation at issue). Such a scheme also
creates an incentive for the government to draft balanced crime prevention regulations-codes
that would protect potential victims from crime and owners from high liability.
293. Consider this analysis of parking lots:
In the past, parking facility owners have hesitated to document their rationale for the
specific security measures employed at a facility because they were afraid that such
documentation would be used against them in any litigation. However, experience has
shown that documentation that shows a thoughtful, rational approach to security
planning is of substantial benefit in court.
SMITH, supra note 28; see also B.A. Glesner, Landlords as Cops: Tort, Nuisance & Forfeiture
Standards Imposing Liability on Landlords for Crime on the Premises, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
679, 699 (1992) ("The voluntary assumption theory has been criticized for creating disincentives
to provide security measures."); David W. Robertson, Negligence Liability for Crimes and
Intentional Torts Committed by Others, 67 TUL. L. REV. 135, 142-44 (1992) (explaining the
voluntary assumption theory and cases).
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protection, they can move to apartments where it is available and
presumably pay a higher rental .. 294
There is some reason to doubt that parties will make such contracts on
their own, however, due to the hidden features of architecture. The problem
is that there are informational asymmetries between landlords and tenants.
Landlords have information about crime occurrences, many of which are
not reported to the police. They also may have better knowledge about their
premises and the crime risks created by the design (whether the risks be the
result of latent construction features, low visibility, poor access controls, or
some other factor). Because of these asymmetries, such bargaining might
never take place or might take place in a suboptimal fashion. In striking a
bargain, landlords-who, after all, want to get their apartments rented-
may hold back information concerning the security concerns in a
neighborhood and the particular building from a prospective tenant.295
At the same time, some forms of architectural design are too expensive
to impose on landlords and not sufficiently important to form the basis of a
tort lawsuit or to be mandated across an entire jurisdiction. For those design
features, solutions in contract might be appropriate because they leave the
parties free to bargain about who pays for what and permit a carefully
tailored solution to security in lieu of a one-size-fits-all regulation.
Fortunately, the law of contracts has developed mechanisms to remedy
informational asymmetries. While a full survey of such techniques is
beyond the scope of this Article, one possibility is to impose on landlords a
duty to disclose, like that governing disclosure of latent defects for sellers.
Government could regulate what landlords must disclose to prospective
tenants regarding known occurrences of crime, access controls, lighting,
and the like. Even simply requiring disclosure of the first item, known
occurrences of crime, may induce landlords to take adequate precautions
and can help tenants avoid risky situations. (This idea undergirds
Congress's recent passage of the Crime Awareness and Campus Security
Act, which requires higher education institutions that receive federal
funding to keep track of and disclose crime statistics to members of the
294. Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 492-93 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(MacKinnon, J., dissenting); see also Cohen v. Southland Corp., 203 Cal. Rptr. 572, 579 (1984)
("It is... not unfair that patrons pay a few cents more for items they purchase from ... a store
and gain the assurance of reasonable protection against criminal activity while shopping
there .... "). In Richmond Medical Supply Co. v. Clifton, 369 S.E.2d 407 (Va. 1988), the court
upheld a theory of liability based on express contract when the owner failed to replace a defective
exterior door that gave burglars entrance. The trial court had dismissed the case on the ground that
landlords did not have a duty to provide security, but the supreme court held that the tort duty-of-
care precedents were inapplicable to a contract theory.
295. Even victims of crime are not always forthcoming about their experiences, so the market
in information is imperfect. However, landlords tend to have a much larger set of information than
do individual tenants.
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campus community and prospective students.)296 The failure to disclose
such information could make a lease contract voidable at the option of the
tenant, authorize the withholding of rent, and perhaps give rise to modest
damages if crimes occur.
Should government wish to create incentives for landlords to disclose
even more information, it could adopt a series of penalty defaults-such as
making a landlord responsible for half of the damages from a crime on the
premises-and the defaults could be removed upon a sufficient showing
either of the landlord's disclosure of information or of the victim's
negligence (assessed from the standpoint of a tenant who did not have such
information). 97 Government can also go beyond requiring disclosure of
information to deem lease contracts voidable for failure to meet the housing
code, and also provide for modest liquidated damages. Note that if the
tenant is the better bearer of these crime prevention expenses, the landlord
could write a lease contract explicitly to shift the burden, through waiver
clauses, to the tenant. The information-forcing role of the contractual
scheme would still be maintained.298
Some of the architectural designs discussed in Part I generate positive
externalities for nonsignatories to the contract. When landlords take
security precautions, they dissuade tenants from moving to an inefficient
self-help system-such as staying indoors. Architectural precautions taken
by a landlord may also enhance natural surveillance and decrease the fear of
crime more generally in the neighborhood, thus providing benefits that do
not accrue solely to a tenant. This externality cannot be captured in a
contract. Landlord prevention can also take advantage of economies of
scale (lighting that protects several tenants, common windows, and other
296. See 20 U.S.C. § 1092(0 (1994). Proponents of the Act argued that the reporting
requirements would induce universities to take better precautions and would guide students in the
selection of schools. See The Crime Awareness and Campus Security Act of 1989: Hearing on
H.R. 3344 Before the House Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, 97th Cong. (1990) (statement of Howard Clery). Some jurisdictions have
held landlords liable in tort for the failure to warn tenants of criminal activity. See O'Hara v. W.
Seven Trees Corp. Intercoast Mgmt., 142 Cal. Rptr. 487, 491-92 (Ct. App. 1977) (upholding a
claim where the landlord knew of past rapes in the apartment complex but assured the prospective
tenant of its safety without disclosing the prior rapes); BATES & DUNNELL, supra note 276, at 46
(noting that failure to warn "has developed as an emerging concept in premises security lawsuits"
and that "the failure to warn tenants of criminal activity can lead to a strong claim in premises
security liability").
297. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91-93 (1989) (explaining penalty default rules). This
type of modification to default rules is one that can be generally applied outside of landlord-tenant
relationships, such as in residential and commercial property sales. However, informational
asymmetries are not likely to be as large in such settings, as the private sector may generate such
information on its own.
298. One court has suggested that a waiver clause would release the landlord from liability
for crimes. Cooke v. Allstate Mgmt. Corp., 741 F. Supp. 1205, 1207-08 (D.S.C. 1990). To prevent
boilerplate waivers, a court could insist on explicit proof of actual bargaining over this term, such
as through lower rents.
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features that enable natural surveillance) that would be impossible or
inefficient for individual tenants to undertake or to require in contracts with
landlords. If these externalities are sufficiently great for a particular type of
precaution, a contractual scheme will not be appropriate and heavier
inducements for precautions, such as tax breaks, should be used.2
A different point about externalities counsels against using contracts:
Because the poor have less purchasing power, they are likely to disregard
the information disclosed by landlords. A contract strategy might only give
relatively wealthy tenants architectural protections. In such a circumstance,
crime could be displaced from the wealthy to the poor. Again, one rationale
of systemic and pervasive regulation of architecture is to avoid such
negative externalities. A limited contractual scheme could, under certain
conditions, exacerbate them.
I now turn to some ways in which criminal law can encourage
architectural precautions that prevent crime.
C. Government as Enforcer
1. Regulation of Places of Crime
Government employs both civil and criminal processes to control
private land use. These techniques have been used for many years:
Nuisance and forfeiture were used to close down saloons before and during
Prohibition.300 These tools can be adapted to focus on architectural
considerations relating to crime prevention. For example, ample evidence
suggests that decaying and abandoned buildings are breeding grounds for
crime. To bring about better design, government can threaten to condemn
or forfeit such property or to eliminate the place where congregation occurs.
Such techniques can also reduce the perception that crime is rampant and
bring more people outdoors. That, in turn, enhances natural surveillance.
Jurisdictions have begun experimenting with nuisance abatement
programs. These programs threaten landlords with seizure of property
unless the owners act to prevent the particular nuisance, which is more
often than not drug dealing. Most of these statutes allow for the government
or residents to bring a civil suit, and the primary sanction is an injunction to
299. Tax breaks and direct government spending will also spread the costs of architectural
improvements over a wider segment of the population and minimize the risk that rents will
increase.
300. Annotation, Constitutionality of Statute Providing for Forfeiture of Property upon
Which Intoxicating Liquor Is Manufactured or Sold, 10 A.L.R. 1591 (1921); Henry Schofield,
Equity Jurisdiction To Abate and Enjoin Illegal Saloons as Public Nuisances, 8 ILL. L. REv. 19
(1913).
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abate the nuisance. ° l In addition, some statutes provide for temporary or
permanent closure of property and recovery of monetary damages.31 2
Eviction laws follow a similar path. New York's Bawdy House Law,
for example, states that any owner or tenant within 200 feet of property
used for illegal activity can serve written notice on the landlord requiring
eviction of the tenant engaged in such conduct." 3 New York City also
recently implemented a padlock program whereby premises with illegal
activity would be locked and closed.3" The Padlock Law provides the
police commissioner with the authority to order the discontinuance of
301. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-155.2 (Supp. 2000); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 12-991 (Supp.
2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 7105 (1999); D.C. CODE ANN. § 42-3602 (2001); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-38-9 (Supp. 2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-258.01 (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE
§ 60A-4-403a (2000). Early common law refused to permit such actions, reasoning that the lease
was a conveyance that transferred all power of control to the tenant. E.g., City of St. Louis v. J.E.
Kaime & Brother Real Estate Co., 79 S.W. 140 (Mo. 1904); New York v. Corlies, 2 Sand. Ch.
301 (N.Y. 1848). These rules have been modified both by statute and common law. See, e.g., R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 11-30-7 (2000) (providing an example of statutory modification); People v.
Schriber, 310 N.Y.S.2d 551, 552 (App. Div. 1970) (providing an example of common-law
modification).
Some of these statutes apply only to drug-related crimes. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-155.2;
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 7104; VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-258.01; W. VA. CODE § 60A-4-403a.
Others apply to a wide variety of crimes. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-991 (applying to the use of
residential property in committing any crime); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.138 (crimes involving
drugs, prostitution, stolen property, or gangs); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-38-9 (drug-, gambling-,
prostitution-, and gang-related crimes); WIS. STAT. § 823.113 (Supp. 2001) (drug- and gang-
related crimes).
302. See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 7105 (closure of property); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 893.138 (same); WIS. STAT. § 823.113 (same). However, to recover monetary damages, some
statutes require that the owner knew or reasonably should have known about the nuisance. See,
e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 12-991. Of these statutes that permit closure of the property, some limit
such closure to one year, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.138, while others allow for an undefined
duration, Wis. STAT. § 823.113. In general, the statutes "do not typically result in the transfer of
property ownership or the seizure of property" because owners work with city officials to abate
the nuisance. Eck, supra note 105; see also Lorraine Green, Policing Places with Drug Problems:
The Multi-Agency Response Team Approach, in CRIME AND PLACE, supra note 21, at 199, 200
(discussing Miami's nuisance strategy, which offers landlords low-interest loans to help get rid of
drug dealers); Clarence Dickson, Drug Stings in Miami, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Jan. 1988,
at 1 (same); Bill Miller, Owners of Troubled Properties Targeted; U.S. Suits Seek To Seize Crime-
Ridden Buildings, WASH. POST, July 27, 2000, at J3 (noting that prosecutors have filed suits
claiming inadequate lighting and security).
303. See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 715 (McKinney Supp. 2001); CADWALADER,
WICKERSHAM & TAFT, A CIVIL WAR: A COMMUNITY LEGAL GUIDE TO FIGHTING STREET DRUG
MARKETS 147-48 (1993) (discussing the Bawdy House Law). Cadwalader believed that nuisance
laws were so important to fighting crime that the firm celebrated its bicentennial anniversary with
publication of this book, with sample model complaints that residents could file in court.
304. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE §§ 10-155 to -156 (1996). In order for the police
commissioner to proceed under the Padlock Law, two arrests must take place inside the targeted
building, with at least one of these arrests resulting in a conviction. Then, a third "triggering"
arrest must take place inside the building, and all three of these arrests must occur within one year.
See CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM & TAFT, supra note 303, at 47-49 (describing the Padlock
Law); William J. Bratton, The New York City Police Department's Civil Enforcement of Quality-
of-Life Crimes, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 447, 455-56 (1995) (same). Michigan also has a somewhat similar
Padlock Act. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3801 (West 2000).
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certain criminal activity within a building or to order the closing of the
building to the extent necessary to abate the nuisance.
Oakland recently launched a program that focused on places rather than
on individual offenders. Under this approach, city officials would inspect
properties identified as drug nuisance areas, enforce building codes against
such properties, and force landowners to maintain and clean them." 5 The
approach has been used over 2000 times with striking success. At least
seventy percent of the time, city officials find housing violations and force
compliance by the landlord. A study of the Oakland program found that
those sites in which it was used had the greatest crime reduction-an
amount fifteen percent greater than other areas of the city. The study found
that the program also had a geographic halo effect: Crime dropped not only
in the units targeted by the police, but also in neighboring units. It further
found that major improvements to the physical infrastructure of the
properties occurred after the program was implemented.
In addition to nuisance complaints, prosecutors can also bring forfeiture
actions against places known to be used in criminal activity. The burden of
proof is high,3 6 but such burdens can be advantageous if a jurisdiction
believes that the nuisance power can be invoked by too many people or
imposes too many burdens on innocent owners. Traditional forfeiture
statutes did not attack the place of crime, as they targeted properties that
were purchased with the proceeds of crime (some of these might also be
places where crime takes place; others, however, may not).3 7 By contrast,
more recent federal law permits forfeiture of real property that is used, or is
intended to be used, to commit certain drug offenses.0 8
One large difference between forfeiture and nuisance concerns
knowledge of the owner. Forfeiture laws require that owners know illegal
305. The data in this paragraph can be found in Green, supra note 302, at 199-213, and John
E. Eck & David Weisburd, Crime Places in Crime Theory, in CRIME AND PLACE, supra note 21,
at 1, 20. Another study of San Diego landlords found that crime dropped when code inspectors
and police officers met with landlords after their tenants were arrested on drug charges. See JOHN
E. ECK & JULIE WARTELL, REDUCING CRIME AND DRUG DEALING BY IMPROVING PLACE
MANAGEMENT: A RANDOMIZED EXPERIMENT (Nat'l Inst. of Justice, Research Preview, Jan.
1999).
306. The burden of proof in forfeiture proceedings was recently changed through legislation.
See Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185, § 2(c), 114 Stat. 202, 205-06
(codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 983(c) (West Supp. 2001)). The government must now establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that property was used or was intended to be used in the
commission of a drug offense before it is subject to forfeiture. This burden of proof is still lower
than that in a criminal trial, and no convictions are required.
307. Unlike forfeiture of proceeds of a crime, which has no limitations because such proceeds
are not "fines" but rather "fruits," the Constitution limits forfeiture of property used in the
commission of a crime. The Supreme Court recently determined that both civil and criminal
forfeitures (other than those of proceeds) constitute punitive fines and are therefore limited by the
excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993);
Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544 (1993).
308. 21 U.S.C.A. § 881 (West Supp. 2001).
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conduct is occurring on their premises;3 9 nuisance laws, by contrast,
generally do not. When the government is better situated than a landlord to
know that criminal activity is taking place in an apartment, nuisance law
may be preferable because it increases the flow of information to the
landlord (who can then take action to avert closure or seizure of the
building).
2. Criminal Regulation of Owners of Places
Some statutes already subject the owner of a dwelling that is used by
drug dealers or drug users to criminal penalties."' The federal code, for
example, provides for criminal sanctions against an owner or occupier who
knows premises are being used for narcotics activity under a law commonly
referred to as the "crack-house statute." 3 1' Criminalizing use or possession
is unlikely to be effective by itself because the owner of the property may
not be present and because, "[w]hen police raid these crack houses, the
dealers and users can easily dispose of the drugs, thus avoiding arrest."312
Three important limits generally confine the use of these statutes. First, the
crimes must be proven "beyond a reasonable doubt." Second, many of
these statutes specifically require knowledge on the part of the owner.313
And third, the courts have interpreted some statutes to require more than a
single instance of drug activity.314
309. The federal statute explicitly provides that an "innocent owner's interest in property
shall not be forfeited under any civil forfeiture statute." 18 U.S.C.A. § 983(d)(1) (West Supp.
2001). Another difference concerns the remedy. If an owner is prone to allowing crime to
continue, forfeiture, which permanently strips ownership of property away from an owner, is a
better solution than nuisance, which often leads to only temporary closure of the property.
310. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11366.5 (1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-42
(1999); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286(a)(5) (1996 & Supp. 2000); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2925.13 (Anderson 1996 & Supp. 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-42-10 (Michie 1998);
WASH. REV. CODE § 69.53.010 (1997). Some statutes also criminalize the conduct of owning a
dwelling that was involved in prostitution. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-3208 (2001); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 22-2713 (1996 & Supp. 2001); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 750.454 (Michie 1991) (prohibiting
leasing). The criminal sanctions applicable under these state and federal statutes vary from
misdemeanor to felony penalties and often include jail time and fines.
311. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) (1994). This section "is designed to apply to the person who may
not have actually opened or maintained the place for the purpose of drug activity, but who has
knowingly allowed others to engage in those activities." United States v. Chen, 913 F.2d 183, 190
(5th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Sturmoski, 971 F.2d 452, 461-62 (10th Cir. 1992)
(describing the section as going "beyond the proscriptions found in other statutes relating to
possession and manufacture of controlled substances and actually criminaliz[ing] a particular
defendant's use of property" ).
312. 132 CONG. REc. S 13,741 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1986) (statement of Sen. Chiles).
313. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11366.5; GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-42; OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.13; WASH. REV. CODE § 69.53.010. A requirement of knowledge has
also been read into another statute where such a requirement was not explicitly stated. See State v.
Stone, 467 N.W.2d 905,906-07 (S.D. 1991) (interpreting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-42-10).
314. See, e.g., Barnes v. State, 339 S.E.2d 229, 232 (Ga. 1986); Hunt v. State, 314 A.2d 743
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974); Howard v. State, 815 P.2d 679, 683 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991).
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The threat of criminal penalties might induce a landlord to take
architectural precautions to avoid criminal liability down the road.
However, criminal sanctions, like forfeiture, are only modest inducements
to take such precautions. Their stronger effect may be to encourage natural
surveillance as neighborhoods get cleaner and safer, enabling architecture
to work more effectively. As with all law enforcement solutions, however,
the costs can be significant.
3. Criminal Regulation of Perpetrators and Others
a. Crimes Against Neighbors and Networks
Architectural concepts such as natural surveillance demonstrate that
certain forms of crime pose special dangers to society. These crimes target
social networks and make it more difficult for interaction to develop.
31 5
Examples are hate crimes, rape, and some other forms of violent crime that
have the effect of creating stratification among divergent social groups.
Others are some more minor crimes, from assaults to public urination.
People who are afraid of being hurt do not venture outdoors, and so even a
garden-variety assault, given the circumstance, may undermine natural
surveillance. Similarly, if the sights and smells in a neighborhood are not
pleasing, it is unlikely that people will walk the streets. Offenses that are
considered trivial can thus have more dramatic consequences. Instead of
focusing on the act involved in the commission of a crime, I am arguing
that its probable consequences are relevant when apportioning punishment.
One such consequence concerns complementarity. Complementarity is the
economic notion that two products "go together" and that a price decrease
in one will lead to additional consumption of the other. If offenses such as
public urination have low "prices" attached to them, more of these offenses
will be committed, and these may prompt additional, more serious offenses.
The apportionment of sentences and of investigative and prosecutorial
resources should take into account consequences of crime and, in particular,
its harm to social networks.
A few crimes even more explicitly target neighbors who act as good
citizens. For example, when a neighbor is assaulted while attempting to
break up a street fight, that assault has repercussions on natural surveillance
more generally. Similarly, when a witness to a crime is threatened, other
witnesses can be deterred from assisting law enforcement in later cases. For
this reason, obstruction of justice statutes play a crucial role in protecting
natural surveillance practitioners. Although such statutes do not protect
practitioners until the police are involved, their existence can provide some
315. Katyal, supra note 3, at 1087-90 (discussing the crime of targeting networks).
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comfort to bystanders. Bystanders need to know that the law will protect
them if need be-even if they do not actually invoke formal process.
Bystander intervention will be more likely as the possibility for protection
increases.
b. Crimes Against Architecture
Some crimes directly interfere with architecture. A historical example
concerns the crime of burglary, defined at common law to require
"breaking" and "entering." 3 6 Criminal law students often wonder why
breaking and entering should be a special crime, when the laws against
robbery, trespass, and assault cover the brunt of cases. Some venture the
answer that breaking and entering serves as an inchoate crime to cover
circumstances in which the perpetrator was not able to abscond with any
items. But the problem with that rationale is that attempt liability covers
many of the inchoate contexts. Others venture that the law wants to protect
residents from having their houses invaded, even by individuals who do not
wish to steal or maim. But, again, the law against trespass generally serves
this purpose. The prohibition against breaking and entering, however, could
have a unique function: to protect access barriers. If a criminal "breaks"
through such barriers to the point where "entry" is achieved, others can
follow into the premises.1 7 The law, perhaps unconsciously, reflects the
belief that access barriers need special protection, to prevent criminals from
weakening them and creating the possibility of repeated attacks against a
target.
The common law of burglary intentionally provided a direct incentive
for landowners to take precautions and strengthen access barriers: It was
not burglary when a burglar crawled through an open window or went
through an open door. Blackstone defined burglary as "at least by breaking,
or taking out the glass of, or otherwise opening, a window; picking a lock,
or opening it with a key."" 8 "But," Blackstone continued, "if a person
leaves his doors or windows open, it is his own folly and negligence; and if
a man enters therein, it is no burglary." 3' 9 As one English court put it, "if a
316. COKE, supra note 58, at 63 ("A burglar is by the common law a felon, that in the night
breaketh and entreth into a mansion house of another .... ).
317. This rationale does not explain all of burglary, as burglary did not always require
destruction of an access barrier. If someone opened an unsecured door or window, it would
constitute burglary. See I MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 68-70 (London, Richard
Tonson 1678).
318. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *226.
319. Id.; see also Gaddie v. Commonwealth, 78 S.W. 162, 163 (Ky. 1904) ("[T]here is no
breaking where the entering is through... pushing further open a door partly open, or raising a
window partly raised .... ); I HALE, supra note 317, at 68 ("If A. enter into the house of B. in
the night, by the doors open, and breaks open a chest, and takes away goods without breaking
open an inner door, this is no burglary .... ").
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man choose to leave an opening in the wall or roof of his house, instead of a
fastened window, he must take the consequences."3 2' The limitation on
common-law burglary was also based on a sort of "attractive nuisance"
theory, that the "manifest carelessness of the householder" in leaving a
window open "tempts the passer-by to enter."'2 In other words, the
common law of burglary was based in part on the desire to encourage
potential victims of crime to take precautions and to ue architecture to
prevent easy access.
The access point suggests that crimes against architecture should be
punished because deterring those crimes will prevent the commission of
more serious ones. It also suggests that if certain crimes can be easily foiled
by architecture, law enforcement might not want to invest as many
resources in fighting those crimes. This is, as we have seen, one explanation
for the elimination of the nighttime requirement in the crime of burglary.322
Crimes that directly interfere with natural surveillance should also be
singled out for special penalties. Destroying the lighting around a building
is one obvious example. Another would be attempts by criminals to bring
smoke-belching trucks onto a street before robbing an establishment.323
c. Law Enforcement Priorities
Another way to encourage development of architectural solutions is to
adopt a policy whereby prosecutors and police give priority to cases in
320. Rex v. Spriggs, 174 Eng. Rep. 122 (C.P. 1834).
321. State v. Lapoint, 88 A. 523, 524 (Vt. 1913).
322. See supra text accompanying note 58.
323. These examples underscore that architecture alone will not stop crime. Law can go
further and place minimal legal duties on bystanders to instill a norm of being a watchful
neighbor. Whether law should create an affirmative duty to report a crime is a difficult question,
replete with moral and social consequences that this Article cannot resolve in the short space
remaining. Yet the importance of natural surveillance provides a modest argument in favor of
imposing a duty to report criminal acts and to punish the failure to report with nominal fines. The
idea is that bystanders serve as cheapest cost avoiders: They are more responsive to minimal legal
sanctions than criminals are to larger ones. Placing liability on them may thus bring about more
preventive action by the public and the police.
Bystander intervention requirements are also helpful in that they provide an excuse for
monitoring. At present, if a neighbor is only partially convinced that he is watching a crime take
place, he may refrain from calling the police out of fear of retaliation by the supposed perpetrator.
But once the law imposes a duty, the neighbor's call to the cops is more understandable--even,
perhaps, to the supposed perpetrator. Legal duties, here and elsewhere, sometimes provide an
excuse, a cover, for conduct that could risk social disapproval.
Some jurisdictions have used law to facilitate intentional surveillance as part of a design
strategy. For example, some localities have passed laws requiring convenience stores to have two
clerks on duty at all times. Casteel & Peek-Asa, supra note 51, at 110, 113 (finding that this
strategy likely decreases crime but that more controlled research is required). Private contracts, or
even default rules in law, could go even further and place requirements on store clerks to detect
and report thefts by holding them liable for a small percentage of the theft. If such a scheme is
used, liability should not be draconian; the idea is simply to reinforce attitudes toward intervention
and reporting.
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which owner-victims used appropriate design before the crime was
committed. If a victim of crime did not take adequate architectural
precautions, that case would be relegated to the back of the list. This is a
strategy I have proposed in the context of computer crime, with the aim of
getting victims of crime to take adequate architectural and other precautions
before an offense occurs.324 It is designed to provide incentives not only to
victims, but also to law enforcement. If police know that the only way to
have freedom to prioritize cases as they see fit is to have a series of victims
who have used adequate architecture, they will then warn owners to use
such techniques.
Many, for good reason, would find it inappropriate to apply such
prioritization strategies to situations in which victims suffer physical harm.
But on this view, prioritization could still be applied to those crimes in
which no physical violence takes place, such as damage to property and
theft.32 If a perpetrator, in the course of committing a property offense, also
engages in an act of physical violence to a human being, however, the
prioritization strategy would be discarded. Under this system, marginal
deterrence against crimes of violence-presumably a goal of those who
would limit prioritization to crimes against property-is actually enhanced.
A perpetrator can commit a property offense at less risk of investigation and
prosecution, but the risks increase once that crime turns to one of violence.
4. Community Policing
The recent move toward community policing has potential synergies
with architectural solutions to crime. Community policing refers to
techniques of law enforcement that locate police directly in communities,
where they are responsive to local concerns and pursue local agendas. The
idea is to prosecute those cases that the community feels deserve sanction,
instead of relying on standardized instructions from a centralized
headquarters. When done correctly, community policing brings more
people out onto the streets, where they can perform their natural
surveillance role. It does so by creating respect for law enforcement, which
reduces the fear of threats on the street (whether from criminals or police
officers).
As the New Jersey Safe Neighborhoods program showed, architectural
techniques work together with community policing. Effective community
324. Katyal, supra note 3, at 1077-82.
325. The strategy will be most desirable for inexpensive forms of architectural precaution. As
the precautions become more costly, prioritization will become so regressive that it should be
abandoned. Similarly, if the strategy disadvantages the poor, it might only be applied to
commercial establishments. Prioritization may also provide an incentive for criminals to attack
areas with fewer precautions, so the strategy should be employed in limited circumstances in
which the precautions are easy to adopt and hard to observe and where law enforcement is costly.
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policing requires advice from residents about unsafe areas and about ways
to respond to the problem, and effective architectural design benefits from
law enforcement's views about architectural techniques.3 26 A program in
Rogers Park, Chicago, brought residents and police together and generated
a series of design recommendations that would reduce the crime rate and
help foot patrols function better.3 27 Even the process of developing an
architectural plan fosters community; when residents of Miami's Coconut
Grove neighborhood began consideration of a plan to take down their
individual fences and create more visibility and diversity of land use, the
process created common understandings and sharing.328
The techniques discussed in Part I are designed in part to give
communities greater roles in order maintenance. Yet they also make
policing easier by reducing opportunities for escape and reducing tensions
in a community. Moreover, when communities feel they have more control
over the criminal process, they may involve law enforcement in different
ways. They will not have to fear that every call to the police will result in
an arrest; instead they may ask the police to serve as peacekeepers. Such
techniques contribute to public order and reduce the fear of crime.
III. SOME RISKS OF ARCHITECTURE
When theorists such as Jane Jacobs began formulating design principles
that would deter crime, their proposals generated a wave of criticism. Hard
architecture, it was thought, looked draconian and gave an appearance
redolent of jail cells. New advances in technology, however, liberate us
from a choice between high crime and life in a fortress. Concrete can be
attractively stained to enhance visibility, access barriers can be subtle and
pleasing to the eye, and plastics can be employed that appear to be
welcoming but are actually stronger than steel. For that reason, the
aesthetics argument is not as powerful as it once was. However, there are
326. See DAN FLEISSNER & FRED HEINZELMANN, CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH
ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN AND COMMUNITY POLICING (1996), http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles/
crimepre.txt; supra note 240. In 1973, Hartford, Connecticut, adopted a program to couple
community policing with changes to the environmental design of two neighborhoods. Burglary
dropped by approximately fifty percent, whereas neighborhoods that did not use architectural
techniques had no drop in their crime rates. The study also revealed a 27.5% reduction in
incidence of street crime. GARDINER, supra note 30, at 67.
327. Michelle Anderson et al., A Defensible Space Project: Deterring Crime and Building
Community in Rogers Park, at http://www.luc.edu/depts/curlpub/defense.html (last visited Nov.
29, 2001).
328. According to one radio report, Coconut Grove residents destroyed "the psychic walls"
that were dividing them and came together as a result of the project: "Before starting the crime-
fighting project, they went their separate ways and hardly spoke to each other. 'But that's all
changed.... Now, I mean, it's unbelievable the difference. We pretty much talk on the phone
practically almost every day. Everybody has become friends." Neighborhood Fights Crime by
Opening Up (NPR radio broadcast, May 29, 1994) (quoting a five-year Coconut Grove resident).
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four remaining general criticisms to consider. The first concerns the risk to
individual privacy posed by natural surveillance. The second is a broader
criticism about extending the sphere of social control beyond the state. The
third is an argument about whether architectural solutions reduce crime or
simply displace it. And the fourth underscores how rules to harness design
might produce suboptimal types of architectural protections against crime.
In this Part, I explore these criticisms, though again my goal is not to
answer them in full. The objections are sufficiently weighty to counsel the
government against employing architectural solutions in some
circumstances. But one important global response to the criticisms must be
kept in mind: They plague law enforcement as well. Extensive law
enforcement methods threaten privacy, as any person who has read a Fourth
Amendment case knows.329 Intrusions by the government can be of special
danger in that they invoke the coercive apparatus of the state, manifested in
the potential for imprisonment. Law enforcement can also displace crime
from one area to another or lead to the substitution of one type of crime for
another. Reliance on conventional policing can also induce owners to take
suboptimal architectural protections. Accordingly, government should not
use architecture everywhere to prevent crime, although it should consider
design concepts in an array of situations before resorting to increases in law
enforcement.
A. Threat to Privacy
At first blush, natural surveillance appears to be in tension with a
commitment to privacy. In this Section, I outline some reasons why
government can both be faithful to privacy interests and support natural
surveillance and similar crime reduction techniques.
First, without government attention to architectural solutions,
individuals will embrace architectural solutions of their own. At times,
architectural solutions to crime will be inevitable; the real questions
concern what type of solutions will be picked, and who will pay the bill.
The use of private solutions can pose even more severe risks to privacy; a
closed-circuit television camera that looks out onto public space is one
good example. Without careful attention to violations of privacy by private
actors, government neutrality can perversely restrict privacy instead of
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
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augmenting it. In these settings, government regulation of architecture to
prevent crime might enhance privacy.33
Without better design, individuals will use other suboptimal means of
self-help as well. The most instinctive approach is simply to stay indoors
and avoid contact with the outside world. Recall what happened to the St.
Louis Pruitt-Igoe project: The architectural design created hidden stairwells
where crime festered and forced residents into their individual
apartments."' Government should steer individuals and businesses away
from these coping mechanisms by, for example, creating semipublic spaces
that mediate the tension between an atomized group of individuals and a
collective and undifferentiated mass.
Second, many individuals who might be helped by architecture already
lack privacy, as they live in conditions where intrusion is common and
crime is rampant. This is one reason why a paradigmatic application of
these architectural concepts is inner-city housing that suffers from high
crime. Privacy in America today is a luxury good that the poor often lack
the resources to secure. Privacy is about controlling the boundaries of one's
exposure, and if a person can be attacked by others, or if her property can
be invaded, it is a fundamental violation of these boundaries. Far from
destroying privacy, government can help secure more privacy for the poor
through architectural techniques such as increasing territoriality and
controffing private space.
A third point is sufficiently complicated that I offer it only tentatively.
The argument is that architecture can reinforce the essential value of
privacy by creating public spaces that encourage social interaction. Groups
of atomized individuals who live and think alone do not fulfill the
aspirations of privacy. Privacy should be valued precisely because it
contrasts with a public life. It cannot be valued as highly on its own,
because an essential purpose of privacy is to permit individuals to take
lessons from public life and reflect upon them in conditions of relative
isolation, where candor and deliberation are at their height. Put differently,
many privacy enthusiasts have remarked that privacy is necessary to ensure
a vibrant public life, because private space facilitates the development of a
public persona.332 But the converse could be true as well: The realization of
one's privacy may depend on one's ability to develop a public persona.
My argument presumes that an overriding goal is to get rid of crime,
but those who disagree can still endorse architectural strategies while also
330. There are also distributional consequences to nonintervention; a free market may induce
more affluent communities to use architectural protections and possibly externalize crime onto
other communities, thereby invading the privacy of the latter.
331. See supra text accompanying note 97.
332. E.g., GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOR, supra note 34, at 38-39 (discussing how "involvement
shields" permit individuals to hide in private to display fully reactions to news received in
public); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE 11-12 (2000) (making a similar observation).
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arguing to reduce the level of law enforcement. If society concludes that a
degree of crime is not harmful, some crime can be excused on a random
basis, or sentences for particular crimes eliminated altogether. And if
destabilization of the law is a goal in a particular community, the above
analysis illuminates a way to resist the force of law: building places where
surveillance is minimal, access is plentiful, and territoriality is weak.
B. Social Control
A major theme of Michel Foucault's incisive book, Discipline and
Punish, concerns the evolution of methods of social control. He showed
how punishment moved away from inflicting pain on the body toward
creating a system where enforcers could always view what people were
doing-" eyes that must see without being seen."33 3 Central to Foucault's
analysis, though underappreciated by legal scholars, is a claim about
architecture.
Foucault's work illustrated how earlier systems of punishment
depended on marking the body of the offender and creating a public
spectacle, a spectacle that would reinforce law-abiding behavior in the
citizenry. More modern systems, by contrast, substituted this spectacle for a
regime of surveillance. Architecture played a critical role in perfecting this
new regime. Foucault explained how its "ideal model" for the plan of
buildings and cities was the military camp: "The geometry of the paths, the
number and distribution of the tents, the orientation of their entrances, the
disposition of files and ranks were exactly defined; the network of gazes
that supervised one another was laid down."334
Foucault relied on two examples to demonstrate this form of
surveillance. The first concerned measures to control the spread of the
plague in the seventeenth century. The city was partitioned, and each street
was placed under the control of a syndic. Everyone was ordered to stay
indoors, and the syndic locked each door from the outside. Observation
posts were erected to watch the streets, and "[i]nspections function[ed]
ceaselessly. The gaze [wa]s alert everywhere." 
335
Foucault's second example was Jeremy Bentham's famous Panopticon.
The initial conception of the Panopticon dates back to a series of letters
Bentham wrote in 1787, which began with the following invocation:
333. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 171 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books
2d ed. 1995) (1975).
334. Id. "The perfect disciplinary apparatus would make it possible for a single gaze to see
everything constantly... ; a perfect eye that nothing would escape and a centre towards which all
gazes would be turned." Id. at 173; see also Katyal, supra note 4, at 2456-57 (discussing
Foucault's views on the transformation of social control).
335. FOUCAULT, supra note 333, at 195.
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"Morals reformed-health preserved-industry invigorated-instruction
diffused... the gordian knot of the Poor-Laws not cut, but untied-all by
a simple idea in Architecture!' ' 336 Bentham's panoptic design arranged
prison cells in a ring-shaped building surrounding a central tower. The cells
were to be open to the tower and backlit, rendering the inmates constantly
visible to the guard in the tower. The purpose of the Panopticon was to use
surveillance to control behavior: "[Tihe more constantly the persons to be
inspected are under the eyes of the persons who should inspect them, the
more perfectly will the purpose of the establishment have been attained."337
To achieve this effect, Bentham proposed that power should be "visible,"
in that the inmate could always see the central tower from which he is spied
upon, and "unverifiable," in that the inmate must never know whether he is
being looked at during any one moment, but must realize that he may
always be so.338
Foucault identified other applications of the Panopticon besides its use
in the prison setting. These included treating patients in hospitals,
instructing schoolchildren, supervising workers, and putting idlers to work
in factories.339  Foucault's claim mirrored those of contemporary
environmental psychologists about how architecture can shape tastes. When
architecture "is no longer built simply to be seen.., but to permit an
internal, articulated and detailed control[;] .. architecture... operate[s] to
336. JEREMY BENTHAM, PANOPTICON; OR, THE INSPECTION HOUSE, at i (London, T. Payne
1791) [hereinafter BENTHAM, PANOPTICON] (emphasis altered). As these opening words suggest,
Bentham's claim was all about architecture. Bentham's letters were full of technical details, such
as the placement of windows in prisons, JEREMY BENTHAM, PANOPTICON: POSTSCRIPT; PART I,
at 132-37 (London, T. Payne 1791), the width of passages, id. at 110-15, the types of doors and
locks, id. at 107-09, the height of a proper inspection tower and the types of fences necessary, id.
at 116-31, and the different construction materials that should be employed, id. at 138-43.
337. BENTHAM, PANOPTICON, supra note 336, at 3.
338. Id. (stating that since surveillance "during every instant of time" was "impossible," the
next best "thing to be wished for is, that, at every instant ... [a prisoner] should conceive himself
to be" under observation); see also Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of
the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-
Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REv. 291 (1998) (discussing Foucault's
understanding of crime control).
339. FOUCAULT, supra note 333, at 205; see also Hugh Baxter, Bringing Foucault into Law
and Law into Foucault, 48 STAN. L. REv. 449, 456 (1996) (reviewing ALAN HUNT & GARY
WICKHAM, TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGY OF LAW As GOVERNANCE (1994)). For Foucault, in the
Panopticon,
it does not matter who exercises power. Any individual, taken almost at random, can
operate the machine.... Similarly, it does not matter what motive animates him: the
curiosity of the indiscreet, the malice of a child, the thirst for knowledge of a
philosopher.... The more numerous those anonymous and temporary observers are,
the greater the risk for the inmate of being surprised and the greater his anxious
awareness of being observed.
FOUCAULT, supra note 333, at 202.
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transform individuals." 3 "Stones," for Foucault, "can make people docile
and knowable." 
3 a4
Foucault's keen observations on the power of architecture to extend the
sphere of social control do not require abandoning the project of crime
control through architecture. After all, architecture, regulated or not, will
inevitably shape us in various ways. The safest form of architecture can be
that which is publicly regulated and justified. Private architectural
developments shape and modify behavior, too, and may do so on a more
invidious scale than public ones.- 2 (This mirrors a criticism I have made
elsewhere about Lawrence Lessig's views on the use of code in regulating
cyberspace.)143 The government labors under special constraints when it
acts; it is subject to information disclosure laws (such as the Freedom of
Information Act), and it is publicly accountable for its decisions in ways
that private actors are not. Public manipulation of architecture can be more
responsible and far more transparent than private decisionmaking.?
Indeed, if government used its power to alter physical environments, it
might reduce the impulse of private bodies to do so.
Picking up again on the global response, another reason why Foucault's
analysis should not counsel abandoning architectural solutions is that it
equally-if not even more forcefully-indicts the alternative to
architecture: conventional law enforcement. 5 The public already acts as an
arm of the state and has been assisting law enforcement for most of this
country's existence. Consider, for instance, that over three-fourths of all
arrests are due to reports by bystanders or victims.' 6 As we have seen,
340. FOUCAULT, supra note 333, at 172.
341. Id. The Panopticon "could be used as a machine to carry out experiments, to alter
behaviour, to train or correct individuals." Id at 203.
342. See Daniel B. Kennedy, Facility Site Selection and Analysis Through Environmental
Criminology, 18 J. CRIM. JUST. 239, 249 (1990) (observing that private industry is currently using
architectural strategies to prevent crime). Likewise, governments that do not have open access to
information pose special dangers when they employ architecture to shape behavior. For example,
the former Soviet Union used architecture self-consciously to try to change attitudes. See
ANATOLE KopP, CONSTRUCTIVIST ARCHITECTURE IN THE USSR 7, 31-37, 144-50 (1985).
343. Katyal, supra note 3, at 1103-06. This rejoinder does not fully resolve the problem,
however, because some strategies discussed in Part II spur autonomous private architecture.
344. See, e.g., David H. Bayley & Clifford D. Shearing, The Future of Policing, 30 LAW &
SOCY REV. 585, 596 (1996) (observing that private security is not accountable to "all the people
who might be affected by it"); Clifford D. Shearing & Philip C. Stenning, Private Security:
Implications for Social Control, 30 SOC. PROBS. 493, 497-98, 504 (1983) (discussing problems
with private social control).
345. Many followers of Foucault have similarly argued that law enforcement is a system of
private and public social control. E.g., WILLIAM G. STAPLES, EVERYDAY SURVEILLANCE (2000).
346. See Shotland & Goodstein, supra note 37, at 9. The first formal police department was
not created until 1837 in Boston, and in the early nineteenth century it was neighborhoods that had
the responsibility for reporting crimes to the town marshal. Other evidence suggests that private
social control is now embedded. See Clifford D. Shearing & Philip C. Stenning, From the
Panopticon to Disney World: The Development of Discipline, in PERSPECTIVES IN CRIMINAL
LAW 335, 346-48 (Anthony N. Doob & Edward L. Greenspan eds., 1985).
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careful attention to design can enable more private control of public spaces.
Governments can reduce the presence of police officers-a presence that is
more coercive than the presence of architecture-as the ability of
communities to self-protect increases.
This analysis will not persuade everyone. For many, crime prevention
is simply not an important enough goal to justify greater government
interference. Again, my aim is not so much to persuade such individuals
that they should rethink their tolerance of crime as it is to suggest that the
study of architecture can inform their understanding of the relevant policy
decisions. Government is already making choices about crime through
architecture when it builds housing projects, government offices, schools,
embassies, and other buildings. Whether these choices by the government
are conscious or not, there is much to be gained from public debate about
them. Underlying this claim is a deeper point: Just as critical scholars have
exposed how government inaction through law is itself a form of action, so
too the government's decision to forgo using crime prevention strategies is
a form of social control. It has meant, for example, that more affluent
communities have been able to secure protection for their bodies and
property while others have not. It is possible that government choices are
causing a certain amount of crime via displacement to poorer communities.
So even though architectural strategies have not formally been embraced
everywhere, as long as they are embraced somewhere, their use may
"regulate" faraway spaces. In this sense, the choice is not whether to
embrace architecture, but how.
C. Geographic Substitution
A potential problem with architectural solutions to crime is that they
may create geographic substitution; that is, offenses may simply be
displaced to those locations with less architectural protections. If so,
architecture is not necessarily reducing crime, it is shifting it. Of course,
displacement may be a reason for government regulation of architecture
when regulation achieves greater spatial uniformity of architectural
precautions. Uniformity is one rationale for increased law enforcement in
poorer areas, too, and standard policing runs similar risks of
displacement.347 There are also other reasons why displacement does not
require abandoning the project of reducing crime through architecture.
347. For example, a RAND study showed that when New York City increased the presence
of police by forty percent in one precinct, it reduced street crimes in that precinct, but crimes in
adjacent precincts increased. S. JAMES PRESS, SOME EFFECTS OF AN INCREASE IN POLICE
MANPOWER IN THE 20TH PRECINCT OF NEW YORK CITY (197 1); see also BURSIK & GRASMICK,
supra note 81, at 17-18 (discussing studies showing geographic substitution following law
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First, several factors explain why the geographic substitution of crime
as a response to architectural strategies will be only partial.34 Offenders
generally do not travel far. More than thirty percent of burglaries occur
within one half-mile of the offender's home. 9 Distance imposes costs-the
costs of perpetration rise, the risk of getting caught due to unfamiliarity
with the area increases, and the criminal's certainty as to the outcome of the
offense is reduced. For these reasons, some studies have found that target-
hardening measures do not always displace crime; rather, at times they
reduce its overall level.35° Other studies suggest that rather than displacing
crime, architectural protections might actually have geographic halo
effects.35'
Second, if the architectural protection is not apparent from the outside
of a structure, then geographic substitution will be avoided and overall
crime reduced. Many devices, such as steel-reinforced doors, strong
plastics, and the like are not discernible until a criminal has invested some
energy and time.352 These forms of precaution will thus increase expected
perpetration cost and deter offenders without risking substantial
displacement.
Third, displacement is often desirable. Many times an architectural
precaution should be visible to deter offenders from attacking a target.
Granted, these visible designs do run the risk of displacing crime to other
areas, but concentrating crime into areas characterized by poor architectural
enforcement); George F. Rengert, Spatial Justice and Criminal Victimization, 6 JUST. Q. 543, 545
(1989) (same).
348. FOWLER ET AL., supra note 34, at 104 (" [I]f displacement of burglary occurred as part
of the reduction of burglary" due to an architectural design plan in Hartford, Connecticut, "it did
not occur in the most obvious places for it and the pattern was difficult to identify."); Patricia
Allatt, Residential Security: Containment and Displacement of Burglary, 23 How. J. CRIM. JUST.
99, 110 (1984) (presenting an empirical study finding that "while the upgrading of security for an
entire area does have displacement effects there may still be a net saving in crimes committed");
Eck & Weisburd, supra note 305, at 1, 20 ("There is a growing body of evidence that suggests
that displacement is seldom total and often inconsequential or absent.").
349. Van Soomeren, supra note 65, at 10 (detailing studies); see also JEFFERY, supra note 22,
at 190-91, 201 (same).
350. CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH HOUSING DESIGN, supra note 32, at 8; Clarke & Field,
supra note 104, at 88 (reporting that target hardening in Australian banks did not displace crime);
Dickson, supra note 302, at 6 (" [D]isplacement is not occurring to any significant degree. Buying
patterns are not easily reestablished; the infrastructure and support networks take time to
rebuild."); Eck, supra note 105 (suggesting that barriers in Miami Shores, Florida, did not
displace crime elsewhere); Grandjean, supra note 104, at 158 (finding that target hardening of
some banks in Switzerland did not displace crime); Barry Poyner, Situational Crime Prevention in
Two Parking Facilities, 2 SECURITY J. 96, 98-99 (1991) (presenting an empirical study of parking
lot architectural protections, finding that their adoption in some parking garages did not displace
crime to other lots); Spelman, supra note 154, at 483 (finding that boarding up abandoned
buildings did not displace juvenile crime to other locations because the kids "were motivated
primarily by the availability of easy opportunities").
351. See, e.g., Eck & Weisburd, supra note 305, at 1, 20 (summarizing evidence).
352. See Ian Ayres & Steven D. Levitt, Measuring Positive Externalities from Unobservable
Victim Precaution: An Empirical Analysis of Lojack, 113 Q.J. EcON. 43, 44 n.2 (1998).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1134 [Vol. I1 H: 1039
Architecture as Crime Control
design permits law enforcement to focus on fighting crime in those areas.
Diffuse crime can be difficult to fight. Moreover, to the extent that design
techniques have benefits that radiate beyond a single target (neighborhood
street closures are a good example), the resulting increase in autonomous
order enforcement will free up law enforcement to focus on other areas.
Indeed, when one jurisdiction enhances its architectural precautions, it may
upset the equilibrium in other areas, leading those others to adopt
architectural measures as well.
The comparison of law enforcement to architecture highlights a broader
substitution problem. Law enforcement can create substitution effects with
respect to different offenses: If police begin a crackdown on heroin, for
example, that may simply induce individuals to use other drugs for which
penalties are not as strongly enforced. Architecture, however, generally
works as a "wide-band" strategy; by creating visibility, it attempts to deter
several types of crime at once . 53 Natural surveillance, for example, does
not simply constrain burglary, it also reduces assault, rape, murder, battery,
drug sales, public urination, loitering, and other forms of incivility. As a
result of their wide deterrence potential, architectural strategies can
minimize negative substitution effects. But substitution is still possible.
Criminals might, for example, react to architectural protections by
increasing computer crimes. If substitution is widespread, and criminals can
easily shift to new and unpredictable forms of crime, law enforcement
might be preferable to architectural methods because architecture requires
sunk costs that cannot be easily recouped. On the other hand, architecture
precludes a wide variety of crimes, some of which are constant problems
(such as burglary and assault), and can therefore help law enforcement
focus on rapidly evolving challenges.
In sum, using architecture to control crime poses dangers, but law
enforcement and, of course, crime itself have costs. The substitution risks
and the dangers to freedom from the government's manipulation of
architecture must therefore be assessed alongside the corresponding harms
from the government's employment of law enforcement tactics.
D. Suboptimal Architecture
The final problem concerns whether government inducement of
architectural protections might produce the wrong types of design. This
problem takes two different forms. In the first, government regulation can
lead to counterproductive architecture that expresses fear. In the second, the
government's regulation of architecture in the name of crime can become
353. See Katyal, supra note 4, at 2413 (discussing wide-band strategies to minimize
substitution effects).
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so pervasive that it upsets other values served by architecture, such as its
aesthetic appeal. These complications, though difficult, are not intractable.
Begin by accepting the premise of the first. There are good and bad
forms of architectural precaution, and many bad ones may actually increase
the crime rate."' Some methods of government regulation, such as the CIS
and tort lawsuits, may not mandate a particular form of precaution and
thereby run the risk of driving architects to think solely in terms of target
hardening. This risk can be minimized through legal rules that require
attention to other goals besides the protection of targets, such as natural
surveillance. It may also be offset by incorporating specific restrictions on
counterproductive designs in the building and housing codes.
These types of land-use decisions will be made at the local level, based
on the unique characteristics of a given area. As such, localities will strike
different balances on how their regulations are structured. Some regulations
may of course culminate in producing some suboptimal architecture, but so
too does our current reliance on law enforcement: Because governments
concentrate so many resources on law enforcement despite the ability of
police to solve only limited amounts of crime (and to prevent even less),
private actors are currently driven to use suboptimal forms of architectural
protection. And when private actors consider crime prevention in their
building, their efforts often express fear rather than control. By contrast,
when governments employ, on their own lands, other methods of crime
control besides target hardening, they can both inspire private actors and
dampen the private incentive to adopt an architecture driven by fear.
Government regulation of private building can do even more to avoid the
negative externalities created by suboptimal architecture.
A second risk is that by focusing on design, governments will forget
about other goals of architecture, such as its aesthetic appeal. Until now we
have been considering one facet of architecture-its ability to constrain
crime. This facet is only one of the several values architecture serves. The
emphasis on crime can, of course, run the risk of obscuring these other
values. Such a result would stand the moves made in this Article on their
head. To be faithful to architecture, law must first strive to understand these
other values and then incorporate them into a crime prevention strategy
through design.
The Roman Vitruvius expressed the goals of architecture with a simple
formula: "commodity, firmness, delight."355 Much contemporary thinking
354. See supra text accompanying notes 171-172 (discussing how items such as cheap iron
bars on windows can increase fear and reduce natural surveillance).
355. VITRuvius, TEN BOOKS ON ARCHITECTURE 26 (Ingrid D. Rowland trans., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1999) (n.d.) ("All these works should be executed so that they exhibit the principles
of soundness, utility, and attractiveness."). Vitruvius's words are firmitas, utilitas, and venustas,
and were first translated as "firmness, commodity and delight" by Henry Wotten in 1624, and the
formulation has persisted, so much so that the three words are engraved today on the Pritzker
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about architecture has underemphasized one aspect of commodity, namely,
the ability of design to control crime. But firmness and delight are
important values served by architecture, and policy prescriptions that
emphasize only one of these values risk the corruption of architecture.356 So
too, the modern emphasis in architecture schools (and architecture critics)
on "delight" also deserves our resistance; aesthetics are simply one goal of
architecture, not its end. Architecture thus fundamentally differs from other
arts like painting and sculpture; it is always about function.357 It is entirely
appropriate that law regulate function in circumstances where market
failures exist. Indeed, much regulation today-from building codes to
zoning decisions-does exactly this. Sometimes these regulations run afoul
of other values served by architecture, and these moves are to be resisted,
both with respect to crime control and more generally.
When architecture fails to control, or even creates, crime (such as in
circumstances where it expresses fear), it is not serving functionality.
Theorists of architecture throughout history have emphasized that function
is a defining characteristic of architecture, so buildings that do not prevent
crime are failing in a fundamental way. Whether the sentiment is expressed
in terms of Vitruvius's "commodity" or Heidegger's "dwelling," the
control of crime is a critical element of function.
IV. CONCLUSION
Perhaps because crime is about breaking the law, the natural impulse
has been to think about law enforcement as its solution. This Article has
urged reconsideration of this impulse. Reconsideration is particularly
important in light of advances in architecture that reduce the need to rely on
traditional law enforcement. We have not yet broken free of Macaulay's
nineteenth-century English assessment that
medal, architecture's most cherished award. See The Hyatt Foundation, About the Bronze
Medallion, http://www.pritzkerprize.com/medal.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2001). Vitruvius's
statement has served as the basis for understanding architecture throughout modem history.
356. Karl Llewellyn made a similar point about both architecture and law in his playful essay.
See K.N. Llewellyn, On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 224 (1941).
Llewellyn's architectural moves are an implicit criticism of the view expressed by the ascendant
Bauhaus School of architecture and architect Adolph Loos's view of "Ornament as Crime." See
Adolf Loos, Ornament and Crime, in PROGRAMS AND MANIFESTOES ON 20TH-CENTURY
ARCHITECTURE 19 (Ulrich Conrads ed. & Michael Bullock trans., MIT Press 1970) (1964).
357. I am not claiming that function is primary, or that "form ever follows function." Louis
Henri Sullivan, The Tall Office Building Artistically Considered, LIPPINCOr'S MAG., Mar. 1896,
at 403, 408 (making this statement but intending a somewhat different meaning than that now
attributed to him). Rather, each of the three values of Vitruvius explains a part of what
architecture is about, and legal remedies that lead to the exclusion of any one of these values must
be resisted.
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nothing is so ill-made... as the laws.... Our bridges, our canals,
our roads, our modes of communication, fill every stranger with
wonder.... Can there be a stronger contrast than that which exists
between the beauty, the completeness, the speed, the precision with
which every process is performed in our factories, and the
awkwardness, the rudeness, the slowness, the uncertainty of the
apparatus by which offences are punished and rights vindicated?35
The fear of anachronistic law has driven cyberlaw theorists to think in
terms of architectural solutions, not simply law enforcement. In real space,
however, governments have been slow to recognize architectural advances
and have instead chosen to throw dollars at hiring additional police and
locking up more people with longer sentences for increasingly minor
crimes.
This has been an unfortunate choice, for we have seen how architecture
works to constrain crime in several ways. Enforcement of rape laws can
help avoid some stranger rape; but redesign of fire stairs, public spaces, and
exterior lighting can prove far more effective (particularly given the
reluctance of some victims to come forward).359 Community policing may
prevent some windows from being broken, but architects can prevent many
more with unbreakable panes and restricted access to window sills. Parent
education and gun control might deter some crimes at schools, but changing
schools' physical layout to enhance visibility may deter many more.
Stepping up law enforcement patrols might foreclose street crimes and drug
sales somewhat, but more attention to city street design would reduce crime
even further.
The changes to architecture can range from the most fundamental,
involving questions of how tall buildings should be and where they must be
placed, to the most minute, such as whether door frames should face inward
or outward. Some of the most promising solutions concern public lands,
such as streets, parks, and public housing. Government attention in this area
can instruct architects and stimulate private precautions. Crime impact
358. Lord Macaulay, Speech on the Parliamentary Reform Bill, Delivered in the House of
Commons (July 5, 1831), in 1 LORD MACAULAY: SPEECHES AND POEMS 40, 48-49 (Boston,
Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1886).
359. Consider the following e-mail I received from a young lawyer about a prominent
Washington, D.C., law firm:
[Y]ou were supposed to take the (deserted) fire stairs if you were only going one floor
but I always took the elevator (and annoyed people) because the fire stairs presented an
obvious risk of rape. Just another aspect of the macho firm culture-besides locating
the firm in an area where women could not walk safely at night.... I wasn't just
completely paranoid, because the stairs meant that several thieves who entered the
building stole laptops or wallets, and then had an easy escape .... Fear of rape is a
serious problem for women in terms of travelling and even walking around at night,
and architecture makes a huge difference.
E-mail to author (Aug. 4, 2001) (on file with author).
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statements, declaratory judgments, and tort lawsuits can further educate
architects and the public about using architecture to prevent crime. Other
mechanisms, culled from land-use and criminal law, provide additional
tools for the government to harness the power of architecture. Some of
these methods are not easy to adopt and might not be prudent given their
costs, but widespread attention to their drawbacks and benefits can further
the dialogue about crime control.
In the end, architecture enables the other constraints on criminal
activity to work more effectively. First, architecture can make law
enforcement more likely to succeed in its task of catching criminals. Public
areas can be made more visible, enabling witnesses and police to observe
wrongdoing, and can be configured in ways that make escape more
difficult. Second, architecture can modify the social norms of a community.
Design can influence the attitudes and beliefs of individuals about a given
neighborhood, draw into a community law-abiders with a vested interest in
social order, and create conditions conducive to the development of trust
among neighbors. Third, architecture can shape preferences away from
crime, for example, by influencing the psychology of aggression. Fourth,
design can make crime more expensive, thereby creating cost deterrence.
When neighborhoods are planned in ways that make surveillance more
likely, criminals will incur additional expenditures to carry out their crimes,
and such expenditures can deter the criminal act. These constraints on
crime--cost deterrence, legal risks, social norms, and individual tastes-are
not, of course, influenced by architecture alone, but architecture may be
able to alter these variables more easily than the police.
Along the way, this inquiry into architecture yields other interesting
results. The focus on natural surveillance suggests, for example, that rent
control may decrease crime because it will encourage rootedness. It also
generates a new understanding of the expressive function of architecture as
it relates to law, providing a helpful lens through which to view everything
from the Americans with Disabilities Act to gated communities. Finally, it
specifically calls into question the "broken windows" theory of social order
policing that has taken hold of America since Wilson and Kelling published
their famous article.
Employing architecture will not be easy, nor will it be cheap. But law
enforcement is not easy or cheap either. As the costs of design solutions
drop while those of policing rise, we cannot afford to be blind to
architecture any longer. Bricks may not save us, and mortar will not keep us
together, but they can help.
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